- Sep 2013
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rhetoric.eserver.org rhetoric.eserver.org
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The political speaker will find his powers of persuasion most of all enhanced by a knowledge of the four sorts of government -- democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, and their characteristic customs, institutions, and interests. Definition of the four sorts severally. Ends of each.
Knowledge of government: tenants of political persuasion.
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Comparison of "good" things. Of two "good" things, which is the better? This entails a consideration of degree -- the lore of "less or more."
"good" by degree
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The political speaker will also appeal to the interest of his hearers, and this involves a knowledge of what is good. Definition and analysis of things "good."
Political appeal to interests. Things "good"
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In urging his hearers to take or to avoid a course of action, the political orator must show that he has an eye to their happiness. Four definitions (of a popular kind: as usual in the Rhetoric, and some fourteen constituents, of happiness.
tenants of political oratory
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The subjects of Political Oratory fall under five main heads: (1) ways and means, (2) war and peace, (3) national defence, (4) imports and exports, (5) legislation. The scope of each of these divisions.
5 divisions of political oratory
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There are three kinds of rhetoric: A. political (deliberative), B. forensic (legal), and C. epideictic (the ceremonial oratory of display).
divisions, or three kinds of rhetoric
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The persuasive arguments are (a) the example, corresponding to induction in dialectic; (b) the enthymeme, corresponding to the syllogism; (c) the apparent enthymeme, corresponding to the apparent syllogism.
divisions of persuasive agrument
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Hence rhetoric may be regarded as an offshoot of dialectic, and also of ethical (or political) studies.
of philosophical and of ethical or political studies
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(3) his power of proving a truth, or an apparent truth, by means of persuasive arguments (logos ).
mehtod of logos
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(2) his power of stirring the emotions of his hearers (pathos )
method of pathos
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(1) the speaker's power of evincing a personal character which will make his speech credible (ethos );
defining method of ethos
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Definition of rhetoric as "the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion." Of the modes of persuasion some belong strictly to the art of rhetoric and some do not.
further distinctions and definition
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The writers of current text- books on rhetoric give too much attention to the forensic branch (in which chicanery is easier)
More written about the methods of persuasion by trickery
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The argumentative modes of persuasion are the essence of the art of rhetoric: appeals to the emotions warp the judgement.
Distinguishing legitimate rhetoric from and deceptive.
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It is a subject that can be treated systematically.
Qualifying rhetoric as a legitimate subject.
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Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic
I'm not grasping the distinction. Maybe "persuasion" vs. exploring the truth of an opinion?
But his point, that they go together as proper counterparts.
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Its possible abuse is no argument against its proper use on the side of truth and justice. The honest rhetorician has no separate name to distinguish him from the dishonest.
Stating that by definition, ethical and unethical rhetoric and consequently rhetoricians are one and the same as there are no terms for distinguishing two separate bodies and applications of rhetoric?
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enthymeme
enthymeme |ˈenθəˌmēm| noun Logic an argument in which one premise is not explicitly stated.
Tags
- olitical
- divisions
- ethics
- methods
- knowledge
- proper
- enthymeme
- definition
- good
- chicanery
- politics
- 3860
- dialectic
- syllogism
- epideictic
- definiction
- legitimate
- dinstinction
- political
- ethos
- qualification
- lega
- deliberative
- government
- appeal
- oratory
- logos
- pathos
- forensic
- distinction
- interests
- degrees
- happiness
Annotators
URL
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caseyboyle.net caseyboyle.netGorgias25
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Aeacus does the same; and they both have sceptres, and judge; but Minos alone has a golden sceptre and is seated looking on, as Odysseus in Homer declares that he saw him: 'Holding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.'
"he who has the most toys (gold) makes the rules"
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To this however the many cannot attain; and they blame the strong man because they are ashamed of their own weakness, which they desire to conceal, and hence they say that intemperance is base.
The elitist perspective, which assumes that people rise and fall in positions of power and fortune through some unseen force of nature.
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the law of natural right
the true true, not the copy
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whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker; and in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior.
reference to 'survival of the fittest' philosphy
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When Polus was speaking of the conventionally dishonourable, you assailed him from the point of view of nature; for by the rule of nature,
Accused Socrates of tricking Polus by shifting his position in order to trip him up. Basically saying that he sees through Socrates' game and questioning his character.
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For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth, are appealing now to the popular and vulgar notions of right, which are not natural, but only conventional.
He challenges Socrates on his motives and attempts to belittle him.
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O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and seem to be running riot in the argument.
Retorts that Socrates only argues for the sake of argument.
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Now, I observe that you, with all your cleverness, do not venture to contradict your favourite in any word or opinion of his; but as he changes you change, backwards and forwards.
Setting the stage, he claims the high ground, putting Callicles on the defense.
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for I do not know what my own meaning is as yet
I suspected as much, and yet he confidently presses on laying ground for argument. interesting.
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Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them arts of rhetoric?
it is a fine distinction to classify art and other forms of expression as "arts of rhetoric". "A picture paints a thousand words"
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And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of these arts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used was, that rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious might say, 'And so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric.' But I do not think that you really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than geometry would be so called by you.
"What is Rhetoric?" precisely "what is rhetoric?"
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Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion?
Rhetoric as solely the art of persuasion
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Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way;—is rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same effect? I mean to say—Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that which he teaches or not?
If this is that, then is that also this?
Socrates method of persuasion seems to be to tease out distinguishing elements in such a manner as to expand the view and scope of the proposition. it feels like kind of a psychological exercise. I feel like he is going somewhere with this and that he has used several rhetorical tactics and tricks of persuasion that are about be revealed.
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And here let me assure you that I have your interest in view as well as my own
not arguing for the sake of argument, but clearly in pursuit of truth - the psychology of his approach - his method
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in my admiring mind
a cute turn of phraze
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And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like any other competitive art, not against everybody,—the rhetorician ought not to abuse his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of fence;—because he has powers which are more than a match either for friend or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends.
the ethics of rhetoric, sportsmanship, and conduct
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say rather, if you have a real interest in the argument, or, to repeat my former expression, have any desire to set it on its legs, take back any statement which you please; and in your turn ask and answer, like myself and Gorgias—refute and be refuted:
verbal sparring that made good rhetoricians
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to set it on its legs
to give it ground, in contemporary terms, since our teachers no longer travel and teach door to door in the same way. Yet, "to give it legs" still works for our times.
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the province of rhetoric
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Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?
defining and distinguishing rhetoric and dialogue
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a maker of rhetoricians
wouldn't that make him a sophist?
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exhibit
"exhibit"
what today we call a lecture, or presentation
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Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to excuse his own injustice,
a foretelling of his own, indisputable fate
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The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but not for a feast
The wise man is "a lover not a fighter" or, "call me anything but late for dinner". Early beginnings of contemporary expressions.
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you praised it as if you were answering some one who found fault with it, but you never said what the art was.
presented a defense rather than answering the question.
Tags
- argument
- Gorgias
- conduct
- darwin
- pursuit
- sophist
- legs
- sacrates
- exhibition
- dissmisive
- sidestepping
- sport
- ethos
- retort
- logos
- truetrue
- rhetorician
- persuasion
- distinction
- rhetoric
- socrates
- groundwork
- dialogue
- setup
- 3860
- perspective
- meaning
- truth
- art
- injustice
- verbal_sparring
- challenge
- accusation
- pathos
- fate
- refute
- province
- method
- elitist
- expression
- admiring_mind
- define
Annotators
URL
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caseyboyle.net caseyboyle.net
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Notes
Whose notes are these?
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But in order that I may not appear to be breaking down the pretensions of others while myself making greater claims than are within my powers, I believe that the very arguments by which I myself was convinced will make it clear to others also that these things are true.
Qualifying statement: In other words, speaking from experience rather than conjecture.
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I hold that there does not exist an art of the kind which can implant sobriety and justice in depraved natures
Distinction of "class" - those who can be taught from those who lack sufficient innate moral character? The idea that people are born to either rise or fall.
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When all of these requisites are found together, then the devotees of philosophy will achieve complete success; but according as any one of the things which I have mentioned is lacking, to this extent must their disciples of necessity fall below the mark.
Attempting to establish a standard of formal education, pretense for outlining "Course Objectives" that adhere to a set of institutionalized standards.
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I think all intelligent people will agree with me
appeal to ethos
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More than that, they do not attribute any of this power either to the practical experience or to the native ability of the student, but undertake to transmit the science of discourse as simply as they would teach the letters of the alphabet, not having taken trouble to examine into the nature of each kind of knowledge, but thinking that because of the extravagance of their promises they themselves will command admiration and the teaching of discourse will be held in higher esteem--oblivious of the fact that the arts are made great, not by those who are without scruple in boasting about them, but by those who are able to discover all of the resources which each art affords.
Basically arguing that they are simply bs artists, and teachers of the same.
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But it is not these sophists alone who are open to criticism, but also those who profess to teach political discourse.(11) For the latter have no interest whatever in the truth,(12) but consider that they are masters of an art if they can attract great numbers of students by the smallness of their charges and the magnitude of their professions and get something out of them.
Broadening his dissent and attack to include teachers of political discourse?
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promise to make their disciples all but immortal!
...by claiming the education will insure a prosperous future for the student.
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But what is most ridiculous of all is that they distrust those from whom they are to get this money--they distrust, that is to say, the very men to whom they are about to deliver the science of just dealing--and they require that the fees advanced by their students be entrusted for safe keeping
Second part of argument: I assume this argument stands on the normative that payment of services is due upon receipt and approval of the end product. If one asked for payment before delivery of items or services, it would be seen as an attempt to deceive.
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"Why, if they were to sell any other commodity for so trifling a fraction of its worth they would not deny their folly;
Asserting that if the education were as valuable as they claim, they would charge accordingly, hence the falsity of the claim is evident.
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they attempt to persuade our young men that if they will only study under them they will know what to do in life and through this knowledge will become happy and prosperous
What he means by pretending to know the future?
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But these professors have gone so far in their lack of scruple that they attempt to persuade our young men that if they will only study under them they will know what to do in life and through this knowledge will become happy and prosperous.
His main point, I think, is that the "education" that a sophist professes to impart on the student is a useful commodity and worthy of payment based on the assertion that it will benefit the student in the "future". His tone seems intent on stirring discontent, to raise an emotional response.
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If all who are engaged in the profession of education were willing to state the facts instead of making greater promises than they can possibly fulfill, they would not be in such bad repute with the lay-public.
First part of argument: Challenges the foundation of claim that their "goods" will be of future benefit to the student.
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When, therefore, the layman puts all these things together and observes that the teachers of wisdom and dispensers of happiness are themselves in great want but exact only a small fee from their students, that they are on the watch for contradictions in words(10) but are blind to inconsistencies in deeds,
An appealing to the ethos of the common man, argues that they do not lead by example; knowledge vs. experience. There is no apparent evidence that the "goods" will as claimed produce happiness and prosperity, since the Sophists are essentially vagabonds. Further, claims their own deeds are inscrutable in attempting to secure payment up front, so how can they impart scruples, let alone, truth and wisdom?
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they pretend to have knowledge of the future"
By claiming that the tutoring will ensure prosperous and happy lives for the pupil in the future, but present no evidence in the present to support the claim.
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For it is not to be supposed that men who are honorable and just-dealing with others will be dishonest with the very preceptors who have made them what they are.
Asserting that requiring payment be held in advance is unethical.
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caseyboyle.net caseyboyle.net
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Casey, when I click on your username I get the page of "Annotations by user 'caseyboyle' ", but the page is blank. Why is that?
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And I think a person who says these things would be unable to answer if anyone should question him as follows: " Just tell me, did your parents ever do you any good? " He would answer, " Yes, a great deal." " Then you owe them for a great deal of evil if the good is really the same as the bad."
There is some truth to this. The argument makes a good case for the dual-nature of human acts and their ensuing impacts. We live with the dual impacts of all that influenced our developing minds in childhood.
Another branch of the topic/argument might be "intention vs. outcome".
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This is the first step: if you focus your attention, your mind, making progress by this means, will perceive more. (3) Th
This section is instructional, more like a "lesson", and differs from the "Two-fold arguments" in that way - less persuasive and more instructional rhetoric.
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It follows that he will know everything. (5) The reason for this is that he knows the art of all forms of speech, and all forms of speech (have for their subject matter) everything that (exists). (
It is interesting to notice that people tend to infer that someone who speaks well is also knowledgeable on the matters they speak of, though it might not be true at all. These early arguments shine a light on ways our "natural instincts" may have been shaped by developments in rhetoric throughout history.
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Thus my argument is complete, and you have its beginning, middle and end. And I don't say that wisdom and virtue are teachable, but that these proofs do not satisfy me.
It is incredible to think that these arguments had to be made at some time, that the idea of "teaching", and of learning were things to be proved and persuaded, in order to be accepted into main stream culture and developed into standardized teaching institutions.
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I shall go through the individual cases, beginning with eatiing, drinking and sexual pleasures.
logos: organized logically. and, appealing to common place things one can easily identify with: ethos?
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I don't think I understand what we are doing with this reading.
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