74 Matching Annotations
  1. Aug 2023
    1. Through living relations, the world speaks itself. The world becomes its own language for anyone who wishes to listen. [...] In perceiving we always participate in the world, which thus starts to speak. And through speaking we not only resonate to the world, but we actually transform it.
  2. Jun 2023
    1. In accord with these different cultural emphases Chinese preschoolers develop theory of mind insights in a different sequence than Western children, Both groups of children understand the diversity of desires first. But Chinese children, unlike Western children consistently understand knowledge acquisition before they understand the diversity of beliefs. (Wellman, et al. 2006; Wellman, et al. 2011).

      The varying theories of mind by preschoolers of different cultures, provides further evidence that epistemology plays a major role in learning, and learning differences based on culture. Meyer (2013) makes room for indigenous epistemology to move us beyond Western thought. Giving rise to more understanding on implications of culture on learning.

      Meyer, M. A. (2013, April 1). Holographic epistemology: native common sense. Document - Gale Academic OneFile. https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=googlescholar&id=GALE|A330802620&v=2.1&it=r&sid=AONE&asid=4d695856

  3. Feb 2023
    1. Deutsch’s index and his ‘facts’, then, seemedto his students to embody a moral value in addition to epistemological utility.

      Beyond their epistemological utility do zettelkasten also "embody a moral value"? Jason Lustig argues that they may have in the teaching context of Gotthard Deutsch where the reliance on facts was of extreme importance for historical research.

      Some of this is also seen in Scott Scheper's religious framing of zettelkasten method though here the aim has a different focus.

  4. Nov 2022
  5. Sep 2022
    1. Why%do%I%write?

      I have an experience of my mother that I am trying to express that I know is true. That epistemology is true, but the saying of it is all manner of false, approximate. The doing is all wrong. untrued in the machinists sense, off, useless.

  6. Jun 2022
    1. By the way, that quotation indicates one thing that Mario Bunge thinks knowledge is not: namely, knowledge is not what @ctietze has called the collector's fallacy. If you want to know what Bunge thinks knowledge is, I recommend his Epistemology & Methodology I–III, which are volumes 5–7 of Bunge's 8-volume Treatise on Basic Philosophy (in fact, it's 9 books since the third volume of Epistemology & Methodology is two books: parts I and II). See, e.g., Figure 7.3: "A scientific research cycle", on page 252 of Epistemology & Methodology I, Chapter 7, Part 2: "From intuition to method", and subsequent sections.

      This looks interesting.

  7. Mar 2022
    1. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (born 12 January 1946) is an historian of science who comes from Liechtenstein. He was director of the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin from 1997 to 2014. His focus areas within the history of science are the history and epistemology of the experiment, and further the history of molecular biology and protein biosynthesis.
    1. “See that bird? It’s a brown-throated thrush, but in Germany it’s called a halzenfugel, and in Chinese they call it a chung ling, and even if you know all those names for it, you still know nothing about the bird. You only know something about people: what they call the bird. Now that thrush sings, and teaches its young to fly, and flies so many miles away during the summer across the country, and nobody knows how it finds its way.”
  8. Oct 2021
    1. Conceptual knowledge has a hierarchical structure, with the definition of every concept referring to more fundamental concepts. This leads to the question of where this recursive process ends, i.e. what the most fundamental concepts are. When considering human knowledge as a whole, this is a non-trivial problem in epistemology.

      Also there is a question of self-reference and bootstrapping:

      • If/when a knowledge network is defined by the mutual relation between elements on the same level, instead of the ones at the "bottom". And
      • once you have reached the level of self-referentiality and mutual definition how can you go up
  9. Sep 2021
    1. One complicating issue when trying to make sense across multiple communities is that not only do different communities have different cultures and practices, but also different epistemologies: different languages to describe their community and the soci(et)al context it operates in, with often different meanings attached to the terminologies used.
    2. relational epistemology
  10. Jul 2021
    1. από τις 53 μελέτες που είχαν υποβληθεί από παραγωγούς της γλυφοσάτης στην EFSA μόλις δύο ήταν επιστημονικά αξιόπιστες με βάση τα διεθνή πρότυπα του ΟΟΣΑ. Οι 34 ήταν μη αξιόπιστες ενώ οι υπόλοιπες 17 μερικά αξιόπιστες.

      Πάμε πάλι: η Επιστήμη δεν αποφαίνεται για θετικά συμπεράσματα, αλλα μονο διαψεύδει.

  11. May 2021
    1. Σε ό,τι αφορά τις επιστήμες, το σημείο που ειλικρινά με έπληξε διανοητικά είναι το να ακούω -κυρίως από τους γιατρούς- να μιλούν για «την Επιστήμη», στον ενικό. Καθώς και το να βλέπω τους πολιτικούς να σπεύδουν να υιοθετούν αυτόν τον όρο, για παράδειγμα, να ισχυρίζονται, επειδή τους συμφέρει, «εμείς ακούμε την Επιστήμη».

      Η προσωποποίηση της επιστήμης κρύβει την θρησκευτική πίστη σε αυτή.

    1. Datafication, the authors argued, involves much more than converting symbolic materialinto digital form, for it is datafication, not digitization, that “made [digital] text indexable andthus searchable”

      One could be tempted to assert that digitization is a matter of mediality, while the datafication is a matter of epistemological concern. It is to say that datafication is a particular gnoseological process that not only translate an 'event' from a medium to another, but rather a process of refinement of the event qualities.

  12. Apr 2021
    1. Η δύναμη της επιστημονικής σκέψης δεν είναι οι απόλυτες βεβαιότητες και οι αλήθειες, αλλά η διαχείριση των λαθών και της εγγενούς αβεβαιότητας της ανθρώπινης σκέψης.

      Το έγραψε εξάλλου κι ο Αλ. Κροκίδας, 1 χρόνο πριν.

    2. Οι ανθρωπογενείς παρανοήσεις σχετικά με το «αλάνθαστο» και την «αυθεντία» του επιστημονικού λόγου, που εσφαλμένα συγχέονται με τη μεθοδολογική «αντικειμενικότητα» των επιμέρους επιστημών, ίσως αποδειχτούν τα πιο αποφασιστικά εμπόδια για την επαρκή και λιγότερο επώδυνη αντιμετώπιση της νέας επιδημίας.

      Scientists were not wong because they argued, - it was the people that thought so.

    3. Οταν δεν συμβαίνει αυτό, όταν δηλαδή οι επιστήμονες αθετούν ή, έστω, παραβλέπουν την αναγκαία μεθοδολογική και διαφωτιστική λειτουργία τους, τότε από ερευνητές της πραγματικότητας μετατρέπονται σε «ειδικούς», που αναλαμβάνουν τον ρόλο -αλλά όχι και την ευθύνη- της επίλυσης διάφορων προβλημάτων τα οποία, ενώ σχετίζονται με την επιστημονική τους αρμοδιότητα, ταυτόχρονα την υπερβαίνουν, λόγω των επιπτώσεων που θα έχουν στη ζωή των ανθρώπων οι «λύσεις» που εισηγούνται.

      "Ειδικοι" != Επιστημονες

  13. Mar 2021
  14. Dec 2020
  15. Oct 2020
    1. I may own the truth–with the quicksand waiting to hide me when the words are written.

      Truth is obviously an important theme in a detective novel. Collins lays the metaphor thick here with the quicksand, conjuring imagery of truth lost in the muddy sands. Rosanna also mentions that she "may own" the truth - but is truth not objective fact? It emphasizes the question of perception versus reality and the epistemology of truth. For Rosanna, truth is what she believed to be true, her truth. She died due to the burden of this truth, fully believing in its validity.

  16. Aug 2020
    1. “At exactly which point in the process does the pebble become magic?” says Mark.

      Despite giving off the impression of a stubborn officer, Mark asks good questions

    1. Unlike logicism, probabilism doesn’t require an absolute belief about what the truth of a statement is. However, it does require that any statement actually is either absolutely true or absolutely false. Suppose you want to know if there is any water in the refrigerator. To eliminate uncertainty, you look inside, and there appears to be only an eggplant. Now, is there water in the refrigerator? Well, with probability nearly 1.0, it’s sort of true that there is (in the cells of the eggplant).3 And with probability nearly 1.0, it’s sort of false (you were thirsty and there’s nothing to drink). It’s a rock-bottom principle of the mathematics that the probability of a statement being true and the probability of it being false have to add up to 1.0. (This is a different way of stating the Law of the Excluded Middle.) Here the probabilities of sort-of truth and sort-of falsity add up to nearly 2.0, which is uninterpretable as a probability. The math doesn’t work for sort-of truths.

      This argument strikes me as malformed and perverse.

      Obviously there's a conflation here between two different questions, but I think a deeper error is implied by the fact of the conflation.

      You seem to suppose there is some objective 'literal' sense of the statement "Is there water in the fridge?". Considering you wrote earlier that beliefs are not strings of words (reasonable), it's weird to then use that as a premise to argue against Bayesian Epistemology. Words are a way to locate things in concept space, and epistemology doesn't exist separate from neurology. There are no real agents that make this mistake, because it's more or less based on a type error. A Bayesian Epistemology is de-facto not enough to replicate human cognition, if it was then artificial intelligence would be solved. That doesn't stop it from being pretty powerful in conjunction with the world modeling capabilities of a human brain.

      More to the point: At the moment of posing the question, any sensibly designed agent capable of being in this situation wielding a Bayesian Epistemology knows exactly which of these two questions it is posing when it thinks "Is there water in the fridge?" in its internal monologue. The conflation only exists when an outsider observer tries to impute some literal meaning to a thing that is contextually in a system of meaning extending beyond the words in the sentence.

  17. Jun 2020
  18. Dec 2019
    1. a long time before I learned to distinguish between the operations of my various senses

      The Creature's awakening to consciousness follows John Locke's account of how the mind slowly learns to distjnguish the various senses before it can apprehend the world. CITE LOCKE SOURCE

  19. Nov 2019
    1. A decades-long effort on the right has resulted in a parallel set of institutions meant to encourage tribal epistemology. They mimic the form of mainstream media, think tanks, and the academy, but without the restraint of transpartisan principles. They are designed to advance the interests of the right, to tell stories and produce facts that support the tribe. That is the ultimate goal; the rhetoric and formalisms of critical thinking are retrofit around it.

      I think this is true of the independentist movement in Catalonia

    2. If it only were the right. This is a trend we can see in Catalonia in the independentist movement.

  20. May 2019
  21. Mar 2019
    1. Lettvin, along with the young neuroscientist Patrick Wall, joined McCulloch and Pitts at their new headquarters in Building 20 on Vassar Street. They posted a sign on the door: Experimental Epistemology.
  22. Feb 2019
    1. ew are qualified to give judgment on any work of ar

      This is still humanism, but perhaps a humbler humanism. Descartes still looms large. The objective capital T truth is still out there somewhere, and we can tell that it is perceived because of the universal rules, but the human is fundamentally not the kind of thing that can perfectly perceive objective reality because the organs of internal sensation don't work well enough, or reliably enough.

  23. Jan 2019
    1. healthy skepticismtoward Cartesian doubt

      lol, but for real, what Barad is suggesting really is difficult to do, or at least I'm finding it difficult to do.

      We believe words are more understandable and apprehensible than the physical world. We believe words are more understandable and apprehensible than the physical world. We believe words are more understandable and apprehensible than the physical world. . .

      It seems crazy because our society is so science and tech driven, but she's right. We believe words to be prior (ontologically) to the world around us because they are a part of "us," our own minds.

      Distorting Descartes's famous thought experiment here seems to help me understand this. While I suspect the average person could be pushed into admitting the possibility of an evil demon spinning an elaborate hoax for you, deceiving your physical senses and tricking your brain, I can't imagine finding anyone who would admit the opposite. The opposite would be that the external world exists largely as you perceive it. The demon is not manipulating your experience of the natural world at all. Instead, he is tricking you into believing you exist.

      We're so Cartesian we can't even conceive of it being otherwise. Perhaps Spinoza would help here, as well as other monist ontologies?

      Someone please redeem this annotation I don't even know what is happening anymore.

    1. We know by now that there is no GreenwichMean Time in knowledge production in the posthuman era.

      To say it another way (although, why do that, when she just knocked it out of the park?) by borrowing an analogy from economics, knowledge production is a series of floating baskets, all fluctuating together. There is no firm base that everything is built on, the structure persists by virtue of its relations of its coherent parts, one to another.

    1. For clearly it applies not only to rhetoric, but to all teachmgof tne arts and letters, to everything we call the humanities.

      Why don't we ask this question in STEM? If rhetoric is applicable in every sphere, then surely there must be something worth examining on that level. Could this have to do with the different ways in which we approach epistemology in STEM versus the humanities, or is there something more to this lack of discourse?

    2. o one, or almost no one, fads to beheve 1n climate chan~Je out of sincere ignorance. Ttiey •choose-to d1sbeheve either for material gain or 1ust to be dicks.

      "If people were more aware of x, then they would realize they're wrong about y, and they would do z" is a line that is constantly repeated in my WGST classes, and I always look like an asshole when I argue that that's not how things work.

    3. he would extend this to "science" tout court-does not use value-free lan-guage, that value-free language does not exist, and that we cannot posit a purely transparent language devoid of distracting ornament, through which we transact business with pure facts.

      This reminds me of an article I read in my Feminist Epistemologies class, "The Egg and the Sperm: How Science Has Constructed a Romance Based on Stereotypical Male-Female Roles," which shook me to my core. It argues that science and culture are intertwined and that they influence and reinforce one another. The scientific descriptions of egg, sperm, reproduction, and ovulation she provides to support her argument show how dangerous the perpetuation of the idea of "value-free" and/or unbiased language can be (and is).

    1. The issue of disaster, and phases and social change is an important consid­eration since the "what is a disaster?" debate draws directly upon whether disasters are a "social problem," {e.g., Drabek 1989; Kreps and Drabek 1996), part of a "reconstructionist" approach {e.g., Stallings 1991), or part of social change {e.g., Quarantelli 1987a). I do not see these important aspects of these approaches as contradictory. Interestingly, these three approaches reflect the three main theoretical issues of sociology (see Hinkle 1980): social statics {generally associated with functionalism), social change {generally associated with conflict theory), and social emergence{generally associated with symbolic interactionism).

      Neal raises interesting epistemological questions about the nature of disaster, how it is defined/framed in the research, and the ways of knowing applied to the study.

  24. Sep 2018
    1. For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind’s perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible.

      The theory of the unconscious mind opposes this view

    2. These have so settled a reputation of maxims universally received, that it will no doubt be thought strange if any one should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, that these propositions are so far from having an universal assent, that there are a great part of mankind to whom they are not so much as known.

      Is Locke asserting that Identity is not a universal feature of experience?

    3. Universal consent proves nothing innate. This argument, drawn from universal consent, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shown how men may come to that universal agreement, in the things they do consent in, which I presume may be done.

      Assuming a dichotomy of innate vs acquired, can a truly universal thing be subject to this test? If it is ubiquitous, no space/time where it wasn't so, and there are no instances where it is consciously acquired, is it not functionally innate?

      An example would be the idea of physical orientation, "Left vs Right". They are near-universal aspects of experience that are absent (as far as we can tell) only in some people with neurological disorders.

    1. Education as a practice has placed a much higher value on observation and hands-on experience than on scientific evidence, Seidenberg said. "We have to change the culture of education from one based on beliefs to one based on facts."
  25. Jul 2018
  26. course-computational-literary-analysis.netlify.com course-computational-literary-analysis.netlify.com
    1. I told him exactly what I was permitted to tell, and no more.

      Ezra Jennings is very conscious about what he can and cannot disclose to other characters (and, consequently, to readers of the text). When and why do characters withhold information throughouth The Moonstone? And how does delayed information shape the pacing of the narrative? A comparative word count of chapters and larger sections that involve deferred information can help us to determine whether the act of withholding knowledge extends or curtails narration.

    2. “Facts?” he repeated. “Take a drop more grog, Mr. Franklin, and you’ll get over the weakness of believing in facts! Foul play, sir!” he continued, dropping his voice confidentially. “That is how I read the riddle. Foul play somewhere–and you and I must find it out. Was there nothing else in the tin case, when you put your hand into it?”

      The repetition of the word "facts" in this conversation reanimates the tension between absolute knowledge and shifting suspicions. As an epistolary novel, does The Moonstone present any "facts"? Or is every (alleged) "fact" refracted by memory, sentiment, and linguistic representation? What is the status of evidence (i.e., the stained nightgown) in this scene?

    3. The picture presented of me, by my old friend Betteredge, at the time of my departure from England, is (as I think) a little overdrawn. He has, in his own quaint way, interpreted seriously one of his young mistress’s many satirical references to my foreign education; and has persuaded himself that he actually saw those French, German, and Italian sides to my character, which my lively cousin only professed to discover in jest, and which never had any real existence, except in our good Betteredge’s own brain. But, barring this drawback, I am bound to own that he has stated no more than the truth in representing me as wounded to the heart by Rachel’s treatment, and as leaving England in the first keenness of suffering caused by the bitterest disappointment of my life.

      Although the novel has already suggested that Betteredge is an unreliable narrator, Franklin Blake's explicit refutation of specific points in the First Period account corroborates the faultiness of Betteredge's perspective. Whom should we trust? Maybe a comparative sentiment analysis of Betteredge and Blake's accounts would allow us to test Blake's claim that Betteredge has "overdrawn" his narrative and interpreted passing references too "seriously."

    4. The next thing I have to do, is to present such additional information as I possess on the subject of the Moonstone, or, to speak more correctly, on the subject of the Indian plot to steal the Diamond.

      The language that Bruff uses to preface the case at hand--"to speak more correctly, on the subject of the Indian plot to steal the Diamond"--betrays his preconceived conclusion. Once again, the tension between knowledge and suspicion comes to mind.

    5. witnessed

      As we evaluate the many forms of "evidence" that the novel presents, we should ask ourselves how important or meaningful eyewitness accounts are in relation to testimonies, object clues, hearsay, and characters' inferences. An evidence network would allow us to visualize how information interacts and spreads, and modify our epistemological questions and detective work accordingly.

    6. Mr. Bruff thinks as I think, that the whole story ought, in the interests of truth, to be placed on record in writing–and the sooner the better.

      Betteridge is calling attention to the material (in writing) nature of this account here, as if it were a legal or scientific document. Is this an aspect of his insistence on his story's truth?

    1. Actually, no, it hasn't, no matter what the Bunny's sign says. The scientific method is designed specifically to root out bias and false assumptions, including political ones. Sure, individual scientists can be political, but the scientific method is not. Its ideological agnosticism is why it works so well. In fact, the self-correcting nature of science means it is the best source of secular knowledge that humankind possesses.
  27. May 2018
    1. reflection on unconscious values embedded in computing and the practices that it supports can and should be a core principle of technology design

      Yes but how? What if one doesn't even have the vocabulary and lived experience to identify that value and it's influence?

    2. Values in design is an approach to studying sociotechnical systems from the perspective of values, and starts from the assumption that technology is never neutral

      Ahh so similar to Shannon Vallor's virtue epistemology approach to tech? https://global.oup.com/academic/product/technology-and-the-virtues-9780190498511?cc=in&lang=en&

  28. Sep 2017
    1. Kuhn (1970, p. 167) commented that science education tends to elide the processthrough which knowledge has been constructed, whereas students of other subjectsare exposed to varying interpretations over time. As a result, he suggested, sciencestudents are blind to the history of their subject, seeing it only as unproblematicprogress. The interview data suggest that this is indeed a point of difference betweenthe ‘arts’ and ‘science’ students in this sample. While both of them tend to have adualistic view of science itself, the ‘arts’ students seem to be more at ease with arelativistic view of knowledge in history.

      Kuhn on lack of training science students receive on how knowledge is constructed.

    2. The distinction between hard and soft fieldsrelates to the extent to which knowledge is constructed on the basis of a frameworkof shared assumptions. The pure sciences (hard) typically maintain a degree ofinternal unity over aims, methods of investigation and evaluation criteria, which maycome to be seen as derived from reality itself, rather than constructed by disciplinaryconvention. The humanities and social sciences (soft), in contrast, tend to becharacterized by internal discord, encouraging a view of knowledge as a matter ofinterpretation.

      disciplinary differences in the construction of knowledge

    3. Research suggests that students majoring in hard fields with a high degree ofdisciplinary consensus are more likely to subscribe to beliefs in absolute knowledgethan those majoring in soft fields, and that these beliefs may be encouraged byaspects of the disciplinary context in which they work (Paulsen & Wells, 1998;Schommer-Aikins et al., 2003). Neumann (2001) reviews evidence of disciplinarydifferences in a number of aspects of teaching and learning, noting that soft disci-plines tend to emphasize critical thinking, oral and written expression, and analysisand synthesis of course content, while hard disciplines tend to emphasize skills indealing with facts and figures, with little writing required beyond the exposition ofexperimental results. In a large-scale undergraduate survey Entwistle and Tait(1995) found that students’ learning styles varied between different disciplines in linewith the demands of their course. Students of science and economics, for example,were more likely to use surface strategies, perhaps encouraged by assessmentpatterns that emphasized the reproduction of facts. In contrast, markers in historyand English were likely to penalize a reproducing orientation and a serialist (listing)style (Entwistle & Tait, 1995, p. 96).

      How disciplinary differences affect approach to knowledge and grader expectations.

    4. Such tutor comments suggest that ‘science’ students are less ready to criticallyevaluate source material, a feature that can be related to the tendency already notedin their writing to downplay the role of human interpretation in the construction ofknowledge

      This whole section so agrees with my read on this! What an amazing bit of research to show specifically what the hunch was.

  29. Feb 2017
    1. They are also rooted in the understanding that what we count as knowledge, what we ask questions about, and how we answer those questions are not value-free; people benefit and suffer, differentially based on their positionality, as a result of these decisions.

      ever so important Personal epistemology is an important consideration here as well - particularly captured in "what we count as knowledge" and with personal epistemology are a whole range of political considerations

  30. Jan 2017
    1. Finally, the sophisticated contextual approach circles back around to unite the two previous categories, in a way. From this approach knowledge is seen as created by individuals to serve a purpose. What is true depends on evidence and a given context. There are authorities, but they are not absolute. Knowledge is always changing and you come to know by creating knowledge, collecting the most up-to-date and appropriate evidence.

      contextual personal epistemology defined

    2. In the subjective approach, the individual recognizes that not all knowledge is absolute but takes it to a position that there is no authority, knowledge depends entirely on what works for each individual. In the subjective approach the stance is often “If I believe something, it is true for me. You can believe something different, and that’s true for you.” Knowing comes from personal experience.

      subjective personal epistemology defined

    3. The simplistic and absolute approach is an outlook where knowledge is simple: there is a right and wrong. There is a Truth. Knowledge comes from some official authority, and you come to know when that authority transmits the information to you.

      absolute personal epistemology defined

    4. In talking back to something through annotation are we not inherently questioning some authority, immediately pushing ourselves out of an absolute stance?
    5. conversing with an author

      annotation as "conversing with an author" even when the author is not actively responding to annotations, but when one's annotations are a conversation with the author through their work

    6. you come to know by creating knowledge

      maybe more than anything, annotation is an invitation to actively create knowledge for oneself

  31. Nov 2016
    1. he never deceives himself but when he neglects to return back to nature

      This is a very high view of human nature

  32. Sep 2016
  33. Apr 2016
  34. Sep 2013
    1. those who know

      I want to know how Socrates tells the difference between belief and knowledge. Capital letters Truth and Knowledge seem pretty important to him, but in this statement he's assuming that the ignorant and the knowledgeable are easily distinguished.