- Jan 2023
the illusion of subject object duality 01:21:14 because the moment i think of myself as a self then i think that there's me a subject and then there's my objects there's the i and there's its visual field and they're totally different from one 01:21:26 another and that the basic structure of experience is there's me the subject who's always a subject and never an object and then all of those objects and i take that to be primordially given to 01:21:39 be the way experience just is instead of being a construction or superimposition so that's one illusion
!- self illusion : creates illusion of duality - as soon as a self is imputed, that is metaphorically Wittgenstein's eye that stands in opposition to the visual field, the object - hence, existence of the imputed self imputes opposing objects
now i want to talk about that serpent and really focus um firmly on what the 01:18:05 self illusion is this will be the last part of this little section that self is supposed to be something that stands outside of the world not something embedded in the world 01:18:17 it's the wittgenstein um the austrian philosopher of the first half of the 20th century um expressed this beautifully in his book the trektatus he said that the self stands to the world 01:18:30 like the eye stands to the visual field we don't see the eye but the fact that we have a visual field lets us know that there is an eye behind it but not in the field 01:18:42 the self he said is just like that we see a world we experience a world we act on a world and that tells us that there has to be a subject that stands outside of that world and experiences it just like the 01:18:56 eye stands outside of the visual field that's one of the worst things about the self-illusion is the illusion that we're not even in the world that we're totally transcendent to it that's really weird right i mean when you realize that 01:19:09 that's what you believe in your gut um that is it's like the eye and the visual field um that the self is continuous it doesn't stop as hume said talking about descartes 01:19:22 that it's always present to us that it's conscious it's the thing that's aware of everything else that it's free from causation that we can act freely on our motives without being caused so when you go to the 01:19:34 notary public to have a document notarized and she asks you those beautiful questions is this your free act and deed and if you said no i'm being caused to 01:19:46 do this she wouldn't notarize it would you so you say yes this is my free act indeed and i always just have my fingers crossed behind my back i don't believe in free acts and deeds but 01:19:59 we do take have this ideology about ourselves that we're with our free actions aren't cause we just do them as can't put it spontaneously that we are independent not 01:20:11 interdependent that when your mom tells you you've got to learn to stand on your own two feet that somehow that makes sense that ourselves can stand on our own two feet as independent objects 01:20:24 and mostly the self is what i am i am not my body my body is constantly changing my body was once young and fast now it's old and has a new knee um i'm 01:20:36 not my mind my mind was once sharp now it's dulled and beaten into submission by years of overwork but that i the jay who was once young is still here in this old man's body 01:20:49 so when we think about that self-illusion the self-illusion is partly bad because it's only a root illusion that leads to a whole cascade 01:21:01 of terrible illusions so now i want to really dump on the self-illusion by showing you just how dangerous it is
!- Wittgenstein : Self-illusion - Wittgenstein also elucidated the power of the self-illusion - self is interpreted as something that stands outside of the world, not embedded in it - In his work "Tractacus Logico-Philosophicus", Wittgenstein used the metaphor of the eye that stands apart from the visual field to compare to the self concept - We have the compelling illusion that we as subject, like the eye, transcend the world - We perceive that this "self" is without cause, we are independent, not INTERDEPENDENT
- Oct 2022
this is not to say that our inner life has some kind of a second grade um existence conventional reality is not 00:25:14 second level reality um because as the guardian and chandra kirti also emphasized we must remember that conventional reality dependent 00:25:26 origination is exactly the same as emptiness which is ultimate reality the only kind of reality anything that we ever encounter is going to have is conventional reality so when i'm talking 00:25:38 here about cognitive illusion i'm not arguing that the existence of our interstates um is illusory i'm arguing that the illusion is that we have immediate access to them as they are and 00:25:51 that their mode of existence um is um intrinsic existence so this allows us to understand the majority analysis of the most fundamental cognitive illusion 00:26:04 of all the illusion of the immediacy of our knowledge of our own minds and the givenness of our own interstates and processes our direct knowledge of them as the kinds of things they are independent of 00:26:18 any concepts that's the illusion that wittgenstein quine and sellers each in there worked so hard in the 20th century to diagnose and to cure but we can put this just as easily and maybe more 00:26:31 easily in the terms of second century indian madhyamaka the fundamental cognitive illusion is to take our mental states to exist intrinsically rather than conventionally and to take our knowledge of them to be 00:26:45 immediate independent of conventions this illusion is pervasive it is instinctive and it is profoundly self-alienating because it obscures the deeply conventional character of our own 00:26:57 existence and of our self-knowledge and this illusion is what according to buddhist philosophers lies at the root of our grasping of our attraction and diversion and hence at the root of the 00:27:09 pervasive suffering of existence
This fundamental illusion of immediacy lay at the root of our ignorance in the world. We mistaken our mental states to exist intrinsically instead of conventionally. We don't think they depend on language, but they do, in a very deep way.
From a Deep Humanity perspective, even our instantly arisen mental states are part of the symbolosphere..mediated by the years of language conditioning of our culture.
!- critical insight of : Buddhist philosophy - we take our mental states to exist intrinsically rather than conventionally - this illusion is pervasive, instinctive and profoundly self-alienating and lay at the root of all suffering Our language symbols are our model through which we interpret reality. We inhabit the symbolosphere but we mistaken it for intrinsic reality.
- Aug 2022
Wittgenstein makes a similar observation, pointing out that “the aspects ofthings that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity andfamiliarity (one is unable to notice something – because it is always beforeone’s eyes).” 3
Lader756 · 1 day agoFascinating. Thanks for sharing.Given this post may attract others interested in Zettelkasten workflow by esteemed authors, I'll take the opportunity to ask: does anyone know of a description of Wittgenstein's?
I've got a few slips/references to Wittgenstein's practice available here: https://hypothes.is/users/chrisaldrich?q=Wittgenstein
- Jul 2022
Famously, Luswig Wittgenstein organized his thoughts this way. Also famously, he never completed his 'big book' - almost all of his books (On Certainty, Philosophical Investigations, Zettel, etc.) were compiled by his students in the years after his death.
I've not looked directly at Wittgenstein's note collection before, but it could be an interesting historical example.
Might be worth collecting examples of what has happened to note collections after author's lives. Some obviously have been influential in scholarship, but generally they're subsumed by the broader category of a person's "papers" which are often archived at libraries, museums, and other institutions.
Examples: - Vincentius Placcius' collection used by his students - Niklas Luhmann's zettelkasten which is being heavily studied by Johannes F.K. Schmidt - Mortimer J. Adler - was his kept? where is it stored?
Posthumously published note card collections - Ludwig Wittgenstein - Walter Benjamin's Arcades Project - Ronald Reagan's collection at his presidential library, though it is more of an commonplace book collection of quotes which was later published - Roland Barthes' Mourning Diary - Vladimir Nabokov's The Original of Laura - others...
Just as note collections serve an autobiographical function, perhaps they may also serve as an intellectual autobiographical function? Wittgenstein never managed to complete his 'big book', but in some sense, doesn't his collection of note cards serve this function for those willing to explore it all?
I'd previously suggested that Scott P. Scheper publish not only his book on note taking, but to actually publish his note cards as a stand-alone zettelkasten example to go with them. What if this sort of publishing practice were more commonplace? The modern day equivalent is more likely a person's blog or their wiki. Not enough people are publicly publishing their notes to see what this practice might look like for future generations.
- note taking
- posthumous notes
- Vincentius Placcius
- card index as autobiography
- Ludwig Wittgenstein
- Walter Benjamin
- published zettelkasten
- Niklas Luhmann's zettelkasten
- Johannes F.K. Schmidt
- Scott P. Scheper
- posthumous publication
- Apr 2022
Such radical compositional approaches arecontemporaneous with the Surrealist use of montage, but predateBurrough’s cut-up-fold-in technique, and ‘put[...] the avant-gardeclaims of hyperfiction to shame’ (Krapp, 2006: 362).
The compositional approaches mentioned here are those of Wittgenstein and Walter Benjamin.
What was Burrough's cut-up-fold-in technique?
Wittgenstein from his ‘Zettel’, a box containing over 700 textfragments (or ‘scraps’) and other loose pages (Krapp, 2006: 362).
Ludwig Wittgenstein had a box, which he apparently called his 'Zettel' in which he kept over 700 text fragments or scraps and other loose pages.
Double check this reference for a translation error from German as Zettel is the 'slip' and kasten is the 'box', 'crate', or 'container'.
In the caseof Wittgenstein, he worked with typescripts and would often cut upthe typed text into fragments so he could rearrange the order of theremarks jotted on them (Krapp, 2006: 362; von Wright, 1969).
Wittgenstein worked with typescripts which he would often cut up into fragments so that he could reorder them for his particular needs. He had an unpublished work titled The Big Typescript of 768 pages which he created in this manner.
Link this to: - Kevin Marks' media fragments and fragmentions work - blackout poetry - mid 1900s newspaper publishing workflows
In a remarkable essay on precursors to hypertext, Peter Krapp(2006) provides a useful overview of the development of the indexcard and its use by various thinkers, including Locke, Leibniz, Hegel,and Wittgenstein, as well as by those known to Barthes and part of asimilar intellectual milieu, including Michel Leiris, Georges Perec,and Claude Lévi-Strauss (Krapp, 2006: 360-362; Sieburth, 2005).1
Peter Krapp created a list of thinkers including Locke, Leibniz, Hegel, Wittgenstein, Barthes, Michel Leiris, Georges Perec, and Lévi-Strauss who used index cards in his essay Hypertext Avant La Lettre on the precursors of hypertext.
see also: Krapp, P. (2006) ‘Hypertext Avant La Lettre’, in W. H. K. Chun & T. Keenan (eds), New Media, Old Theory: A History and Theory Reader. New York: Routledge: 359-373.
Notice that Krapp was the translator of Paper Machines About Cards & Catalogs, 1548 – 1929 (MIT Press, 2011) by Marcus Krajewski. Which was writing about hypertext and index cards first? Or did they simply influence each other?
- Marcus Krajewski
- Peter Krapp
- paper machines
- Claude Lévi-Strauss
- Ludwig Wittgenstein
- Georg Hegel
- Walter Benjamin
- index cards
- Michel Leiris
- Georges Perec
- Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz
- Roland Barthes
- cut-up-fold-in technique
- Feb 2022
you can't see the beetle in my box nor I the one in yours ludwig wittgenstein use the beetle in the Box analogy to suggest that the meaning of sensation words such as pain isn't given 00:01:10 by referring to some private inner introspected something a sensation to which you alone have access in his view there can't be more to the public meaning of our language than we are capable of teaching each other and the 00:01:23 private something the beetle can't have a role in that teaching because we can't get at
The duality of self and other is the peculiar symmetrical asymmetry of being human, and possibly of being life itself.
Similarity and differences in the meaning of words between individuals is unavoidable because we all seem to share this quality of consciousness, as well as the quality of experiencing others as objects of our consciousness.
Nature instills the quality of "unique conscious experience" to each of us. Biological replication is the basis for the repetition of this pattern in all members of our species.
Why was I drawn to the content of this youtube, which came from this article interviewing Teodora Petkova: https://medium.com/content-conversations/a-semantic-text-strategy-conversation-teodora-petkova-fa6d8ad7c72f Through this youtube and through the interview with Teodora Petkova, I became aware of Ludwig Wittgenstein's beetle-in-a-box analogy for private thoughts.A meme is reproduced and shared over and over, drawing people who resonate with it.
Hence, my own discovery of this idea demonstrates the mechanics of self and other consciosness. In any rendition of the present, my semantic state has been influenced by countless number of other writers, content developers or consciousnesses, echoing Husserl's Lebenswelt. Once we are bootstrapped into language through a long gestation period of child development, we simply grow our vocabulary of words, and continuously upgrade their individual meaning through the unique experiences of our unique lifeworlds.
This symmetrical asymmetry is a distinct and unique property of the individual human, showing just how entangled the individual is with the collective, the self with the other.
It is said that the most obvious is at the same time the most difficult to see. The metaphor "a fish does not know of the water that surrounds it" is apt. Our symmetrical asymmetry of experience is so universal that its salience and peculiarity is easily overlooked and not explicitly discussed except by the philosophically inclined. It is more often subconsciously felt than made into an explicit subject of discourse. It is recognized as obvious and coming with the territory of being human.
Indeed, we might say that this common peculiarity of the private, subjective world is paradoxically one of the strangest and yet one of the most common at the same time. Its obviousness does not lessen its profound sense of magic.
The fact that we live in these two kinds of worlds, the private inner and the public outer, and that these terms "private inner" and "public outer" are themselves abstractions, also explains how our participation in collective reality may often not live up to expectations.
For example, in a time when the world needs to undergo a monumental whole system change, it is a challenge to mobilize sufficient number of people to drive the needed change. Part of the reason for this could be that the individual pole, the salience of the "private, inner" pole could prioritize it above even such collective action. The ideas and feelings in our own life as an individual, driven by our private inner lives may dominate our individual actions. Getting on with life often supersedes even threats to society.
- Jul 2020
Notion of reading and re-reading for "linguistic inroads," cross sections, and divergences - language captures the amorphousness of existence. It is not bounded, its referents are not bounded, it is a moving, elastic, restless thing.
Words are not simple tools to be applied and used.
To try to use words in life as uniform instruments with preconceived uses would be to use a jackhammer to repair a swiss watch.
To repair a spider-web with one's fingers.
Denial of atomistic picture of linguistic meaning. Real words, live words, don't work as singular referents.
TS Eliot - words do not sit still.
- Mar 2017
Any communication between people about the same thing isa common revelatory experience about informational models of that thing.Each model is a conceptual structure of abstractions formulated initially inthe mind of one of the persons who would communicate, and if the conceptsin the mind of one would-be communicator are very different from those inthe mind of another, there is no common model and no communication
cf. Wittgenstein Beetle in a Box
the stone is hard," as if "hard" were something otherwise familiar to us, and not merely a totally subjective stimulation!
Had this come out later, this would work as functional critique of Wittgenstein's Tractatus in which all logical propositions rest on atomic facts. Whereas Neitzche declares the atoms themselves untrue.
- Apr 2016
According to Stemler, consistency estimates of interrater reliability assume that it is not necessary for judges to share a common meaning of the rating scale, so long as each judge is consistent in their classifications.
Wittgenstein's beetle in a box