the number one and most important reason why research is meaningful and makes a useful and valuable contribution is theory.

(1) Why is theory so critical and for whom? (2) What does a good theory look like? (3) What does it mean to have too much or too many theories? (4) When don’t we need a theory? (5) How does falsification work with theory? and (6) Is good theory compatible with current publication pressures?

Science must find for every effect a single cause. The historian is rarely faced with the same requirement.Historians have the advantage of being able to live with explanatory ambiguity that would be unacceptable in science.

Science is not described by thefalsification standard, as Popper recognized and argued.4 In fact, deductive falsification isimpossible in nearly every scientific context. In this section, I review two reasons for thisimpossibility.(1) Hypotheses are not models. The relations among hypotheses and different kinds ofmodels are complex. Many models correspond to the same hypothesis, and manyhypotheses correspond to a single model. This makes strict falsification impossible.(2) Measurement matters. Even when we think the data falsify a model, another ob-server will debate our methods and measures. They don’t trust the data. Sometimesthey are right.For both of these reasons, deductive falsification never works. The scientific method cannotbe reduced to a statistical procedure, and so our statistical methods should not pretend.

Popper 1983, Introduction 1982: "We must distinguish two meanings of the expressions falsifiable and falsifiability:"1) Falsifiable as a logical-technical term, in the sense of the demarcation criterion of falsifiability. This purely logical concept — falsifiable in principle, one might say — rests on a logical relation between the theory in question and the class of basic statements (or the potential falsifiers described by them)."2) Falsifiable in the sense that the theory in question can definitively or conclusively or demonstrably be falsified ("demonstrably falsifiable")."I have always stressed that even a theory which is obviously falsifiable in the first sense is never falsifiable in this second sense. (For this reason I have used the expression falsifiable as a rule only in the first, technical sense. In the second sense, I have as a rule spoken not of falsifiability but rather of falsification and of its problems)."

the concern of phenomenology "to explicate its ownfoundation .. requires th¢ self-reflexiveness which characterizes a self·referential theory.

the Tahāfut al-Falāsifa ("Incoherence of the Philosophers") is a landmark in the history of philosophy, as it advances the critique of Aristotelian science developed later in 14th-century Europe.[35]

It is argued that Droysen, not Dilthey, is the true father of the method of historical understanding or Verstehen.

Mechanical and vitalist systems existed concurrently, and although it might seem easy to distinguish them,when we come to look at most specific characters and their thought, the distinctions appear blurred

Aristotle already thought the argument to be deceiving. He ridicules it by saying that according to the same kind of argument a hair, which was subject to an even pulling power from opposing sides, would not break, and that a man, being just as hungry as thirsty, placed in between food and drink, must necessarily remain where he is and starve. To him it was the wrong argument for the right proposition. Absolute propositions concerning the non-existence of things are always in danger of becoming falsified on closer investigation. They contain a kind of subjective aspect: “as far as I know.”

So many people today – and even professional scientists – seem to me like somebody who has seen thousands of trees but has never seen a forest. A knowledge of the historic and philosophical background gives that kind of independence from prejudices of his generation from which most scientists are suffering.

one of the roles of philosophy over the past two and half millennia has been to prepare the ground for the birth and eventual intellectual independence of a number of scientific disciplines. But contra what you seem to think, this hasn’t stopped with the Scientific Revolution, or with the advent of quantum mechanics. Physics became independent with Galileo and Newton (so much so that the latter actually inspired David Hume and Immanuel Kant to do something akin to natural philosophizing in ethics and metaphysics); biology awaited Darwin (whose mentor, William Whewell, was a prominent philosopher, and the guy who coined the term “scientist,” in analogy to artist, of all things); psychology spun out of its philosophical cocoon thanks to William James, as recently (by the standards of the history of philosophy) as the late 19th century. Linguistics followed through a few decades later (ask Chomsky); and cognitive science is still deeply entwined with philosophy of mind (see any book by Daniel Dennett). Do you see a pattern of, ahem, progress there? And the story doesn’t end with the newly gained independence of a given field of empirical research. As soon as physics, biology, psychology, linguistics and cognitive science came into their own, philosophers turned to the analysis (and sometimes even criticism) of those same fields seen from the outside: hence the astounding growth during the last century of so called “philosophies of”: of physics (and, more specifically, even of quantum physics), of biology (particularly of evolutionary biology), of psychology, of language, and of mind.

. I consider that my job, as a philosopher, is to activate the possible, and not to describe the probable, that is, to think situations with and through their unknowns when I can feel them