1,216 Matching Annotations
  1. Feb 2014
    1. Property Status Conclusions and Implications Intellectual property is neither ‘scarce,’ nor does the taking of it leave “enough, and as good, left in comm on for others” (the Lockean proviso) (Long, 1995, n. pag.; Locke, 1690, Chap. V, Sect. 27).

      Intellectual property is neither scarce nor leaves enough for the common good. It is not property in the Lockean sense.

  2. Dec 2013
  3. Oct 2013
    1. We may define a good thing as that which ought to be chosen for its own sake; or as that for the sake of which we choose something else; or as that which is sought after by all things, or by all things that have sensation or reason, or which will be sought after by any things that acquire reason; or as that which must be prescribed for a given individual by reason generally, or is prescribed for him by his individual reason, this being his individual good; or as that whose presence brings anything into a satisfactory and self-sufficing condition; or as self-sufficiency; or as what produces, maintains, or entails characteristics of this kind, while preventing and destroying their opposites.

      The definition of a good thing.

  4. Sep 2013
    1. Again, that is good which has been distinguished by the favour of a discerning or virtuous man or woman, as Odysseus was distinguished by Athena, Helen by Theseus, Paris by the goddesses, and Achilles by Homer. And, generally speaking, all things are good which men deliberately choose to do; this will include the things already mentioned, and also whatever may be bad for their enemies or good for their friends, and at the same time practicable. Things are "practicable" in two senses: (1) it is possible to do them, (2) it is easy to do them.

      Good is virtuous, deliberate, practicable.

    2. We may define a good thing as that which ought to be chosen for its own sake; or as that for the sake of which we choose something else; or as that which is sought after by all things, or by all things that have sensation or reason, or which will be sought after by any things that acquire reason; or as that which must be prescribed for a given individual by reason generally, or is prescribed for him by his individual reason, this being his individual good; or as that whose presence brings anything into a satisfactory and self-sufficing condition; or as self-sufficiency; or as what produces, maintains, or entails characteristics of this kind, while preventing and destroying their opposites.
    3. and those in which no worthless man can succeed, for such things bring greater praise:

      Things of value and worth

    4. Good also are the things by which we shall gratify our friends or annoy our enemies;

      Things that are admirable and coveted.

    5. Good, too, are things that are a man's very own, possessed by no one else, exceptional; for this increases the credit of having them.

      Good through virtue of their scarcity.

    6. The acquisition of a greater in place of a lesser good, or of a lesser in place of a greater evil, is also good, [1362b] for in proportion as the greater exceeds the lesser there is acquisition of good or removal of evil.

      Regarding Goodness and Utility: All things being in proportion to greater and lesser Good or Evil.

    1. Comparison of "good" things. Of two "good" things, which is the better? This entails a consideration of degree -- the lore of "less or more."

      "good" by degree

    2. The political speaker will also appeal to the interest of his hearers, and this involves a knowledge of what is good. Definition and analysis of things "good."

      Political appeal to interests. Things "good"

    1. But I do hold that people can become better and worthier if they conceive an ambition to speak well,137 if they become possessed of the desire to be able to persuade their hearers, and, finally, if they set their hearts on seizing their advantage—I do not mean “advantage” in the sense given to that word by the empty-minded, but advantage in the true meaning of that term;138 and that this is so I think I shall presently make clear.
    2. We ought, therefore, to think of the art of discourse just as we think of the other arts, and not to form opposite judgements about similar things, nor show ourselves intolerant toward that power which, of all the faculties which belong to the nature of man, is the source of most of our blessings. For in the other powers which we possess, as I have already said on a former occasion,125 we are in no respect superior to other living creatures; nay, we are inferior to many in swiftness and in strength and in other resources; but, because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and invented arts; and, generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man which the power of speech has not helped us to establish. For this it is which has laid down laws concerning things just and unjust, and things honorable and base; and if it were not for these ordinances we should not be able to live with one another. It is by this also that we confute the bad and extol the good. Through this we educate the ignorant and appraise the wise

      The good of rhetoric, a blessing which enables society and creates possibility

    1. Socrates defines good and evil: just and unjust.

    2. Suppose a man to have been trained in the palestra and to be a skilful boxer,—he in the fulness of his strength goes and strikes his father or mother or one of his familiars or friends; but that is no reason why the trainers or fencing-masters should be held in detestation or banished from the city;—surely not. For they taught their art for a good purpose, to be used against enemies and evil-doers, in self-defence not in aggression, and others have perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use their own strength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither is the art in fault, or bad in itself; I should rather say that those who make a bad use of the art are to blame

      An interesting argument in defense of rhetoric.