a further, pressing, concern given scibeh's goals of developing a transparent, online community suitable for scientific exchange building from extant social media has been how to conduct discourse and build an environment in which debate can happen in a constructive

and what kind of "expertise" behavioural scientists have in this pandemic, and how that should shape scientists role

key early concerns were where we might draw the line (if at all) at scientists being "too political"

SciBeh started with attempts to prompt discussion on how behavioural scientists should best respond to the crisis. https://psyarxiv.com/hsxdk/ which led to the present environment of @SciBeh, our Reddits and the SciBeh database of behavioural science relevant COVID material

A (long!) thread about a tweet that raises many of the questions that have been central to http://SciBeh.org's concerns

Coronavirus cases in England have "increased rapidly", data shows, as ministers grapple with what to do next.

Covid cases increase rapidly as next steps planned

Behavioural economist Pete Lunn on how to renew the fight against coronavirus

Much of what we think about Covid-19 is wrong. We need to change the conversation

As the U.S. heads toward the winter, the country is going round in circles, making the same conceptual errors that have plagued it since spring.

America Is Trapped in a Pandemic Spiral

To sum up: this is a very bold article that I’m not convinced can really back up its claims. Does’t mean it’s wrong. But I don’t think the evidence is nearly as strong as it is made out to be. STILL. Govs can still choose to put kids over bars and help schools open. /Fin

To me this seems like basic aresol transmission control so I find it really odd that someone claiming expertise is making such an obvious mistake. Stones and glass houses and all... But claiming business are not mass spreaders is way off base. See: bars & eat-in restaurants. 7/

And as overconfident as the article comes off to me, this statementis maybe the most problematic. Reminder: Crowding transmission. Limiting school to kids in need crowding. Limited students IS safer vs full school attendance. Add everyone & the risk changes. 6/

Elementary and secondary schools don’t have the resources & testing anywhere near the level of colleges or some summer camps. It’s not that schools CAN’T be safely opened. It’s that the resources aren’t there for many schools so caution is warranted. 5/

Studies based on contact tracing in a local area would be much more informative than high level stats. These could help us understand the effects on the broader community & staff. Staff are an important target, and there have been deaths of teachers. 4/

One thing to keep in mind is that schools within states have different policies. The data we see are not that of opening all schools - some are fully virtual, some partly, some not at all. Not all kids in these analyses are in school. This will underestimate any effect. 3/

I’m all for a data-driven approach & I definitely applaud the work needed to pull this data together! But. Epidemics & outbreaks are local. To me, pooling data across all states-or even within a state-is asking the wrong question. Especially since testing in kids is low. 2/

A few thoughts on this... (Other folks who know much more than me should definitely chime in! Looking at you @Theresa_Chapple @JasonSalemi @COVKIDProject @EpiEllie!) Mini thread. 1/n

GPs have reported a substantial drop in the numbers they are seeing across the country

Non-Covid infectious disease cases down in England, data suggests

Countries such as Vietnam and New Zealand are reopening due to robust strategies. When will we learn from them?

Continual lockdowns are not the answer to bringing Covid under control

The current phase of the COVID-19 pandemic is forcing countries to choose between two strategies: one based on individual responsibility, and the other on coercive measures—the carrot and stick of popular analogy.Coercive isolation might be justified during emergencies, but its effectiveness during a long-term management phase is unproven in liberal democracies. If isolation is imposed, people might either avoid testing and withhold contact information, or reject COVID-19 regulations entirely. In France, resistance to coercive interventions could plausibly fuse with protest movements such as the gilets jaunes (yellow vests).

10.1016/S2468-2667(20)30235-8

COVID-19: France grapples with the pragmatics of isolation

The COVID-19 epidemic has impacted the population of Spain far more than most feared or projected. As of Sept 25, 2020, more than 700 000 individuals had tested positive, and more than 31 000 deaths with a positive test had been recorded.1Centro de Coordinación de Alertas y Emergencias SanitariasActualización no 215. Enfermedad por el coronavirus (COVID-19).https://www.mscbs.gob.es/profesionales/saludPublica/ccayes/alertasActual/nCov/documentos/Actualizacion_215_COVID-19.pdfDate: Sept 25, 2020Date accessed: September 29, 2020Google Scholar Earlier in this pandemic, the Spanish Ministry of Health provided data by age and sex for the whole country in its daily COVID-19 situation updates (in Adobe PDF format), as well as daily data on total hospitalisations, intensive care unit admissions, discharges, and deaths by region. However, since May 19, 2020, disaggregated data have not been provided in the daily updates.1Centro de Coordinación de Alertas y Emergencias SanitariasActualización no 215. Enfermedad por el coronavirus (COVID-19).https://www.mscbs.gob.es/profesionales/saludPublica/ccayes/alertasActual/nCov/documentos/Actualizacion_215_COVID-19.pdfDate: Sept 25, 2020Date accessed: September 29, 2020Google Scholar In recent months, data improvements have been made by the National Centre of Epidemiology (CNE), and open data on total counts by region are updated and revised daily.2Centro Nacional de EpidemiologíaDatos notificados a la Red Nacional de Vigilancia Epidemiológica (RENAVES).https://cnecovid.isciii.es/covid19/#documentaci%C3%B3n-y-datosDate: 2020Date accessed: September 29, 2020Google Scholar However, at the time of writing, age-specific data from the CNE is given only in weekly publications (as Adobe PDF files), without geographic detail or retrospective corrections, and with cumulative counts tabulated only from mid-May onwards. Therefore, properly merging age-specific time series after the first wave is difficult or impossible.

10.1016/S2468-2667(20)30234-6

The need for detailed COVID-19 data in Spain

Here is my latest heatmap showing how cases are travelling through the age groups. It is very concerning.

13604

Using a large-​scale survey of U.S. consumers, we study how the large one-time transfers to in­di­vid­u­als from the CARES Act affected their con­sump­tion, saving and labor supply decisions. Most re­spon­dents report that they primarily saved or paid down debts with their transfers, with only about 15 percent reporting that they mostly spent it. When providing a detailed breakdown of how they used their checks, in­di­vid­u­als report having spent or planning to spend only around 40 percent of the total transfer on average. This rel­a­tively low rate of spending out of a one-time transfer is higher for those facing liquidity con­straints, who are out of the labor force, who live in larger house­holds, who are less educated and those who received smaller amounts. We find no mean­ing­ful effect on labor supply decisions from these transfer payments, except for twenty percent of the un­em­ployed who report that the stimulus payment made them search harder for a job.

How Did U.S. Consumers Use Their Stimulus Payments?

13620

This paper examines the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on em­ploy­ment and res­pi­ra­tory health for remote workers (i.e. those who can work from home) and non-​remote workers in the United States. Using a large, nationally-​representative, high-​frequency panel dataset from March through July of 2020, we show that job losses were up to three times as large for non-​remote workers. This gap is larger than the dif­fer­en­tial job losses for women, African Americans, Hispanics, or workers without college degrees. Non-​remote workers also ex­pe­ri­enced rel­a­tively worse res­pi­ra­tory health, which likely occurred because it was more difficult for non-​remote workers to protect them­selves. Grouping workers by pre-​pandemic household income shows that job losses and, to a lesser extent, health losses were highest among non-​remote workers from low-​income house­holds, ex­ac­er­bat­ing existing dis­par­i­ties. Finally, we show that lifting non-​essential business closures did not sub­stan­tially increase em­ploy­ment.

Remote Work and the Het­ero­ge­neous Impact of COVID-19 on Em­ploy­ment and Health

13622

We study the COVID-19 pandemic’s effect on college students’ government-​ and market-​attitudes using within-​subject com­par­isons of survey responses elicited before and after the onset of the pandemic. We find that support for markets sig­nif­i­cantly declines after the onset of the pandemic, with students less likely to think markets are efficient and more likely to think they can cause harm. Support sig­nif­i­cantly increases for bigger gov­ern­ment though this does not translate to increased support for specific re­dis­trib­u­tive policies (i.e., the minimum wage, food stamps, and taxes on estates or extremely high income), nor to increased support for the gov­ern­ment to play a role in the various specific ca­pac­i­ties listed in the survey (e.g., ensuring access to health­care, re­spond­ing to natural disasters, and helping people get out of poverty). Both con­tent­ment with and trust in gov­ern­ment sig­nif­i­cantly decrease after the onset of the pandemic. Subgroup analyses indicate these results are largely driven by more po­lit­i­cally pro­gres­sive students.

The Effect of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Government-​ and Market-​Attitudes

13625

We discuss and review lit­er­a­ture on the macro­eco­nomic effects of epidemics and pandemics since the late 20th century. First, we cover the role of health in driving economic growth and well-​being and discuss standard frame­works for assessing the economic burden of in­fec­tious diseases. Second, we sketch a general the­o­ret­i­cal framework to evaluate the tradeoffs pol­i­cy­mak­ers must consider when ad­dress­ing in­fec­tious diseases and their macro­eco­nomic reper­cus­sions. In so doing, we emphasize the de­pen­dence of economic con­se­quences on (i) disease char­ac­ter­is­tics; (ii) in­equal­i­ties among in­di­vid­u­als in terms of sus­cep­ti­bil­ity, pref­er­ences, and income; and (iii) cross-​country het­ero­geneities in terms of their in­sti­tu­tional and macro­eco­nomic en­vi­ron­ments. Third, we study phar­ma­ceu­ti­cal and non­phar­ma­ceu­ti­cal policies aimed at mit­i­gat­ing and pre­vent­ing in­fec­tious diseases and their macro­eco­nomic reper­cus­sions. Fourth, we discuss the health toll and economic impacts of five in­fec­tious diseases: HIV/AIDS, malaria, tu­ber­cu­lo­sis, influenza, and COVID-19. Although major epidemics and pandemics can take an enormous human toll and impose a stag­ger­ing economic burden, early and targeted health and economic policy in­ter­ven­tions can often mitigate both to a sub­stan­tial degree.

Modern In­fec­tious Diseases: Macro­eco­nomic Impacts and Policy Responses

We in­ves­ti­gate the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the role played by credit con­straints in the trans­mis­sion mechanism, using a novel survey of ex­pec­ta­tions and plans of Italian firms, taken just before and after the outbreak. Most firms revise downward their ex­pec­ta­tions for sales, orders, em­ploy­ment, and in­vest­ment, while prices are expected to increase at a faster rate, with ge­o­graph­i­cal and sectoral het­ero­gene­ity in the size of the effects. Credit con­straints amplify the effects on factor demand and sales of the COVID-19 generated shocks. Credit-​constrained firms also expect to charge higher prices, relative to un­con­strained firms. The search for and avail­abil­ity of liquidity is a key de­ter­mi­nant of firms’ plans. Finally, both supply and demand shocks play a role in shaping firms’ ex­pec­ta­tions and plans, with supply shocks being slightly more important in the aggregate.

13629

The Economic Effects of COVID-19 and Credit Con­straints: Evidence from Italian Firms’ Ex­pec­ta­tions and Plans

13632

Our research estimates Covid-19 non-fatal economic losses in the U.S. using detailed data on cu­mu­la­tive cases and hos­pi­tal­iza­tions from January 22, 2020 to July 27, 2020, from the Centers for Disease Control and Pre­ven­tion (CDC). As of July 27, 2020, the cu­mu­la­tive confirmed number of cases was about 4.2 million with almost 300,000 of them entailing hos­pi­tal­iza­tions. Due to data col­lec­tion lim­i­ta­tions the confirmed totals reported by the CDC under-​count the actual number of cases and hos­pi­tal­iza­tions in the U.S. Using standard as­sump­tions provided by the CDC, we estimate that as of July 27, 2020, the actual number of cu­mu­la­tive Covid-19 cases in the U.S. is about 47 million with almost 1 million involving hos­pi­tal­iza­tions. Applying value per sta­tis­ti­cal life (VSL) and relative severity/injury estimates from the De­part­ment of Trans­porta­tion (DOT), we estimate an overall non-fatal un­ad­justed valuation of $2.2 trillion for the U.S. with a weighted average value of about $46,000 per case. This is almost 40% higher than the total valuation of $1.6 trillion (using about $11 million VSL from the DOT) for all ap­prox­i­mately 147,000 Covid-19 fa­tal­i­ties. We also show a variety of estimates that adjust the non-fatal val­u­a­tions by the dreaded and un­cer­tainty aspect of Covid-19, age, income, and a factor related to fatality cat­e­go­riza­tion. The ad­just­ments show current overall non-fatal val­u­a­tions ranging from about $1.5 trillion to about $9.6 trillion. Finally, we use CDC forecast data to estimate non-fatal val­u­a­tions through November 2020, and find that the overall cu­mu­la­tive valuation increases from about $2.2 trillion to about $5.7 trillion or to about 30 percent of GDP. Because of the larger numbers of cases involved our cal­cu­la­tions imply that non-fatal in­fec­tions are as eco­nom­i­cally serious in the aggregate as ul­ti­mately fatal in­fec­tions.

The Forgotten Numbers: A Closer Look at COVID-19 Non-Fatal Val­u­a­tions

13640

We propose a reweighting-​estimation-transformation (RWET) approach to estimate the impacts of COVID-19 on job postings in Australia. Contrary to the commonly used aggregation-​based method on counting data, our approach can be used in a rel­a­tively ‘thin’ market, such as Australia. In a thin market, the number of job postings is rel­a­tively small, and the share of empty cells increases sub­stan­tially when ag­gre­gat­ing the data into finer cat­e­gories. Using Aus­tralian job postings collected by Burning Glass Tech­nolo­gies and the RWET approach, our empirical evidence shows that the overall labour demand in Australia as of July 2020 is slowly re­cov­er­ing from its lowest 45 per cent dip at the beginning of May. Our results also suggest that the impacts of the pandemic are rel­a­tively evenly dis­trib­uted across skill levels, but vary sub­stan­tially across states, in­dus­tries and oc­cu­pa­tions. Our findings of the dynamics on the demand side of the labour market suggest that skill-​targeted policies might not be as effective as policies targeted at the state and industry levels to fa­cil­i­tate economic recovery.

Measuring the Impacts of COVID-19 on Job Postings in Australia Using a Reweighting-​Estimation-Transformation Approach

13749

This paper examines the impact of di­ag­nos­tic ef­fi­ciency on the COVID-19 pandemic. Using an exogenous policy on di­ag­nos­tic con­fir­ma­tion, we show that a one- day decrease in the time taken to confirm the first case in a city publicly led to 9.4% and 12.7% re­duc­tions in COVID-19 preva­lence and mortality over the sub­se­quent six months, re­spec­tively. The impact is larger for cities that are farther from the COVID-19 epicenter, are exposed to less migration, and have more re­spon­sive public health systems. Social dis­tanc­ing and a less burdened health system are likely the un­der­ly­ing mech­a­nisms, while the latter also explains the more profound impact on reducing deaths than reducing in­fec­tions.

Act Early to Prevent In­fec­tions and Save Lives: Causal Impact of Di­ag­nos­tic Ef­fi­ciency on the COVID-19 Pandemic

13753

This paper con­tributes to the lit­er­a­ture on public health com­mu­ni­ca­tion by studying how the framing of a message relaying the forecast impact of COVID-19 pre­ven­tion measures affects com­pli­ance behaviour amongst both the young and old. A rep­re­sen­ta­tive sample of survey re­spon­dents in the UK and US, along with selected re­spon­dents in Italy, were presented with forecasts for the number of deaths from COVID-19 in their countries with and without public adherence to various pre­ven­tive be­hav­iours. We ex­per­i­men­tally varied whether this in­for­ma­tion was presented in terms of likely deaths or lives saved. The lives saved frame increases reported pro­tec­tive be­hav­iours, but only amongst older re­spon­dents. We present evidence con­sis­tent with the hy­poth­e­sis that framing is likelier to affect decisions whose con­se­quences are felt by oneself (i.e. pro­tec­tive be­hav­iours by the elderly) rather than solely others (i.e. pro­tec­tive be­hav­iours amongst the young).

Framing the Predicted Impacts of COVID-19 Pro­phy­lac­tic Measures in Terms of Lives Saved Rather Than Deaths Is More Effective for Older People

13757

Measuring Ge­o­graph­i­cal Dis­par­i­ties in England at the Time of COVID-19: Results Using a Composite Indicator of Pop­u­la­tion Vul­ner­a­bil­ity

Ob­jec­tives – The growth of COVID-19 in­fec­tions in England raises questions about system vul­ner­a­bil­ity. Several factors that vary across ge­o­gra­phies, such as age, existing disease preva­lence, medical resource avail­abil­ity, and de­pri­va­tion, can trigger adverse effects on the National Health System during a pandemic. In this paper, we present data on these factors and combine them to create an index to show which areas are more exposed. This technique can help policy makers to moderate the impact of similar pandemics. Design – We combine several sources of data, which describe specific risk factors linked with the outbreak of a res­pi­ra­tory pathogen, that could leave local areas vul­ner­a­ble to the harmful con­se­quences of large-​scale outbreaks of con­ta­gious diseases. We combine these measures to generate an index of community-​level vul­ner­a­bil­ity. Setting – 191 Clinical Com­mis­sion­ing Groups (CCGs) in England. Main outcome measures – We merge 15 measures spatially to generate an index of community-​level vul­ner­a­bil­ity. These measures cover preva­lence rates of high-risk diseases; proxies for the at-risk pop­u­la­tion density; avail­abil­ity of staff and quality of health­care fa­cil­i­ties. Results – We find that 80% of CCGs that score in the highest quartile of vul­ner­a­bil­ity are located in the North of England (24 out of 30). Here, vul­ner­a­bil­ity stems from a faster rate of pop­u­la­tion ageing and from the wide­spread presence of un­der­ly­ing at-risk diseases. These same areas, es­pe­cially the North-​East Coast areas of Lan­cashire, also appear vul­ner­a­ble to adverse shocks to health­care supply due to tighter labour markets for health­care personnel. Im­por­tantly, our Index cor­re­lates with a measure of social de­pri­va­tion, in­di­cat­ing that these com­mu­ni­ties suffer from long-​standing lack of economic op­por­tu­ni­ties and are char­ac­terised by low public and private resource en­dow­ments. Con­clu­sions – Evidence-​based policy is crucial to mitigate the health impact of pandemics such as COVID-19. While current attention focuses on curbing rates of contagion, we introduce a vul­ner­a­bil­ity index combining data that can help policy makers identify the most vul­ner­a­ble com­mu­ni­ties. We find that this index is pos­i­tively cor­re­lated with COVID-19 deaths and it can thus be used to guide targeted capacity building. These results suggest that a stronger focus on deprived and vul­ner­a­ble com­mu­ni­ties is needed to tackle future threats from emerging and re-​emerging in­fec­tious disease.

13760

This paper uses a new field survey of low-wage areas of urban India to show that em­ploy­ment and earnings were decimated by the lockdown resulting from the Covid-19 crisis. It examines workers’ desire for a job guarantee in this setting. Workers who had a job guarantee before the crisis were rel­a­tively shielded by not being hit quite so hard in terms of the increased incidence of job loss or working zero hours and earnings losses. A stated choice ex­per­i­ment contained in the survey reveals evidence that low-wage workers are willing to give up around a quarter of their daily wage for a job guarantee. And direct survey questions cor­rob­o­rate this, with informal, young and female workers being most likely to want a job guarantee, and to want it even more due to the current crisis.

The Crisis and Job Guar­an­tees in Urban India

We explore impacts of the pandemic crisis and as­so­ci­ated re­stric­tions to economic activity on paid and unpaid work for men and women in the UK. Using data from the Covid-19 sup­ple­ment of Un­der­stand­ing Society, we find evidence that labour market outcomes of men and women were roughly equally affected at the extensive margin, as measured by the incidence of job loss or fur­lough­ing, but if anything women suffered smaller losses at the intensive margin, ex­pe­ri­enc­ing slightly smaller changes in hours and earnings. Within the household, women provided on average a larger share of increased childcare needs, but in an important share of house­holds fathers became the primary childcare providers. These dis­tri­b­u­tional con­se­quences of the pandemic may be important to un­der­stand its in­equal­ity legacy over the longer term.

Work, Care and Gender during the COVID-19 Crisis

13762

13599

We present findings from the first two waves of an in­no­v­a­tive, population-​representative, UK time-use diary survey conducted both pre- and mid-​lockdown, using an online diary in­stru­ment that proved both reliable and quick-​to-field. Combining diary in­for­ma­tion on activity, location, and co-​presence to estimate infection risks as­so­ci­ated with daily behavior, we show clear changes in such behavior related to infection risk between the pre- and mid-​lockdown periods: a sub­stan­tial reduction of time spent in those behaviors with the highest levels of risk, ac­com­pa­nied by an equiv­a­lent increase in low-risk behavior. Because, in general, a pop­u­la­tions’ time use changes rel­a­tively slowly, the be­hav­ioral changes revealed may be in­ter­preted directly as a con­se­quence of the UK COVID-19 ‘lockdown’ reg­u­la­tions. Sub­se­quent waves will reveal the be­hav­ioral con­se­quences of future changes in reg­u­la­tion.

A New Per­spec­tive from Time Use Research on the Effects of Lockdown on COVID-19 Be­hav­ioral Infection Risk

13595

Social pressure may have relevant con­se­quences in many contexts but it is hard to evaluate it em­pir­i­cally. In this paper we exploit a natural ex­per­i­ment in soccer to provide clear evidence of its effects. We aim to study how social pressure from the crowd in a stadium affects both players and referees. While in normal matches crowd support may be cor­re­lated to a host of variables affecting the outcome of interest, we exploit the fact that after the health emergency for the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, soccer matches in top European Leagues have been allowed only behind closed doors, that is, without spec­ta­tors in the stadiums. We use data of first and second division of 5 major European Leagues (Germany, Spain, England, Italy and Portugal) for the last 10 cham­pi­onships and compare several outcomes (de­ter­mined by players’ per­for­mance and referees’ decisions) of matches played with crowd support to the same outcomes when matches were played without crowd. We find con­sid­er­able effects of the pressure from the crowd: while with the support of the crowd a con­sid­er­able home advantage emerges in various measures of per­for­mance (points, goals, shots, etc.), this advantage is almost halved when matches are behind closed doors. Similar effects are found for the behavior of referees: decisions of fouls, yellow cards, red cards and penalties that tend to favor home teams in normal matches, are much more balanced without crowd pressing on referees. The evidence we provide strongly supports the idea that social pressure has intense effects on agents’ behavior. Keywords

Social Pressure in the Stadiums: Do Agents Change Behavior without Crowd Support?

13578

The Covid-19 pandemic has induced worldwide natural ex­per­i­ments on the effects of crowds. We exploit one of these ex­per­i­ments currently taking place over several countries in almost identical settings: pro­fes­sional football matches played behind closed doors. We find large and sta­tis­ti­cally sig­nif­i­cant effects on the number of yellow cards issued by referees. Without a crowd, fewer cards were awarded to the away teams, reducing home advantage. These results have im­pli­ca­tions for the influence of social pressure and crowds on the neu­tral­ity of ref­er­ee­ing decisions.

Ex­per­i­men­tal Effects of an Absent Crowd on Per­for­mances and Ref­er­ee­ing Decisions during COVID-19

13575

We estimate the economic impact of South Korea’s targeted responses to the first large-​scale COVID-19 cluster in Seoul. We find that foot traffic and retail sales decreased only within a 300 meter radius of the cluster and recovered to its pre-​outbreak level after four weeks. The re­duc­tions appear to be driven by temporary business closures rather than the risk avoidance behavior of the citizens. Our results imply that less intense, but more targeted COVID-19 in­ter­ven­tions, such as pin-​pointed, temporary closures of busi­nesses, can be a low-cost al­ter­na­tive after lifting strict social dis­tanc­ing measures.

Economic Impact of Targeted Gov­ern­ment Responses to COVID-19: Evidence from the First Large-​scale Cluster in Seoul

13574

We document the trans­mis­sion of social dis­tanc­ing practices from the United States to Mexico along migrant networks during the early 2020 Covid-19 pandemic. Using data on pre-​existing migrant con­nec­tions between Mexican and U.S. locations and mobile-​phone tracking data revealing social dis­tanc­ing behavior, we find larger declines in mobility in Mexican regions whose emigrants live in U.S. locations with stronger social dis­tanc­ing practices. We rule out con­found­ing pre-​trends and use a variety of controls and an in­stru­men­tal variables strategy based on U.S. stay-​at-home orders to rule out the potential influence of disease trans­mis­sion and migrant sorting between similar locations. Given this evidence, we conclude that our findings represent the effect of in­for­ma­tion trans­mis­sion between Mexican migrants living in the U.S. and residents of their home locations in Mexico. Our results demon­strate the im­por­tance of personal con­nec­tions when pol­i­cy­mak­ers seek to change fun­da­men­tal social behaviors.

Social Learning along In­ter­na­tional Migrant Networks

13570

With the COVID-19 outbreak imposing stay at home and social dis­tanc­ing policies, warnings about the impact of lockdown and its economic con­se­quences on domestic violence has surged. This paper dis­en­tan­gles the effect of forced co­ex­is­tence and economic stress on intimate partner violence. Using an online survey data set, we find a 23% increase of intimate partner violence during the lockdown. Our results indicate that the impact of economic con­se­quences is twice as large as the impact of lockdown. We also find a large increase of domestic violence when the relative position of the man worsens, es­pe­cially in contexts where that position was already being threat­ened. We view our results as con­sis­tent with the male backlash and emotional cue effects.

Can’t Leave You Now! Intimate Partner Violence under Forced Co­ex­is­tence and Economic Un­cer­tainty

COVID-19 has affected daily life in un­prece­dented ways. Using a lon­gi­tu­di­nal dataset linking biometric and survey data from several cohorts of young adults before and during the pandemic (N=685), we document large dis­rup­tions to physical activity, sleep, time use, and mental health. At the onset of the pandemic, average steps decline from 9,400 to 4,600 steps per day, sleep increases by about 25-30 minutes per night, time spent so­cial­iz­ing declines by over half to less than 30 minutes, and screen time more than doubles to over 5 hours per day. The pro­por­tion of par­tic­i­pants at risk of clinical de­pres­sion increases to 65%, over twice the rate in the same pop­u­la­tion prior to the pandemic. Our analyses suggest that dis­rup­tion to physical activity is a leading risk factor for de­pres­sion during the pandemic. However, restora­tion of those habits–either naturally or through policy in­ter­ven­tion–has limited impact on restoring mental well-​being.

13569

Lifestyle and Mental Health Dis­rup­tions during COVID-19

ECDC has launched a free, open source interactive tool to help with the automatised early detection of public health threats using Twitter data.

New tool for the early detection of public health threats from Twitter data: epitweetr

Report says recovery efforts are undermined by ministers’ tendency to over-promise and under-deliver

‘Hyperbolic messaging’ eroding public trust in UK's Covid response

Doctors grapple for answers as more patients report post-coronavirus cognitive impairment

'Brain fog': the people struggling to think clearly months after Covid

The fourth session of the COVID-19 and the Law series was a discussion on Elections, moderated by Charles Fried, Beneficial Professor of Law, and featuring - Professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos; and - Ruth Greenwood, lecturer on law and co-director of Voting Rights and Redistricting at the Campaign Legal Center

COVID-19 and the Law Colloquium Series | Elections

People still going out even though they risk infecting others, advisers tell ministers

Coronavirus: at least three-quarters of people in UK fail to self-isolate

Today, the Commission publishes a further set of reports provided by the signatories of the Code of Practice on Disinformation as part of the COVID-19 monitoring and reporting programme set out in the Joint Communication “Tackling COVID-19 disinformation - Getting the facts right”.

Second set of reports – Fighting COVID-19 disinformation Monitoring Programme

A few examples of what epidemics/response can look like: - South Korea: https://imperial.ac.uk/mrc-global-infectious-disease-analysis/covid-19/report-25-south-korea/… - Germany: https://ourworldindata.org/covid-exemplar-germany… - Sweden: https://bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/m000mqpv… - Hong Kong: https://researchsquare.com/article/rs-34047/v1… - Vietnam: https://ourworldindata.org/covid-exemplar-vietnam… - Japan: https://sciencemag.org/news/2020/05/japan-ends-its-covid-19-state-emergency… 2/2

It’s a straw argument to claim our COVID options are ‘majority back to normal’ vs ‘lockdown’ (i.e. stay-at-home orders, school closures). There are now many international examples available to learn from. When outlining options, we need sound research, not simplistic rhetoric. 1/

There’s a lot of talk of scientists divided over Covid-19, but when you look at the evidence any so-called divide starts to evaporate

There is no ‘scientific divide’ over herd immunity

experts realise that even after knowing the risks and concerns, the people still refuse to abide by the rules laid down by the governmens. To combat this type of behavior, first they need to accept the fact that only telling people about the risk won’t give them the desired result. They need to approach the situation with different solutions and that’s where behavioral science comes into play.

Covid-19: Is Behavioural Science The Key To Handle The Pandemic?

Guided by the risk information seeking and processing (RISP) model, this study aims to examine the key determinants that predispose individuals’ online information seeking behavior and prevention intent during the COVID-19 outbreak. Through an online survey with 741 respondents in China, results indicate that affective responses, informational subjective norms, and information insufficiency are positively related to online information seeking about COVID-19. Furthermore, online information seeking is positively associated with prevention intent, and attitude toward prevention partially mediates this association. Finally, theoretical and practical implications of this study are discussed in the context of COVID-19.

10.1177/1077699020961518

Online InformationSeeking and Disease Prevention Intent During COVID-19 Outbreak