as long as you leave banking and credit in   private hands you're going to have banks trading  their product debt and the more debt they create   the more debt service that the borrowers the 99  have to pay the banks in order to obtain a house   00:22:54 or an education or medical care or just to break  even and the more money they pay to the financial   sector the less they have to pay for goods and  services so as the economy polarizes between the 1   and the 99 the economy as a whole shrinks because  more and more of its income is spent not on   production uh and consumption it's spent just on  bit service

China's debt-laden local governments are also facing grim prospects. Declining income from land sales because of the crisis in the real estate sector and falling tax receipts are expected to cause a 6 trillion yuan shortfall, roughly $900 billion, in local government revenues this year. Local government financing vehicles that have borrowed heavily from banks or issued bonds will have great difficulties servicing their debt.

Weak supervision, poor risk management and corruption that likely drove the small rural banks in Henan into insolvency are systemic among the country's nearly 4,000 small and medium-sized banks with nearly $14 trillion assets.

Large banks in China are in trouble as well. They have lent tens of billions to poor countries as part of China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. A significant portion of their credit portfolio is likely to become nonperforming as their borrowers are unable to service the debt due to the global economic downturn.

The prime example of this is the Sri Lankan port of Hambantota. As the story goes, Beijing pushed Sri Lanka into borrowing money from Chinese banks to pay for the project, which had no prospect of commercial success. Onerous terms and feeble revenues eventually pushed Sri Lanka into default, at which point Beijing demanded the port as collateral, forcing the Sri Lankan government to surrender control to a Chinese firm.

Our research shows that Chinese banks are willing to restructure the terms of existing loans and have never actually seized an asset from any country, much less the port of Hambantota.

China’s march outward, like its domestic development, is probing and experimental, a learning process marked by frequent adjustment. After the construction of the port in Hambantota, for example, Chinese firms and banks learned that strongmen fall and that they’d better have strategies for dealing with political risk. They’re now developing these strategies, getting better at discerning business opportunities and withdrawing where they know they can’t win.

After nearly one million Chinese people were unable to access their bank deposits in central China’s Henan province earlier this year, residents in east China’s Shanghai, south China’s Shenzhen, north China’s Dandong, and central-east China’s Jiujiang reported the difficulties they faced when trying to withdraw cash from their bank accounts. Some banks only serve a limited number of customers per day, some banks limit each client’s withdrawal to no more than 1,000 yuan and others have closed their branches. Even the ATM machines are empty. Bank runs have been happening in the world’s second-largest economy for over a week, which is unusual in China because most of the banks are state-run. “The reason why the bank run issue hasn’t been solved is that China’s economic system is in crisis and the Chinese regime doesn’t have the ability to solve it,” Wang He, U.S.-based China affairs commentator, told The Epoch Times. Zheng Yongnian, one of the economic advisors to Chinese president Xi Jinping, published an essay on June 1, in which he pointed out that China’s economy is facing critical challenges, including over half of the foreign investments, have left China, and China’s private businesses are struggling for survival due to a supply chain crisis and lack of cash. Zheng’s essay was removed from China’s internet soon after it was published.

The protest involved more than 100 delayed projects as of July 13, up from 58 projects just one day earlier. The frustrated buyers accuse the developers of misusing sales proceeds and the banks of failing to safeguard their loans.

As far back as the spring of 2007, U.S. banks began to underperform financial institutions in Asia. By now, everyone knows most of the subprime mortgage credit risk was inside the USA with domestic banks more exposed than other banks around the world. Notice above, Goldman Sachs (green above) 5 year CDS (the cost of default protection on the bank), began to meaningfully divergence from Standard Chartered. Standard Chartered PLC is an international banking group operating principally in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The company has far more credit risk exposure to China – Asia than U.S. banks. It is clear above, more than 12 months prior to Lehman´s failure, banks in the USA were dramatically underperforming from a credit risk perspective. In other words, in 2007 – the cost of purchasing credit default protection on Goldman Sachs was far more expensive than the bank´s Asian peers. Indeed, elephants leave footprints – when large hedge funds see credit risk – they start placing bets months if NOT years before a credit event. The credit market sniffed out Lehman´s demise months BEFORE equity investors got the joke.

Fast forward to 2021, Evergrande headlines are all the media rage, especially with the Lehman, the lucky 13th anniversary this week. But, what are credit markets telling us this time? As you can see above – far right. Credit risk is calm on Asia banks with exposure to China, no difference to speak of. Central bank liquidity is so abundant, there is NO way Lehman would have failed today.

Are banks that untrustworthy?

Svenska skattebetalare har räddat bankerna flera gånger och finns där om det kniper igen. Går det dåligt för banken så vet ägarna att skattebetalarna finns där. Staten tar över, rensar upp och sen säljs banken vidare till nya privata ägare som ordnar nya skandaler och riskerar den finansiella stabiliteten.

They have a very simplistic view of the activity being monitored by only distilling it down into only a few dimensions for the rule to interrogate

Sanders: What I foresee is a stronger national economy. And, in fact, a stronger economy in New York State, as well. What I foresee is a financial system which actually makes affordable loans to small and medium-size businesses. Does not live as an island onto themselves concerned about their own profits. And, in fact, creating incredibly complicated financial tools, which have led us into the worst economic recession in the modern history of the United States.