43 Matching Annotations
  1. Jan 2023
  2. Nov 2022
  3. Aug 2022
  4. Jun 2022
  5. May 2022
  6. Mar 2022
  7. Feb 2022
  8. May 2021
    1. The NoScript extension for Firefox mitigates CSRF threats by distinguishing trusted from untrusted sites, and removing authentication & payloads from POST requests sent by untrusted sites to trusted ones. The Application Boundary Enforcer module in NoScript also blocks requests sent from internet pages to local sites (e.g. localhost), preventing CSRF attacks on local services (such as uTorrent) or routers.
    2. The Self Destructing Cookies extension for Firefox does not directly protect from CSRF, but can reduce the attack window, by deleting cookies as soon as they are no longer associated with an open tab.
  9. Apr 2021
  10. Feb 2021
  11. Jan 2021
  12. Dec 2020
    1. website developers and extension authors

      Like, for example, Google having a problem with ad-blockers in Google Chrome. This is an example of why monopolies aren't great; Google makes money selling ads but they also control a browser that most people use. There's a conflict here when the users of the browser install extensions that limit Google's ability to show you ads.

  13. Jul 2020
  14. May 2020
    1. 1. Disabling concrete extension update. That's what I wanted! You can do this by editing the extensions manifest json-file on Windows: C:\Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Extensions\<EXTENSION-ID>\<VERSION>\manifest.json (find out the extensions ID by enabling developer mode in the extension settings page) on Ubuntu for Chromium: ${HOME}/.config/chromium/Default/Preferences In this file set "update_url" property to something invalid like "https://localhost" for example. For now according to given url updating of that extension is simply impossible.
    1. Add-ons that are intended for internal or private use, are only accessible to a closed user group, or for distribution testing may not be listed on AMO. Such add-ons may be uploaded for self-distribution instead.
  15. Apr 2020
  16. Mar 2020
  17. Jan 2020
  18. Dec 2019
  19. Nov 2019
  20. Oct 2019
  21. Aug 2017
    1. 6.2 Extension IDs Each extension has an extension ID that follows the browserext:// protocol. For example browserext://MyExtension_c1wakc4j0nefm/options.html browserext://dfcijpibodeoenkablikbkiobbdnkfki/options.html The algorithms that generate these IDs are different for each browser. To access these resources, do not hardcode the ID generated by a particular browser. Instead, use the runtime.getURL() method to convert a relative file name or path to the absolute name or path, which includes the extension ID.

      Vivaldi, as you know, I love your browser and use it primary and multiple times a day, despite it's quirks deviating from Chrome.

      Having said this, can we eliminate the generated file names for extensions, screenshots, and notes?

  22. Aug 2015
    1. When we first set out to identify malicious extensionsour expectation was to find banking trojans and pass-word stealers that duplicated the strategies pioneered byZeus and SpyEye. In practice, the abusive extensionecosystem is drastically different from malicious bina-ries. Monetization hinges on direct or indirect relation-ships with syndicated search partners and ad injection af-filiate programs, some of which earn millions of dollarsfrom infected users [37]. Miscreants derive wealth fromtrafficanduser targetingrather than the computing re-sources or privileged access mediated via the browser. Itmay simply be that the authors of malicious binaries havelittle incentive (or external pressure) to change, leavingextensions to a distinct set of actors. This uncertainty isa strong motivation for exploring the extension ecosys-tem further.

      This is the section that identifies the motives and economics around malicious extensions