The human--animal - the Darwinian, rather than Hobbesian, social animal endowed with ‘social instincts’ and ‘moral sense’ - is surely the anthropological substratum of the ‘study of certain aspects of the human mind’ that Levi carries out in SQ. However, these verses from canto 26 of Dante’s Inferno seem to contravene such evolutionary--anthropological assumptions, instead claiming the humanist identification of humanity with reason.
This apparent ‘conceptual anomaly’ has led interpreters to diverge, between those who see in this chapter a patent affirmation of Levi’s humanist creed (Farrell, Patruno) and those who remind us that these pages should always be read along with Levi’s naturalistic essays from the 1960s and the 1970s (Benvegnù, Ross), or indeed through the ‘Fascist’ Ulysses of the liceo (Druker). Of course, Levi’s reflection on the human mind is not immune from contradictions or unsolved questions.
However, we might propose that ‘Il canto di Ulisse’ can be read as an expression of Levi’s mindset as a man of science who does not conceive any rift between the so-called ‘two cultures’. Levi can pair Darwin and Dante without perceiving any contradiction; a mutual reinforcement that does not entail the lack of spirit in the former and the lack of matter in the latter. Put simply, for Levi, in certain moments, the Scholastic Dante (or the Catholic Manzoni) could say more about human experience than the materialists Darwin and Lorenz, but this is no escape from our finitude.
SG
