Privacy is realized by the group founder creating a specialkeypair for the group and secretly sharing the private group key with every new group member.When a member is removed from a group or leaves it, the founder has to renew the group’s keypair

Some observers say law enforcement’sinvestigative capabilities may be outpaced by the speed oftechnological change, preventing investigators fromaccessing certain information they may otherwise beauthorized to obtain. Specifically, law enforcement officialscite strong, end-to-end encryption, or what they have calledwarrant-proof encryption, as preventing lawful access tocertain data.

Instance methods Instances of Models are documents. Documents have many of their own built-in instance methods. We may also define our own custom document instance methods. // define a schema const animalSchema = new Schema({ name: String, type: String }, { // Assign a function to the "methods" object of our animalSchema through schema options. // By following this approach, there is no need to create a separate TS type to define the type of the instance functions. methods: { findSimilarTypes(cb) { return mongoose.model('Animal').find({ type: this.type }, cb); } } }); // Or, assign a function to the "methods" object of our animalSchema animalSchema.methods.findSimilarTypes = function(cb) { return mongoose.model('Animal').find({ type: this.type }, cb); }; Now all of our animal instances have a findSimilarTypes method available to them. const Animal = mongoose.model('Animal', animalSchema); const dog = new Animal({ type: 'dog' }); dog.findSimilarTypes((err, dogs) => { console.log(dogs); // woof }); Overwriting a default mongoose document method may lead to unpredictable results. See this for more details. The example above uses the Schema.methods object directly to save an instance method. You can also use the Schema.method() helper as described here. Do not declare methods using ES6 arrow functions (=>). Arrow functions explicitly prevent binding this, so your method will not have access to the document and the above examples will not work.

All of these values, including the precious contents of the private key file, can be seen via ps when these commands are running. ps finds them via /proc/<pid>/cmdline, which is globally readable for any process ID.

hat we want is to be able to leave Facebook and still talk to our friends, instead of having many Facebooks.

Sending secure email is one of the questions we hear more and more. This is a result of an increasing number of email security risks, hacks and other threats. So you're not the only person wondering, "How to send secure email in Gmail? (or any other public email service for that matter?") You'll find the answer in this article. This article concludes with a link to a free encrypted email service First check whether you meet the conditions.

Zoom told its users that their video calls were end-to-end encrypted when actually they were protected by TLS encryption. Zoom generated and stored the keys to its users’ encrypted information on its servers rather than on its users’ devices, meaning anyone with access to those servers could monitor the unencrypted video and audio content of Zoom meetings. These servers are located around the world, often in countries where companies can be forced to share user data with law enforcement organizations. What’s worse is that, according to the most recent lawsuit, Zoom’s response made it clear that it “knew that it did not use the industry-accepted definition of E2E encryption and had made a conscious decision to use the term ‘end-to-end’ anyway”.

The alternative for curl is a credential file: A .netrc file can be used to store credentials for servers you need to connect to.And for mysql, you can create option files: a .my.cnf or an obfuscated .mylogin.cnf will be read on startup and can contain your passwords.

Linux keyring offers several scopes for storing keys safely in memory that will never be swapped to disk. A process or even a single thread can have its own keyring, or you can have a keyring that is inherited across all processes in a user’s session. To manage the keyrings and keys, use the keyctl command or keyctl system calls.

Docker container can call out to a secrets manager for its secrets. But, a secrets manager is an extra dependency. Often you need to run a secrets manager server and hit an API. And even with a secrets manager, you may still need Bash to shuttle the secret into your target application.

Using environment variables for secrets is very convenient. And we don’t recommend it because it’s so easy to leak things

As the sanitized example shows, a pipeline is generally an excellent way to pass secrets around, if the program you’re using will accept a secret via STDIN.

A few notes about storing and retrieving file secrets

Long term keys are almost never what you want. If you keep using a key, it eventually gets exposed. You want the blast radius of a compromise to be as small as possible, and, just as importantly, you don’t want users to hesitate even for a moment at the thought of rolling a new key if there’s any concern at all about the safety of their current key.

A long term key is as secure as the minimum common denominator of your security practices over its lifetime. It's the weak link.

If the EU is set to mandate encryption backdoors to enable law enforcement to pursue bad actors on social media, and at the same time intends to continue to pursue the platforms for alleged bad practices, then entrusting their diplomatic comms to those platforms, while forcing them to have the tools in place to break encryption as needed would seem a bad idea.

People want to be able to choose which service they use to communicate with people. However, today if you want to message people on Facebook you have to use Messenger, on Instagram you have to use Direct, and on WhatsApp you have to use WhatsApp. We want to give people a choice so they can reach their friends across these networks from whichever app they prefer.We plan to start by making it possible for you to send messages to your contacts using any of our services, and then to extend that interoperability to SMS too. Of course, this would be opt-in and you will be able to keep your accounts separate if you'd like.

Mr Dutton will renew his attack on Facebook and other companies for moving to end-to-end encryption, saying it will hinder efforts to tackle online crime including child sexual abuse.This month, Australia joined its "Five-Eyes" intelligence partners – the United States, Britain, New Zealand and Canada – along with India and Japan, in signing a statement calling on tech companies to come up with a solution for law enforcement to access end-to-end encrypted messages.

In the interest of transparency, this data is not encrypted: you can see exactly what information we store.

Bad people will always be motivated to go the extra mile to do bad things.

Meanwhile, criminals would just continue to use widely available (but less convenient) software to jump through hoops and keep having encrypted conversations.

As billions of conversations transition online over the coming weeks and months, the widespread adoption of end-to-end encryption has never been more vital to national security and to the privacy of citizens in countries around the world.

It is as though the Big Bad Wolf, after years of unsuccessfully trying to blow the brick house down, has instead introduced a legal framework that allows him to hold the three little pigs criminally responsible for being delicious and destroy the house anyway. When he is asked about this behavior, the Big Bad Wolf can credibly claim that nothing in the bill mentions “huffing” or “puffing” or “the application of forceful breath to a brick-based domicile” at all, but the end goal is still pretty clear to any outside observer.

Proponents of this bill are quick to claim that end-to-end encryption isn’t the target. These arguments are disingenuous both because of the way that the bill is structured and the people who are involved.

For a political body that devotes a lot of attention to national security, the implicit threat of revoking Section 230 protection from organizations that implement end-to-end encryption is both troubling and confusing. Signal is recommended by the United States military. It is routinely used by senators and their staff. American allies in the EU Commission are Signal users too. End-to-end encryption is fundamental to the safety, security, and privacy of conversations worldwide.

The EARN IT act turns Section 230 protection into a hypocritical bargaining chip. At a high level, what the bill proposes is a system where companies have to earn Section 230 protection by following a set of designed-by-committee “best practices” that are extraordinarily unlikely to allow end-to-end encryption. Anyone who doesn’t comply with these recommendations will lose their Section 230 protection.

At a time when more people than ever are benefiting from these protections, the EARN IT bill proposed by the Senate Judiciary Committee threatens to put them at risk.

Matrix provides state-of-the-art end-to-end-encryption via the Olm and Megolm cryptographic ratchets. This ensures that only the intended recipients can ever decrypt your messages, while warning if any unexpected devices are added to the conversation.

More than two billion users exchange an unimaginable volume of end-to-end encrypted messages on WhatsApp each day. And unless an endpoint (phone) is compromised, or those chats are backed-up into accessible cloud platforms, neither owner Facebook nor law enforcement has a copy of those encryption keys.

Security agency frustration at the lack of lawful interception for encrypted messaging is understandable, but the problem with global over-the-top platforms is that once those weaknesses are inbuilt, they become potentially available to bad actors as well as good.

“End-to-end encryption,” NSA says, “is encrypted all the way from sender to recipient(s) without being intelligible to servers or other services along the way... Only the originator of the message and the intended recipients should be able to see the unencrypted content. Strong end-to-end encryption is dependent on keys being distributed carefully.” So, no backdoors then.

On April 24, the U.S. National Security Agency published an advisory document on the security of popular messaging and video conferencing platforms. The NSA document “provides a snapshot of best practices,” it says, “coordinated with the Department of Homeland Security.” The NSA goes on to say that it “provides simple, actionable, considerations for individual government users—allowing its workforce to operate remotely using personal devices when deemed to be in the best interests of the health and welfare of its workforce and the nation.” Again somewhat awkwardly, the NSA awarded top marks to WhatsApp, Wickr and Signal, the three platforms that are the strongest advocates of end-to-end message encryption. Just to emphasize the point, the first criteria against which NSA marked the various platforms was, you guessed it, end-to-end encryption.

And while all major tech platforms deploying end-to-end encryption argue against weakening their security, Facebook has become the champion-in-chief fighting against government moves, supported by Apple and others.

EFF describes this as “a major threat,” warning that “the privacy and security of all users will suffer if U.S. law enforcement achieves its dream of breaking encryption.”

Once the platforms introduce backdoors, those arguing against such a move say, bad guys will inevitably steal the keys. Lawmakers have been clever. No mention of backdoors at all in the proposed legislation or the need to break encryption. If you transmit illegal or dangerous content, they argue, you will be held responsible. You decide how to do that. Clearly there are no options to some form of backdoor.

While this debate has been raging for a year, the current “EARN-IT’ bill working its way through the U.S. legislative process is the biggest test yet for the survival of end-to-end encryption in its current form. In short, this would enforce best practices on the industry to “prevent, reduce and respond to” illicit material. There is no way they can do that without breaking their own encryption. QED.

Governments led by the U.S., U.K. and Australia are battling the industry to open up “warrant-proof” encryption to law enforcement agencies. The industry argues this will weaken security for all users around the world. The debate has polarized opinion and is intensifying.

One thing that would certainly be a game-changer would be some form of standardized RCS end-to-end encryption that allows secure messages to be sent outside Google Messages.

You should not use a messaging platform that is not end-to-end encrypted, it really is as simple as that.

Such is the security of this architecture, that it has prompted law enforcement agencies around the world to complain that they now cannot access a user’s messages, even with a warrant. There is no backdoor—the only option is to compromise one of the endpoints and access messages in their decrypted state.

The answer, of course, is end-to-end encryption. The way this works is to remove any “man-in-the-middle” vulnerabilities by encrypting messages from endpoint to endpoint, with only the sender and recipient holding the decryption key. This level of messaging security was pushed into the mass-market by WhatsApp, and has now become a standard feature of every other decent platform.

Despite its opposition, EARN-IT is the clearest threat yet to end-to-end encryption, given this clever twist in pushing the onus onto the platforms to avoid transmitting illegal content, rather than mandating a lawful interception approach.

Putting that risk more simply, the EARN-IT bill is cleverly leaving it to the tech platforms to keep themselves safe—there would be little option other than some form of access to encrypted content, even though it would not be specified in law. Sophos describes this as “the backdoor virus that law enforcement agencies have been trying to inflict on encryption for years.”

On the encryption front, HRW echoes others that have argued vehemently against the proposals—that weakened encryption will “endanger all people who rely on encryption for safety and security—once one government enjoys special access, so too will rights-abusing governments and criminal hackers.” Universal access to encryption “enables everyone, from children attending school online to journalists and whistleblowers, to exercise their rights without fear of retribution.”

the encryption debate continues to rage in the U.S., with proposed new legislation representing the clearest threat yet to the security underpinning WhatsApp and iMessage, as well as Signal, Telegram and Wickr

“End-to-end encryption” sounds nice — but if anyone can get into your phone’s operating system, they will be able to read your messages without having to decrypt them.

Just like Blackberry, WhatsApp has claimed that they are end to end encrypted but in fact that is not trueWhatsApp (and Blackberry) decrypt all your texts on their servers and they can read everything you say to anyone and everyoneThey (and Blackberry) then re-encrypt your messages, to send them to the recipient, so that your messages look like they were encrypted the entire time, when in fact they were not

The only messaging app that has been proven, by an independent authoritative agency, is Apple’s Messages app (which uses Apple’s iMessage protocol that is truly end to end encrypted, Apple cannot read any of your texts which means that no one can read any of your texts)

users must also be informed of the breach (within the same time frame) unless the data breached was protected by encryption (data rendered unreadable for the intruder), or, in general, the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to individuals’ rights and freedoms.

But whereas pseudonymisation allows anyone with access to the data to view part of the data set, encryption allows only approved users to access the full data set.

According to Gemalto’s Breach Level Index, only 4% of data breaches since 2013 have involved encrypted data.

So I'd have to encrypt them and the problem with encryption is decryption. If HIBP got comprehensively pwned itself - and that is always a possibility - to the extent where the encryption key was also exposed, it's game over.

Unfortunately no - it cannot be done without Trusted security devices. There are several reasons for this. All of the below is working on the assumption you have no TPM or other trusted security device in place and are working in a "password only" environment.

Own Your Encryption KeysYou would never trust a company to keep a record of your password for use anytime they want. Why would you do that with your encryption keys? With Graphite, you don't have to. You own and manage your keys so only YOU can decrypt your content.

Another acceptable option is to pass to Google Analytics an encrypted identifier that is based on PII

ZFS native encryption: zpool create -o ashift=12 \ -O acltype=posixacl -O canmount=off -O compression=lz4 \ -O dnodesize=auto -O normalization=formD -O relatime=on -O xattr=sa \ -O encryption=aes-256-gcm -O keylocation=prompt -O keyformat=passphrase \ -O mountpoint=/ -R /mnt rpool ${DISK}-part4

Then create a file with the key (ex 31 x 1) echo 1111111111111111111111111111111 > /key.txt Then create an encrypted filesystem ex enc on your "pool" based on that key zfs create -o encryption=0n keyformat=raw -o keylocation=file:///key.txt pool/enc

Install Ubuntu with Full Disk Encryption and Encrypted Boot

Full disk encryption Ubuntu, USB boot & detached LUKS header

GRUB 2 does not have support for LUKS 2 and Ubuntu switched to it by default in this release

LastPass has always been stressing that they cannot access your passwords, so keeping them on their servers is safe. This statement has been proven wrong several times already, and the improvements so far aren’t substantial enough to make it right. LastPass design offers too many loopholes which could be exploited by a malicious server. So far they didn’t make a serious effort to make the extension’s user interface self-contained, meaning that they keep asking you to trust their web server whenever you use LastPass.

Carson Farmer noted that GMAIL is fundamentally a better user experience because individuals didn’t need to run their own protocols or set up their own servers.

Cloning Encrypted SSD to larger SSD

stop LVM group prior to stop cypher

dm-crypt wipe on an empty disk or partition

IDEAS FOR TECHNICAL MECHANISMSA technique called differential privacy1 provides a way to measure the likelihood of negative impact and also a way to introduce plausible deniability, which in many cases can dramatically reduce risk exposure for sensitive data.Modern encryption techniques allow a user’s information to be fully encrypted on their device, but using it becomes unwieldy. Balancing the levels of encryption is challenging, but can create strong safety guarantees. Homomorphic encryption2 can allow certain types of processing or aggregation to happen without needing to decrypt the data.Creating falsifiable security claims allows independent analysts to validate those claims, and invalidate them when they are compromised. For example, by using subresource integrity to lock the code on a web page, the browser will refuse to load any compromised code. By then publishing the code’s hash in an immutable location, any compromise of the page is detectable easily (and automatically, with a service worker or external monitor).Taken to their logical conclusion these techniques suggest building our applications in a more decentralized3 way, which not only provides a higher bar for security, but also helps with scaling: if everyone is sharing some of the processing, the servers can do less work. In this model your digital body is no longer spread throughout servers on the internet; instead the applications come to you and you directly control how they interact with your data.

Google and HTTP

n this case, decentralization enables them toexchange encrypted data and obtain the sought after re-sult without relying on any particular entity to preservetheir privacy.

Create a script in your encrypted home directory: ~/scripts/mount_storage.sh

JWE

On Wednesday, Rep. Ted Lieu (D-Calif.) and Rep. Blake Farenthold (R-Tex.) introduced a new bill in Congress that attempts to halt state-level efforts that would weaken encryption.

“traffic analysis.” It’s basis lies in observing all message traffic traveling on a network and discerning who’s communicating with whom, how much, and when.

Representatives of the White House seemed to listen attentively, but shared little about their thoughts. They maintained that President Obama’s position has not changed in the last few months. While they seemed well aware of our concerns about the technical infeasibility of inserting backdoors, they didn’t necessarily share them. That worried us a great deal.

this week’s announcement by Google that a machine made by a Canadian company, D-Wave Systems, which is marketed as “the world’s first commercial quantum computer”, had shown spectacular speed gains over conventional computers. “For a specific, carefully crafted proof-of-concept problem,” Google’s Hartmut Neven reported, “we achieved a 100-million-fold speed-up.”

Apple CEO Tim Cook has repeatedly and strongly criticized those in government who have demanded backdoors, explaining: “You can’t have a back door in the software because you can’t have a back door that’s only for the good guys.” And a representative of many of the large tech companies recently remarked: “Weakening security with the aim of advancing security simply does not make sense.” Eighty-five percent of cybersecurity experts recently surveyed by Politico called backdoors “a bad idea”. (We know, for example, the NSA in particular loves to prey on foreign phone companies’ backdoors.)

The San Bernardino shootings are also being cited by some Republicans, including presidential candidate Sen. Marco Rubio, as a reason to reinstate the warrantless bulk collection of domestic telephone data — the one program that was shut down by Congress after NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden revealed a massive, secret surveillance dragnet. An Associated Press story on Saturday added fuel to the fire when it claimed that as a result of the shutdown, the government could no longer access historical call records by the San Bernardino couple. But as Emptywheel blogger Marcy Wheeler amply explained, the FBI has plenty of other ways of getting the information.

The key lesson of the post-9/11 abuses — from Guantanamo to torture to the invasion of Iraq — is that we must not allow military and intelligence officials to exploit the fear of terrorism to manipulate public opinion. Rather than blindly believe their assertions, we must test those claims for accuracy.

In sum, Snowden did not tell the terrorists anything they did not already know. The terrorists have known for years that the U.S. government is trying to monitor their communications.What the Snowden disclosures actually revealed to the world was that the U.S. government is monitoring the Internet communications and activities of everyone else: hundreds of millions of innocent people under the largest program of suspicionless mass surveillance ever created, a program that multiple federal judges have ruled is illegal and unconstitutional.

Bodies were still lying in the streets of Paris when CIA operatives began exploiting the resulting fear and anger to advance long-standing political agendas. They and their congressional allies instantly attempted to heap blame for the atrocity not on Islamic State but on several preexisting adversaries: Internet encryption, Silicon Valley's privacy policies and Edward Snowden.

In this rush to blame a field that is largely unknowable to the public and therefore at once alluring and terrifying, little attention has been paid to facts: The Paris terrorists did not use encryption, but coordinated over SMS, one of the easiest to monitor methods of digital communication. They were still not caught, indicating a failure in human intelligence and not in a capacity for digital surveillance.

The call for backdoors is nothing new. During my career in the private sector, I’ve seen requests to backdoor encryption software so as to please potential investors, and have seen people in the field who appeared to stand for secure software balk under the excuse of “if that’s what the customer wants,” even if it results in irreparable security weaknesses. I’ve had well-intentioned intelligence officers ask me informally, out of honest curiosity, why it is that I would refuse to insert backdoors. The issue is that cryptography depends on a set of mathematical relationships that cannot be subverted selectively. They either hold completely or not at all. It’s not something that we’re not smart enough to do; it’s something that’s mathematically impossible to do. I cannot backdoor software specifically to spy on jihadists without this backdoor applying to every single member of society relying on my software.

In the wake of the cowardly terrorist attacks in Paris, many politicians, intelligence officials and pundits are predictably calling for a return to discredited policies of the past that would weaken Americans’ security, violate their privacy and do little or nothing to protect us from terrorists.

Another provision of the proposed Investigatory Powers Bill is that internet service providers (ISPs) must retain a record of all the websites you visit (more specifically, all the IP addresses you connect to) for one year. This appears to be another measure to weaken privacy while strengthening security – but in fact, it is harmful to both privacy and security. In order to maintain a record of every website you have visited in the last year, the ISP must store that information somewhere accessible. Information that is stored somewhere accessible will sooner or later be stolen by attackers.

I’ll say it again, to be absolutely clear: any mechanism that can allow law enforcement legitimate access to data can inevitably be abused by hostile foreign intelligence services, and even technically sophisticated individuals, to break into systems and gain unauthorised access to the same data.

If the law enforcement services can remotely break into the device of a suspect, then sooner or later criminals will find ways to use the same mechanism to break into devices and steal or destroy your personal data.

Any method that provides exceptional access immediately exposes the system to attacks by malicious parties, rendering the protection of encryption essentially worthless. Exceptional access would probably require that government departments have some kind of master keys that allowed them to decrypt any communication if required. Those master keys would obviously have to be kept extremely secret: if they were to become public, the entire security infrastructure of the internet would crumble into dust. How good are government agencies at keeping secrets?