ownership in educational systems

I could have easily chosen a different prepositional phrase. "Convivial Tools in an Age of Big Data.” Or “Convivial Tools in an Age of DRM.” Or “Convivial Tools in an Age of Venture-Funded Education Technology Startups.” Or “Convivial Tools in an Age of Doxxing and Trolls."

Or do we really even own ideas?), and why we would even fuss about ownership might suggest an attachment of monetary value to the shared thing. Or is it really about wanting to get credit? Can we get credit without staking ownership?

Third, there are valid concerns about some aspects of GE agriculture, such as herbicides, monocultures, and patents. But none of these concerns is fundamentally about genetic engineering.

Both of these works, she says, specifically sought a lawsuit from the estate of Margaret Mitchell.

intellectual property?

If we clear a path to the creation of compelling electric vehicles, but then lay intellectual property landmines behind us to inhibit others, we are acting in a manner contrary to that goal.

The innate qualities of intellectual pr operty, however, in combination with INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: POLICY FOR INNOVATION 15   strong economic motivations have led U.S. intellectual property policy to operate according to rights - based, non - utilitarian theory, possibly as a result of lobbying (capture theory).

The U.S. social contract establishes a utilitarian basis for protection of intellectual property rights: protection as a means of encouraging innovation.

As intellectual property lacks scarcity, and the protection of it fails the Lockean Proviso, there is no natural right to intellectual property. As such, the justification for intellectual property rights arises from the social con tract, and in the case of the United States, the Constitution.

By contrast, any positive or negative effects that intellectual property rights have on the wider populace are diffused, and any individual member of the wider populace has little motive (and potentially insufficient means) to overco me the significant barriers to active political lobbying. As a result, the intrinsic trend is for intellectual INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: POLICY FOR INNOVATION 11   property holders to actively lobby, largely unopposed, for greater rights protections. (Fisher, 1999, Sect. II. C.)

On one hand, there are infinite ideas, and so the taking of one idea as private property clearly leaves “enough,” and debatably “as good” for others (Locke, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: POLICY FOR INNOVATION 8   1690, Chap. V, Sect. 27).

Here, there is disagreement about whether intellectual property violates the Lockean Proviso.

The Privatization of the Natural State Proponents also invoke Locke’s discussion of the making of private property from the natural state by the joining of one’s efforts to the natural state (Menell, 1999, p. 129). The argument goes that authors (ar tists, inventors, etc.) join their efforts to the natural state of undefined ideas, and through their efforts arrive at an intellectual work; and by that effort, they may make a legitimate claim on that intellectual work as their property (Menell, 1999, p. 129; Locke, 1690, Chap. V, Sect. 26).

This is understatement to be sure, but the debate has been principally between two theories: a utilitarian policy theory, and a rights - based , non - utilitarian property theory (Long, 1995, n.pag.) .

U.S. intellectual property law originates (as law) from the Constitution: Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution makes copyright and patent law possible (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: POLICY FOR INNOVATION 4   respective Writings and Discoveries”) ,

This paper establishes cause to suspect that current intellectual property policy overstep s utilitarian justification, and suggests that a clearer distinction should be drawn between the proper role of U.S. law in intellectual property (that which promotes innovation) and moral questions of creator’s rights.

The U . S . Co nstitution firmly grounds the proper role of intellectual property policy as utilitarian .

Keywords : anticommons, copyright, intellectual property, Lockean Proviso, patent, property rights, state of nature, trademark, utilitarian theory

A LOCKEAN JUSTIFICATION

A universal definition of intellectual property might begin by identifying it as nonphysical property which stems from, is identified as, and whose value is based upon some idea or ideas. Furthermore, there must be some additional element of novelty. Indeed, the object, or res, of intellectual property may be so new that it is unknown to anyone else. The novelty, however, does not have to be absolute. What is important is that at the time of propertization the idea is thought to be generally unknown. The re

At the most practical level, intellectual property is the property created or recognized by the existing legal regimes of copyright, patent, trademark, and trade secret. n17 We also must include property recognized by similar legal regimes. For example, federal law now protect original semiconductor masks. n18 "Gathered information" is another genre of intellectual property. Copyright law protects the particular arrangement of the contents of telephone directories and reference works, n19 while other forms of gathered information may have quasi-property status under International News Service v. Associated Press. n20

Like most subjects, intellectual property has grey zones on the periphery, such as the right to publicity -- whether, in property style, someone can control his public image.

inasmuch as coming to own intellectual property is often tied to being well-educated. If people become increasingly progressive with increasing education, intellectual property confers economic power on men and women of talent who generally tend to reform society, not because they are haphazard Burkian goblins, but because they have well-informed convictions.

ctual property may be a liberal influence on society

The breakthrough patent that produces a Polaroid company is more the exception than the rule. The rule is the modestly successful novelist, the minor [*292] poet, and the university researcher -- all of whom may profit by licensing or selling their creations.

ecause such accumulation is less typical, the realm of intellectual property has less of the laborer/capitalist hierarchy of Marxist theory.

In the final analysis, intellectual property shares much of the origins and orientation of all forms of property. At the same time, however, it is a more neutral institution than other forms of property: its limited scope and duration tend to prevent the very accumulation of wealth that Burke championed.

One cannot call the history of intellectual property a purely proletarian struggle. While ancient Roman laws afforded a form of copyright protection to authors, n14 the rise of Anglo-Saxon copyright was a saga of publishing interests attempting to protect a concentrated market and a central government attempting to apply a subtle form of censorship to the new technology of the printing press.

But this is only part of the truth. Much intellectual property is produced only after considerable financial investment, whether it be in the research laboratory or in the graduate education of the scientist using the facility.

Intellectual property is far more egalitarian. Of limited duration and obtainable by anyone, intellectual property can be seen as a reward, an empowering instrument, for the talented upstarts Burke sought to restrain. Intellectual property is often the propertization of what we call "talent." It tends to shift the balance toward the talented newcomers whom Burke mistrusted

In many quarters, property is viewed as an inherently conservative concept --

WHAT COUNTS AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY?

The Philosophy of Intellectual Property

I n B u r r o w - G i l e s , t h e C o u r t d i s t i l l e d t h e s a m e r e q u i r e m e n t f r o m t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s u s e o f t h e w o r d " a u t h o r s . " T h e C o u r t d e f i n e d " a u t h o r , " i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s e n s e , t o m e a n " h e t o w h o m a n y t h i n g o w e s i t s o r i g i n ; o r i g i n a t o r ; m a k e r . " 1 1 1 U . S . , a t 5 8 ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n m a r k s o m i t t e d ) . A s i n T h e T r a d e - M a r k C a s e s , t h e C o u r t e m p h a s i z e d t h e c r e a t i v e c o m p o n e n t o f o r i g i n a l i t y . I t d e s c r i b e d c o p y r i g h t a s b e i n g l i m i t e d t o " o r i g i n a l i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e a u t h o r , " 1 1 1 U . S . , a t 5 8 , a n d s t r e s s e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f r e q u i r i n g a n a u t h o r w h o a c c u s e s a n o t h e r o f i n f r i n g e m e n t t o p r o v e " t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h o s e f a c t s o f o r i g i n a l i t y , o f i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o d u c t i o n , o f t h o u g h t , a n d c o n c e p t i o n . " I d . , a t 5 9 - 6 0 .