philosophical perspectives can drive empirical advances that the philosophy actually really matters because the perspective you have makes certain things possible that were never done before.
for - adjacency - saliency of philosophy - to science - Michael Levin
observation - working scientists often ignore philosophy because the philosophical assumptions that guide their research are implicit
for - interview - Youtube - channel: Brain Inspired - Episode: BI 186 Mazviita Chirmuuta: The Brain Abstracted - 2024, Mar - to - book - Brain Abstracted https://hyp.is/Pk3pylG9EfCJA-ent0tk-g/watermark.silverchair.com/book_9780262378628.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAAygwggMkBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggMVMIIDEQIBADCCAwoGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQMix-FIpy8sXHtTbl9AgEQgIIC20RZIlS1yaYHB2ymjcscJUN46IGDRankNDC3fCPGeuff7MJ6ZcjlCyNRQpGDkd5wZ1HO6ekLFmAxDsOGnaz_3SLpDgkqXGRWVLn7Y1cDpcZ3TQV_nQBTX4Fcj3iYzdmqq2kFoxlqaPOts563eydXLxsCIa7S8FbSBhqdvQgCg1lk0QBImp-SyWKLV5scbXV0FaAbRJmJeFCUKfANHsGfnSVzKvDWx77_lTh__SzxgxAqC74SKR4361Fy2I287u5plBQJwOXqbypumMnJIg_wiTzmhit6OLZhfoXMd84w5sYsCl7gnicPcWi48HzbqxD6WQyIjfNJRG2fBxJTMfq5ORFRVB7Cyfj0qhHG_9y0bxlsF9H5xNbRHyBfpttmxiPpikfi5y2j2FSu4PF4qtzQME_wtqJepiy_6cIA8PHX117aCQRHW2o4BJYq1WkERZcQta7-mNR8vDFUwV0dV3wDJazXVVG3sHhxjR1AyI8edOrM_00Og8-HUCtsNuzv_Swks1T3QsYMgwkCSX6u8RIPUbSEbzfcOXLN_KQy23lRf_zmCjRaj9EyxOPul9t0qADWkhwxlnlZ477xtPz7ePqYfCTLId5aMdSYHVBw-aYL874blz4mbgz-BXpjfni0pNpeAePVVQWRC16k6xpDHtyOpVix4nb8-SazTQuQEKRBLQgmmf76Z_oVmAtuG_Cnex0cM8G-GATTlL7hq_v7E0X5UQfnLli1tu7KHI9qY68ymaSKZXHhII5u3rQ6z7XtJxLDsEAEc9LiMRb-pC7ssE_BI6C37_6G1SvZBp0A3FKjIJ57tjM6Oku3mmvoCLDBs7DxoGMPn-EWEwDXBwGQXYOfkVUC66K-qRXp7hG8YCtztv_4CL5HxynskORGznC1y0B0IvBxCVHkWgMuBKgLOPOTzzMZVU32XZVdXy_WdKuw02k6nUhbMvH0TOvKZv1QLWypzMU0HlWuPbGttUX6
three simplifying strategies
for - three simplifying strategies
three simplifying strategies - MATHEMATICS / QUANTIFICATION - counting - When you count a series of objects, there is an underlying assumption of a simplification and abstraction of reality that eliminates all the variability that is present in real systems in nature - This is especially true in biology - To count "objects you are making the assumption that the similarities between them are what matters and you can ignore the differences that are usually there - So in applying the most basic ideas of mathematics, counting, we are already making a big assumption that abstracts away a lot of natural variability - statistics - once again, a lot of variability is simply bypassed - - - REDUCTION - studying a part of a living system in isolation of the living system - in vitro instead of - in vivo - We reduce the number of natural variables by restricting to an artificial lab environment - Processes can work well within the non-natural, highly constrained test environment but the results may not match with the same process in the natural environment when all the natural variability is present - ANALOGIES / METAPHORS
haptic realism
for - haptic realism - definition - Mazviita Chirmuuta - SOURCE - interview - Youtube - channel: Brain Inspired - Episode: BI 186 Mazviita Chirmuuta: The Brain Abstracted - 2024, Mar
definition - haptic realism - Mazviita Chirimuuta - While mainstream scientific realism suggests that if a scientific theory is mature and supported by strong empirical evidence, then that scientific representation can be taken as the literal truth of how things exactly are. - In contrast, haptic realism, as the name "haptic" suggests, holds that the observer (human agent) through human touching / sensing of the aspect of nature studied plays an important role in contributing to the scientific representation. - In other words, the observer cannot simply be ignored and scientific truth has a kind of built-in degree of constructivism and relativism that depends on the perspectival frame of the observer - The many processes that occur when scientists are generating their theories creates simplifying models that strip away the complexities of reality but can be characterized by one perspective view - The scientist is situated and has his/her own unique - Lebenswelt (lifeworld), - perspective - instrumentation - narrative - to the observation and theoretical construction of the measured / observed data - But this is only one of many potential constructions - In this sense, haptic realism considers that the "objective" scientific reality is a partnership between - that which is observed - the modality of observing (instrumentation, techniques) - the linguistic words and constructed narratives using those words
there will be multiple ways that you can strip away complexity that give you different perspectives on that one same Target system
for - quote - on haptic realism - there are multiple ways that you can strip away complexity that give you different perspectives on that one same target system - SOURCE - interview - Youtube - channel: Brain Inspired - Episode: BI 186 Mazviita Chirmuuta: The Brain Abstracted - 2024, Mar
there is no fundamental objectivity because the scientist is always bring bringing um its his or her interests uh and perspective and Tool making and strategies and these in in essence mold their questions into the questions that they can answer because they need to be able to mold them and so there is no objective uh window into reality in that in that case no scientific realism
for - quote - there is no fundamental objectivity because the scientist is always bringing his or her own interests, perspectives, toolmaking and strategies and these in essence mold their questions that they can answer - SOURCE - interview - Youtube - channel: Brain Inspired - Episode: BI 186 Mazviita Chirmuuta: The Brain Abstracted - 2024, Mar
that doesn't mean that science transcends if you like the human standpoint and we see things with a God's eye view if that's what we mean by objective then I would say no it's not objective
for - quote - It doesn't mean that science transcends, if you like the human standpoint and we see things with a God's eye view. If that's what we mean by objective then I would say no, it's not objective - SOURCE - interview - Youtube - channel: Brain Inspired - Episode: BI 186 Mazviita Chirmuuta: The Brain Abstracted - 2024, Mar
A good theory explains, predicts, and delights!
Sutton and Staw (1995) enlist parts of an article that are not theory that are: references, data, list of variables or constructs, diagrams, hypotheses or prediction (p. 372-377):
Sutton, Robert I; Staw, Barry M. (1995). What Theory is Not. Administrative Science Quarterly; Sep 1995; 40, 3; ABI/INFORM Global pg. 371 Retrieved from https://web.mit.edu/curhan/www/docs/Articles/15341_Readings/Doctoral_Resources/Sutton_Staw_What%20theory%20is%20not.pdf
the number one and most important reason why research is meaningful and makes a useful and valuable contribution is theory.
(1) Why is theory so critical and for whom? (2) What does a good theory look like? (3) What does it mean to have too much or too many theories? (4) When don’t we need a theory? (5) How does falsification work with theory? and (6) Is good theory compatible with current publication pressures?
This is six question to understand the state of art of a theory
published article can be cited as below:
Sacha Golob (2019) A New Theory of Stupidity, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 27:4, 562-580, DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2019.1632372
Science must find for every effect a single cause. The historian is rarely faced with the same requirement.Historians have the advantage of being able to live with explanatory ambiguity that would be unacceptable in science.
Science is not described by thefalsification standard, as Popper recognized and argued.4 In fact, deductive falsification isimpossible in nearly every scientific context. In this section, I review two reasons for thisimpossibility.(1) Hypotheses are not models. The relations among hypotheses and different kinds ofmodels are complex. Many models correspond to the same hypothesis, and manyhypotheses correspond to a single model. This makes strict falsification impossible.(2) Measurement matters. Even when we think the data falsify a model, another ob-server will debate our methods and measures. They don’t trust the data. Sometimesthey are right.For both of these reasons, deductive falsification never works. The scientific method cannotbe reduced to a statistical procedure, and so our statistical methods should not pretend.
Seems consistent with how Popper used the terms [[falsification]] and [[falsifiability]] noted here
Popper 1983, Introduction 1982: "We must distinguish two meanings of the expressions falsifiable and falsifiability:"1) Falsifiable as a logical-technical term, in the sense of the demarcation criterion of falsifiability. This purely logical concept — falsifiable in principle, one might say — rests on a logical relation between the theory in question and the class of basic statements (or the potential falsifiers described by them)."2) Falsifiable in the sense that the theory in question can definitively or conclusively or demonstrably be falsified ("demonstrably falsifiable")."I have always stressed that even a theory which is obviously falsifiable in the first sense is never falsifiable in this second sense. (For this reason I have used the expression falsifiable as a rule only in the first, technical sense. In the second sense, I have as a rule spoken not of falsifiability but rather of falsification and of its problems)."
A passage from [[Karl Popper]] about how he distinguishes between [[falsifiability]] and [[falsification]].
Popper's "falsification" seems related to [[Imre Lakatos]]'s notion that a [[research programme]] has a [[hard core]]
of central theses that are deemed irrefutable—or, at least, refutation-resistant—by methodological fiat. (Musgrave & Pigden 2021, SEP article linked below)
Also, what Popper calls "falsifiable"/"falsifiability" is similar to Lakatos's
[[protective belt]] of [[auxiliary hypotheses]] which has to bear the brunt of tests and gets adjusted and re-adjusted, or even completely replaced, to defend the thus-hardened core. (FMSRP: 48)
[[Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes]]
There's seems to be a curious reversal between Popper & Lakatos. The theoretical component for Lakatos (ie, the "hard core") can't be falsified, whereas the theoretical component for Popper (ie, something being "falsifiable in principle") is a
purely logical concept … [that] rests on a logical relation between the theory in question and the class of basic statements (or the potential falsifiers described by them). (Popper 1982, from passage above)
A crucial difference between Lakatos & Popper is that for Lakatos
A research programme can be falsifiable (in some senses) but unscientific and scientific but unfalsifiable. (Musgrave & Pigden 2021, SEP article linked below)
This seems in direct conflict with one of Popper's views that falsifiability can serve as a [[demarcation criterion]] for what is scientific and non-scientific.
Cf. 2.2 of "Imre Lakatos" on SEP
the concern of phenomenology "to explicate its ownfoundation .. requires th¢ self-reflexiveness which characterizes a self·referential theory.
the Tahāfut al-Falāsifa ("Incoherence of the Philosophers") is a landmark in the history of philosophy, as it advances the critique of Aristotelian science developed later in 14th-century Europe.[35]
It is argued that Droysen, not Dilthey, is the true father of the method of historical understanding or Verstehen.
Who is the father of the method of historical understanding?
Mechanical and vitalist systems existed concurrently, and although it might seem easy to distinguish them,when we come to look at most specific characters and their thought, the distinctions appear blurred
Mechanical philosophy and vitalism were popular and co-existed on a non-mutually exclusive spectrum in the seventeenth century.
Mechanical philosophy is a philosophy of nature which arose broadly in the 17th century and sought to explain all natural phenomenon in terms of matter and motion without relying on "action at a distance" or the idea of a cause and effect that occurred without any physical contact or direct motivation.
René Descartes, Pierre Gassendi, and Marin Mersenne all held mechanistic viewpoints.
See also: - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vitalism - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mechanical_philosophy
Link to: - spooky action at a distance (quantum mechanics)
Wu, L., Kittur, A., Youn, H., Milojević, S., Leahey, E., Fiore, S. M., & Ahn, Y. Y. (2021). Metrics and Mechanisms: Measuring the Unmeasurable in the Science of Science. ArXiv:2111.07250 [Physics]. http://arxiv.org/abs/2111.07250
Aristotle already thought the argument to be deceiving. He ridicules it by saying that according to the same kind of argument a hair, which was subject to an even pulling power from opposing sides, would not break, and that a man, being just as hungry as thirsty, placed in between food and drink, must necessarily remain where he is and starve. To him it was the wrong argument for the right proposition. Absolute propositions concerning the non-existence of things are always in danger of becoming falsified on closer investigation. They contain a kind of subjective aspect: “as far as I know.”
Aristotle came up with some solid counter examples against using the principle of sufficient reason and showed how they could be falsified.
What is the flaw in logic that would cause it to fail? Are there situations in which it could be used reliably? Ones in which it can't?
Read the abstract. Sounds generally fascinating not to mention the Stuart Kauffman source.
Robertson, O. M., & Pownall, M. (2020). The Expertise Paradox: Opportunities and Challenges of a Public Psychology Framework [Preprint]. PsyArXiv. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/sfnb9
Smaldino, Paul E., and Cailin O’Connor. ‘Interdisciplinarity Can Aid the Spread of Better Methods Between Scientific Communities’. MetaArXiv, 5 November 2020. https://doi.org/10.31222/osf.io/cm5v3.
Lakens, D. (2019, November 18). The Value of Preregistration for Psychological Science: A Conceptual Analysis. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/jbh4w
Webster, G. D., Mahar, E., & Wongsomboon, V. (2020). American Psychology Is Becoming More International, But Too Slowly: Comment on Thalmayer et al. (2020). https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/wqmer Ame
Shmueli, G. (2010). To Explain or to Predict? Statistical Science, 25(3), 289–310.
So many people today – and even professional scientists – seem to me like somebody who has seen thousands of trees but has never seen a forest. A knowledge of the historic and philosophical background gives that kind of independence from prejudices of his generation from which most scientists are suffering.
a nice way to put it
one of the roles of philosophy over the past two and half millennia has been to prepare the ground for the birth and eventual intellectual independence of a number of scientific disciplines. But contra what you seem to think, this hasn’t stopped with the Scientific Revolution, or with the advent of quantum mechanics. Physics became independent with Galileo and Newton (so much so that the latter actually inspired David Hume and Immanuel Kant to do something akin to natural philosophizing in ethics and metaphysics); biology awaited Darwin (whose mentor, William Whewell, was a prominent philosopher, and the guy who coined the term “scientist,” in analogy to artist, of all things); psychology spun out of its philosophical cocoon thanks to William James, as recently (by the standards of the history of philosophy) as the late 19th century. Linguistics followed through a few decades later (ask Chomsky); and cognitive science is still deeply entwined with philosophy of mind (see any book by Daniel Dennett). Do you see a pattern of, ahem, progress there? And the story doesn’t end with the newly gained independence of a given field of empirical research. As soon as physics, biology, psychology, linguistics and cognitive science came into their own, philosophers turned to the analysis (and sometimes even criticism) of those same fields seen from the outside: hence the astounding growth during the last century of so called “philosophies of”: of physics (and, more specifically, even of quantum physics), of biology (particularly of evolutionary biology), of psychology, of language, and of mind.
Massimo Pigliucci skewering Neil deGrasse Tyson for outright dismissal of philosophy.
. I consider that my job, as a philosopher, is to activate the possible, and not to describe the probable, that is, to think situations with and through their unknowns when I can feel them
The job of a philosopher is to "activate the possible, not describe the probable."