Reviewer #3 (Public Review):
The central conclusion of this beautiful experimental study is that bumblebees prefer flowers on the basis of their remembered ranking in their context, but are insensitive to their absolute properties. Thus, let's say that there 4 flower types, ranked as follows in nectar concentration: A>B>C>D. However, when the bee learns about these flowers, it does in either of two 'contexts', populated as follows: A & B, or C & D. Thus, the bee experiences that B is the worse option in the context in which it is found, and C is the better one in its own context. If, at a later time, the bee has to make a novel choice, this time between B and C, its memory for ranking leads it to prefer C over B, while its (putative) memory for nectar concentration should favour B over C. The authors find, in a variety of different treatments, evidence for the influence for ranking, but they do not find any evidence for sensitivity to absolute properties (i.e., concentration).
One difficulty that permeates the argument is the ubiquitous difficulty in proving the null hypothesis as true: lack of significant evidence for a putative effect in one or a few experiments, does not mean reliable absence of the effect.
Another difficulty is that in my view memory for absolute properties was not given a full chance: bees were always trained in situations where both dimensions (concentration and ranking) were present. In such situations, they preferentially used ranking. However, to learn ranking between flower types in sequential encounters, they must remember the absolute properties, so that in each encounter they contrast the present flower with the memory for others. Say the bee encounters a type B flower. How does it store its ranking if it doesn't remember the properties of A at all? To take this objection into account and still maintain the claim, it is necessary to say that it remembers the properties of A when in the A & B context, but it erases it from memory when in the context B & C.
Neglecting memory for concentration may be an overshadowing effect. Overshadowing is known in learning studies, and it means that, when more than one cue is paired with an outcome, the most salient between them may reduce learning about the predicting power of the other. In this case, bees may remember and use concentration when trained in contexts where there is only flower type, so that there is no chance of using ranking, and then offered choices between pairs of them. In this case, the bees would not have access to ranking, so that there would be a stronger opportunity for absolute memory to manifest itself.
In experiment 4, during training, they could move between two zones representing the 'contexts', each with 2 flower types, and they were then given choices between the 4 types, rather than just binary choices as previously. In this case, the bees did prefer the top-quality flower type (type A), which is consistent with memory for absolute concentration and with ranking, because A offered the highest concentration of the 4-type context. Why this happened is not clear, but it indicates that the context of choice may be crucial. It is known from other studies that the number of options at the time of choice can be very influential. For instance, in one study, it was shown that starlings appeared to be risk prone when offered a binary choice and risk averse when offered a trinary choice, even if the choices were all intermingled in the same sessions. In any case, this experiment raises doubts as to the claimed insensitivity to memory for nectar concentration. Another possibility is that the separation between contexts in this experiment (a partially avoidable wall) was not extreme as in the previous ones, so that the bees could now establish a ranking among the 4 types because they were all encountered intermingled to an extent.
There is one potential mechanism that may also be discussed. It is known from other species, that state at the time of learning influences subjective value of alternatives. To explain this effect I will exemplify the problem with a non-eusocial consumer. Say that food sources B and C are of equal caloric value. Say, further, that B is encountered when the subject is less food deprived than when it encounters C. Then the hedonic (conditioning) power of B will be lower, because it causes a smaller improvement in fitness (this was Daniel Bernoulli's argument regarding the concept of utility). In animal studies this effect is called State-Dependent Valuation Learning (SDVL). Since in the present experiments the context A & B was richer than the context C & D, the bees would have been in a consequently more favourable state (maybe carrying bigger sugar loads), so that each encounter with B would cause a smaller improvement than each encounter with C. This effect is totally different from remembering the ranking of flower types. The two alternative explanations for preference of C over B (ranking and SDVL) can, fortunately, be confronted because it is possible to change the state of the bees by a common 3rd source that could be used to equate or manipulate the average richness of the contexts.
All the reasons mentioned above should make it clear that this reviewer finds the study of very great interest and much merit, but considers that the conclusion for exclusive impact of ranking on preference should be tempered, or at least defended more strongly against these doubts.