Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by each State shall have at least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three; Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one; Connecticut five; New York six; New Jersey four; Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one; Maryland six; Virginia ten; North Carolina five; South Carolina five; and Georgia three.

Any curious person, I would think, at some point would say, "Well, wait a minute. 55 people. How could they draft this thing? How do they..." Well, you see it right there. The answer is that every night the annotated stuff was typeset. Remember, it was Philadelphia, which is the city of printers. So, it was typeset overnight. It was printed before breakfast. When they came into their meeting, everybody had a fresh copy that looked like the thing there, but without any handwriting on it. They debated about that. They each had their own copy. They wrote their own notes. Then, towards the end of the day, they'd assemble what was going to happen on the next draft. Isn't that great?

The U.S. social contract establishes a utilitarian basis for protection of intellectual property rights: protection as a means of encouraging innovation.

As intellectual property lacks scarcity, and the protection of it fails the Lockean Proviso, there is no natural right to intellectual property. As such, the justification for intellectual property rights arises from the social con tract, and in the case of the United States, the Constitution.

As such, the conclusion is that intellectual property is not ‘property’ in the Lockean sense. If it were, then intellectual property protections would deserve no mo re policy debate than whether police ought to chase thieves. As it is not, the justification for intel lectual property must be sought in the social contract. As noted above, the social contract for the United State s, the Constitution, specifies in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 that Congress may pass laws “ To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec t ive Writings and Discoveries.” This background clarifies the discussion considerably : • There is no natural law basis for intellectual property rights • Thus, intellectual property rights must be provided for by the social contract. • The U.S. social contract as elucidated in the Constitution specifies a utilitarian basis for intellectual property rights (“to promote the progress... by securing for limited times...")

U.S. intellectual property law originates (as law) from the Constitution: Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution makes copyright and patent law possible (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: POLICY FOR INNOVATION 4   respective Writings and Discoveries”) ,

The U . S . Co nstitution firmly grounds the proper role of intellectual property policy as utilitarian .