5 Matching Annotations
  1. Mar 2024
    1. European governments have thus been pushingfor reduced reliance on China’s Huawei forcritical parts of telecommunication networks inthe shift from 4G to 5G networks.

      The article calls 'a 5g moment' the moment of realisation that dependencies in a tech may erode strategic position, by letting critical infrastructure to be controlled by tech firms that can be influenced by other governments. In the case of 5g it's Huawei and Chinese gov, in the case of cloud it's GAM and US gov. This is not a new notion, it is why the EU digital and data legal framework was created the past 4 yrs, so why this paper now?

    2. Cloudsovereignty requires quality technology, but also trust, security and diversification – threeelements that are not necessarily ensured by the current American offers

      DMA level cloud services in 3rd countries provide reliable technology but do not bring trust, security and diversification at a level needed for cloud sovereignty

  2. Sep 2023
    1. https://web.archive.org/web/20230930153114/https://ia.net/topics/unraveling-the-digital-markets-act

      ia writer and their positive take on the EU DMA from their business perspective. Then again, they actually read the thing which most others don't seem to have done. No mention though of the connection to the DSA, AIR or GDPR who all 4 together mean a lot more than each individually.

  3. Sep 2022
    1. ordoliberalism

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordoliberalism

      strong gov regulatory involvement to ensure competition in markets, preventing the rise of monopolistic/oligopolistic powers that would undermine markets and translate economic power into political power undermining democratic structures.

      ordo after ORDO, a economic/legal academic journal in which ordoliberalism was first theorised. "Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft". Published sice 1948, still yearly editions.

    2. https://web.archive.org/web/20220902092000/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40926-022-00213-4

      Places DMA and general EU competition policy in (German) ordoliberalism. Might be an interesting discussion v-a-v 'stifling innovation' charges from neoliberal BigTech noises. I read DMA as very much focused on level playing field. Needs to be read together with the DSA (and AIR) to better see those contours I suppose. So wondering about if this paper looks at DMA insularly or within the context of the entire EU geopolitical proposition that is currently begin created with the legal framework around digital/data (DMA, DSA, AIR, DGA, DA, GDPR, ODD)