The political speaker will find his powers of persuasion most of all enhanced by a knowledge of the four sorts of government -- democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, and their characteristic customs, institutions, and interests. Definition of the four sorts severally. Ends of each.

Comparison of "good" things. Of two "good" things, which is the better? This entails a consideration of degree -- the lore of "less or more."

The political speaker will also appeal to the interest of his hearers, and this involves a knowledge of what is good. Definition and analysis of things "good."

In urging his hearers to take or to avoid a course of action, the political orator must show that he has an eye to their happiness. Four definitions (of a popular kind: as usual in the Rhetoric, and some fourteen constituents, of happiness.

The subjects of Political Oratory fall under five main heads: (1) ways and means, (2) war and peace, (3) national defence, (4) imports and exports, (5) legislation. The scope of each of these divisions.

There are three kinds of rhetoric: A. political (deliberative), B. forensic (legal), and C. epideictic (the ceremonial oratory of display).

The persuasive arguments are (a) the example, corresponding to induction in dialectic; (b) the enthymeme, corresponding to the syllogism; (c) the apparent enthymeme, corresponding to the apparent syllogism.

Hence rhetoric may be regarded as an offshoot of dialectic, and also of ethical (or political) studies.

(3) his power of proving a truth, or an apparent truth, by means of persuasive arguments (logos ).

(2) his power of stirring the emotions of his hearers (pathos )

(1) the speaker's power of evincing a personal character which will make his speech credible (ethos );

Definition of rhetoric as "the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion." Of the modes of persuasion some belong strictly to the art of rhetoric and some do not.

The writers of current text- books on rhetoric give too much attention to the forensic branch (in which chicanery is easier)

The argumentative modes of persuasion are the essence of the art of rhetoric: appeals to the emotions warp the judgement.

It is a subject that can be treated systematically.

Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic

Its possible abuse is no argument against its proper use on the side of truth and justice. The honest rhetorician has no separate name to distinguish him from the dishonest.

enthymeme

Aeacus does the same; and they both have sceptres, and judge; but Minos alone has a golden sceptre and is seated looking on, as Odysseus in Homer declares that he saw him: 'Holding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.'

To this however the many cannot attain; and they blame the strong man because they are ashamed of their own weakness, which they desire to conceal, and hence they say that intemperance is base.

the law of natural right

whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker; and in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior.

When Polus was speaking of the conventionally dishonourable, you assailed him from the point of view of nature; for by the rule of nature,

For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth, are appealing now to the popular and vulgar notions of right, which are not natural, but only conventional.

O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and seem to be running riot in the argument.

Now, I observe that you, with all your cleverness, do not venture to contradict your favourite in any word or opinion of his; but as he changes you change, backwards and forwards.

for I do not know what my own meaning is as yet

Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them arts of rhetoric?

And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of these arts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used was, that rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious might say, 'And so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric.' But I do not think that you really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than geometry would be so called by you.

Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion?

Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way;—is rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same effect? I mean to say—Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that which he teaches or not?

And here let me assure you that I have your interest in view as well as my own

in my admiring mind

And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like any other competitive art, not against everybody,—the rhetorician ought not to abuse his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of fence;—because he has powers which are more than a match either for friend or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends.

say rather, if you have a real interest in the argument, or, to repeat my former expression, have any desire to set it on its legs, take back any statement which you please; and in your turn ask and answer, like myself and Gorgias—refute and be refuted:

to set it on its legs

the province of rhetoric

Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?

a maker of rhetoricians

exhibit

Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to excuse his own injustice,

The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but not for a feast

you praised it as if you were answering some one who found fault with it, but you never said what the art was.

Notes

But in order that I may not appear to be breaking down the pretensions of others while myself making greater claims than are within my powers, I believe that the very arguments by which I myself was convinced will make it clear to others also that these things are true.

I hold that there does not exist an art of the kind which can implant sobriety and justice in depraved natures

When all of these requisites are found together, then the devotees of philosophy will achieve complete success; but according as any one of the things which I have mentioned is lacking, to this extent must their disciples of necessity fall below the mark.

I think all intelligent people will agree with me

More than that, they do not attribute any of this power either to the practical experience or to the native ability of the student, but undertake to transmit the science of discourse as simply as they would teach the letters of the alphabet, not having taken trouble to examine into the nature of each kind of knowledge, but thinking that because of the extravagance of their promises they themselves will command admiration and the teaching of discourse will be held in higher esteem--oblivious of the fact that the arts are made great, not by those who are without scruple in boasting about them, but by those who are able to discover all of the resources which each art affords.

But it is not these sophists alone who are open to criticism, but also those who profess to teach political discourse.(11) For the latter have no interest whatever in the truth,(12) but consider that they are masters of an art if they can attract great numbers of students by the smallness of their charges and the magnitude of their professions and get something out of them.

promise to make their disciples all but immortal!

But what is most ridiculous of all is that they distrust those from whom they are to get this money--they distrust, that is to say, the very men to whom they are about to deliver the science of just dealing--and they require that the fees advanced by their students be entrusted for safe keeping

"Why, if they were to sell any other commodity for so trifling a fraction of its worth they would not deny their folly;

they attempt to persuade our young men that if they will only study under them they will know what to do in life and through this knowledge will become happy and prosperous

But these professors have gone so far in their lack of scruple that they attempt to persuade our young men that if they will only study under them they will know what to do in life and through this knowledge will become happy and prosperous.

If all who are engaged in the profession of education were willing to state the facts instead of making greater promises than they can possibly fulfill, they would not be in such bad repute with the lay-public.

When, therefore, the layman puts all these things together and observes that the teachers of wisdom and dispensers of happiness are themselves in great want but exact only a small fee from their students, that they are on the watch for contradictions in words(10) but are blind to inconsistencies in deeds,

they pretend to have knowledge of the future"

For it is not to be supposed that men who are honorable and just-dealing with others will be dishonest with the very preceptors who have made them what they are.

And I think a person who says these things would be unable to answer if anyone should question him as follows: " Just tell me, did your parents ever do you any good? " He would answer, " Yes, a great deal." " Then you owe them for a great deal of evil if the good is really the same as the bad."

This is the first step: if you focus your attention, your mind, making progress by this means, will perceive more. (3) Th

It follows that he will know everything. (5) The reason for this is that he knows the art of all forms of speech, and all forms of speech (have for their subject matter) everything that (exists). (

Thus my argument is complete, and you have its beginning, middle and end. And I don't say that wisdom and virtue are teachable, but that these proofs do not satisfy me.

I shall go through the individual cases, beginning with eatiing, drinking and sexual pleasures.