Reviewer #2 (Public review):
Summary:
In this study, the authors hypothesize that "causal inferences about illness depend on content-specific semantic representations in the animacy network". They test this hypothesis in an fMRI task, by comparing brain activity elicited by participants' exposure to written situations suggesting a plausible cause of illness with brain activity in linguistically equivalent situations suggesting a plausible cause of mechanical failure or damage and non-causal situations. These contrasts identify PC as the main "culprit" in a whole-brain univariate analysis. Then the question arises of whether the content-specificity has to do with inferences about animates in general, or if there are some distinctions between reasoning about people's bodies versus mental states. To answer this question, the authors localize the mentalizing network and study the relation between brain activity elicited by Illness-Causal > Mech-Causal and Mentalizing > Physical stories. They conclude that inferring about the causes of illness partially differentiates from reasoning about people's states of mind. The authors finally test the alternative yet non-mutually exclusive hypothesis that both types of causal inferences (illness and mechanical) depend on shared neural machinery. Good candidates are language and logic, which justifies the use of a language/logic localizer. No evidence of commonalities across causal inferences versus non-causal situations is found.
Strengths:
(1) This study introduces a useful paradigm and well-designed set of stimuli to test for implicit causal inferences.
(2) Another important methodological advance is the addition of physical stories to the original mentalizing protocol.
(3) With these tools, or a variant of these tools, this study has the potential to pave the way for further investigation of naïve biology and causal inference.
Weaknesses:
(1) This study is missing a big-picture question. It is not clear whether the authors investigate the neural correlates of causal reasoning or of naïve biology. If the former, the choice of an orthogonal task, making causal reasoning implicit, is questionable. If the latter, the choice of mechanical and physical controls can be seen as reductive and problematic.
(2) The rationale for focusing mostly on the precuneus is not clear and this choice could almost be seen as a post-hoc hypothesis.
(3) The choice of an orthogonal 'magic detection' task has three problematic consequences in this study:<br /> (a) It differs in nature from the 'mentalizing' task that consists of evaluating a character's beliefs explicitly from the corresponding story, which complicates the study of the relation between both tasks. While the authors do not compare both tasks directly, it is unclear to what extent this intrinsic difference between implicit versus explicit judgments of people's body versus mental states could influence the results.<br /> (b) The extent to which the failure to find shared neural machinery between both types of inferences (illness and mechanical) can be attributed to the implicit character of the task is not clear.<br /> (c) The introduction of a category of non-interest that contains only 36 trials compared to 38 trials for all four categories of interest creates a design imbalance.
(4) Another imbalance is present in the design of this study: the number of trials per category is not the same in each run of the main task. This imbalance does not seem to be accounted for in the 1st-level GLM and renders a bit problematic the subsequent use of MVPA.
(5) The main claim of the authors, encapsulated by the title of the present manuscript, is not tested directly. While the authors included in their protocol independent localizers for mentalizing, language, and logic, they did not include an independent localizer for "animacy". As such, they cannot provide a within-subject evaluation of their claim, which is entirely based on the presence of a partial overlap in PC (which is also involved in a wide range of tasks) with previous results on animacy.