By contrast, a systematic ordering, which finds its contemporary equivalent in modern outliners, soon runs into difficulties. The anthropologist Alan MacFarlane noted some time ago that "one danger inherent in paper indexes is the amount of effort they take to add to and maintain. That means that more and more of the worker's energies go into the creation of the tools for research, and the less time there is to actually do the research and the writing." He traced this problem to the hierarchical classification that he thought paper makes necessary and complained that the system broke down at 40.000 cards because the preconceived categories proved inflexible. Luhmann's alternative avoids this problem.

Some types exist as descriptions of objects, but not as tangible physical objects. One can show someone a particular bicycle, but cannot show someone, explicitly, the type "bicycle", as in "the bicycle is popular."

Elin K. Jacob found that classification and categorization are different processes

There may only be historical reasons that, for example, the periodic table is called a classification rather than a taxonomy

Taxonomy was first used in biology, but the term has spread to other domains.

Categorization is, for example, mostly used by cognitive psychologists for what other call classification

Synonyms and near-synonyms for the term classification

Categorization is sometimes considered synonymous with classification

The forms of the final keyword vary:

Locke’s humble two page method, in this sense, prefigures libraries filled with volumes of encyclopedias, from Carl Linnaeus’s Systema Naturae (1735) to Luke Howard's classification of clouds.

The lumper–splitter problem occurs when there is the desire to create classifications and assign examples to them, for example schools of literature, biological taxa and so on.

their critics say that if a carnivore is neither a dog nor a bear, they call it a cat

purposes are grouped into 5 categories (strictly necessary, basic interactions & functionalities, experience enhancement, measurement, targeting & advertising)

Orthocoronavirinae

mixed-state checkbox

strume11ts

the conditioning needed by the human being to bring his skills in using Means 1, 2, and 3 to the point where they are operationally effective.

labelled

chains of operations thatlink humans, things, media and even animals

convergence of virtuality/actuality and human/machine,

humans, animals, and machines so intimately that it makesvery little sense to attempt to distinguish among these three categories

signifies a new epistemology insofar as it portraysevents as discrete and isolated; knowledges as mod-ifiable, categorizable, and abstractable; and locally-situated knowledges as best understood by thoseworking remotely

. Previously, scholars have generally ignored any notion of time. Now, we need to make explicit our use of time in understanding disaster. Such an application, I believe, will give us a much deeper understanding on defining disaster, how and why such events unfold, and how various social entities attempt to return to normal after the event. Finally, the use of social time in disaster can provide sociologists a deeper look into understanding key theoretical issues related to social order, social change and social emergence, along with voluntaristic versus deterministic patterns of behavior among various units of analysis.

the field. Such a fresh approach possibly improves a wide range of conceptual issues in disasters and hazards. In addition, such an approach would give us insights on how disaster managers, emergency responders, and disaster victims (recognizing that these “roles” may overlap in some cases) see, use and experience time. This, in turn, could assist with a number of applied issues (e.g., warning, effective “response,” priorities in “recovery”) throughout the process of disaster.

The use of disaster periods provides a useful heuristic device for disaster researchers and disaster managers. These various approaches of disaster Phases give researchers an important means to develop research, organize dates, and generate research findings. Similarly, the use of disaster phases benefits disaster managers in attempting to improve their capabilities. Yet, the current use of disaster phases creates broad definitional problems of the field. I show that the current attempts to describe disaster phases are good heuristic devices, but not effective scientific concepts. Yet, scientific, empirical, and theoretical conclusions are drawn from the use of these Phases.

The next logical step to aid analysis would be to cross-tabulate the temporal periods of "before, during, and after" with functional activities. This type of analysis and consideration could be further extended by including both the unit of analysis and various social categories such as social class or ethnicity. This type of three-dimensional approach would also strongly highlight the idea that disaster phases are multilayered. Overall, not only do different groups and units of analysis experience the phases at different times, but that multiple aspects of time (i.e., objective and subjective; before, during, after a disaster) intermesh with specific activities.

We must differentiate whether the use of any phrase refers to temporal or functional aspects of disaster. They should not have multiple meanings

Disaster Phases Are Multidimensional Another component of the mutually inclusive nature of disaster phases is that they are multidimensional

Disaster Phases Are Mutually Inclusive As previously indicated, disaster phases overlap. From a theoretical and applied viewpoint, researchers and practitioners must first recognize that disaster phases are not discrete units.

Second, the manner the field handles the issue of disaster phases actually reflects a larger problem in the field. Specifically, how do we define disaster? Kreps (1984, p. 324) comes closest to recognizing the relationship among disaster phases, the theoretical components of disaster (i.e., social order and social action), and the definition of disaster (primarily in a heading in his paper). Unfortunately, he does not elaborate upon the connection of defining disaster and disaster phases. Thus, recognizing and recasting our notion of disaster phases may actually help the field more precisely understand or define "disaster."

Researchers have at times treated the disaster phases as scientific constructs to order data and for scientific analysis. However, as the organizational and family literature show, assumptions based on life-cycle approaches and assumptions often fall outside the realm of appropriate scientific analysis. Here, the phases within the disaster life cycle fall outside the scientific necessity of well-de­fined, mutually exclusive concepts.

One high-level manager involved with the Federal Response Plan made the following reflection about two weeks after Hurricane Andrew occurred: My feeling is that recovery needs to start day one, or even prior to a disaster. It would be wise to set up a group or task force, or a committee. They get together to gather information as the disaster begins. The potential for fragmentation is enormous. It actually goes back to intelligence, damage information. It is difficult to plan for recovery when you do 001 have a sense for how long it could take. You know, recovery has already begun. FEMA has already issued over one million dollars worth of checks .... Anyway, why not have a recovery unit? That would be cool. They should deal the long term recovery within hazard mitigation. In any event that needs to be happening ftom day one.

Finally, the notation of the disaster phases affected emergency-respond­ers' decisions. The lexicon of the four phases appeared to force disaster managers and responders to think and respond in a linear, separate-category fashion. Thus, this paradigm in the end can hurt effective response

Addinonal �g­recovery research by Phillips (1991) shows that different_ categones of disaster victims exit and enter disaster-housing phases at different nmes. She finds that some special-population groups ( e.g., elderly, Hispanics) take a much longer time to transition from temporary to pennanent sheltenng, and from sheltering to temporary and permanent housing than other popu· lation segments.

Of equal importance, both structural-and non­structural-mitigation techniques would lessen dramatically response needs. In essence, effective mitigation and preparation would lessen response time. Logically extended, effective mitigation and preparation when coupled with an effective response could decrease the time for both short-and long-tenn recovery. Tlus analysis further convinced me of the interconnec­tiveness of the disaster periods.

In summary, the ECGs study from DRC showed me that the use of disaster periods created analytical problems. The categories often over­lapped, different groups perceived and experienced the disaster phases differently, and individuals or groups defined differently the actual or potential event

emergent citizen groups (ECGs) in disasters (e.g., Neal I 984, Quarantelli 1985)

Emergency response and recovery is not a linear process; decisions that are made during the emergency phase will impact the recovery process. In practice, however, recovery often takes place in an ad hoc fashion because key decisions are not part of a strategic program to restore services and rebuild communities. (Dumam et al. 1993, p. 30)

Therefore, if disaster researchers wish to improve the theoretical devel­opment of the field dramatically, I argue that we should reanalyze the current heuristic related to the phases.

In fact, the Functions and Effects Study generated the notion that the relationship between mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery is not even linear. Rather, some preparedness activities (like educating government officials) could really have mitigation effects; and some recovery activities mitigate against future disasters (like using housing Joans to relocate residences out of a flood plain). The Functions and Effects experts hypothesized at least a cyclical relationship among !hese four phases of disaster activity. (National Governor's Association 1979:108)

Others also allude to the fact that these categories are not mutually exclusive. Haas, Kates, and Bowden (1977) make the following important observation:

Despite a positive approach regarding time models, Stoddard concludes the discussion by saying, a simple or complex time model is not comprehensive enough by itself to integrate completely disaster research. Additional con­structs are required for methodological and theoretical compari­sons and liaisons between findings and the various disaster studies. (Stoddard 1968, p. 12)

Since the beginning of the field, disaster researchers have observed various types of disaster periods. Specifically, different events seem to occur at different times related to a disaster. Also, both academics and practitioners assume that these phases exist, and act as if they do exist Yet, in the last 30 years or so, disaster researchers or practitioners have accom­plished little in defining or refining the use of disaster phases. Yet, as I show in the next two sections, both researchers and practitioners have questioned the use of disaster phases since their initial use.

The National Governor's Association Report

Other empirical studies show that the recovery process is not a simple, linear, or cyclical process. Different units or groups may experience, or perceive that they experience, the different stages of recovery I) at different times and 2) at different rates of time.

Overall, recovery studies suggest that subcategories of the recovery process exist. However, different units of analysis (e.g., individual versus group) or different types of groups (e.g., based on ethnicity or social class) may experience the phases of recovery at differing rates. Thus, patterns, phrases or cycles of recovery are not linear.

Phillips' (1991) analysis of housing following the Loma Prieta Earth­quake confirms these different phases. Also, her study shows that different groups of people, often based upon such factors as social class or ethnicity, go through the phases of housing recovery at different times.

The edited work by Haas, Kates, and Bowden ( 1977) illustrates the complexity of the recovery process. Unlike most other overall codification efforts, the above authors explicitly recog­nize that recovery reflects a complex process. They note that people use several subcategories (e.g., restoration, recovery, rehabilitation, redevelop­ment, reconstruction) to describe aspects of the recovery period.

In Drabek's (1986) more recent codification effort, he modifies the disaster phases. His revision reflects the language of the National Governor's Association's 1979 recommendations (i.e., preparedness, response, recovery, mitigation) of disaster phases.

Stoddard argues that the use of time-and-space models in disaster research

By the 1960s, researchers had studied many disasters to allow codifica­tion efforts (Quarantelli and Dynes 1977). For some (e.g., Dynes 1970) disaster periods refer to a temporal category (e.g., before a disaster strikes, while a disaster strikes, after a disaster strikes). In other cases, the use of the phases may refer to functional activities that may or may not also be embedded with temporal considerations (stocking supplies, search and rescue, responding while the disaster strikes, attempting to recovery from the impact). For example, Barton (1970) combines both functional and temporal considerations of disaster. Yet, these and other writers never fully explored the theoretical implications of using the phases in their research

He adds that this phase could be important with sudden impacts, but not as important with slow-moving impacts.

Disasters, Dynes argues, follow a general temporal sequence despite the agent. Dynes em­ploys these phases to argue successfully for an "all hazards" approach to disaster

Mileti, Drabek, and Haas developed their six categories of: 1) preparedness/adjust­ment; 2) warning; 3) pre-impact, early actions; 4) post-impact, short-term actions; 5) relief or restoration, and 6) reconstruction. They justify these categories by noting that "Numerous researchers have documented how activities and nonnative definitions appear to vary across time and vary greatly among events" (Mileti, Drabek, Haas 1975, p. 9). The six phases serve as a central component of the authors' codification effort (it organizes the book chapters). Yet, the authors do not provide a more specific defini­tion for each category. Other theoretical underpinnings in the book receive much more detailed justification (e.g., collective stress, social nature of disaster).

It is boundaries that help us separate one entity from another: "To classify things is to arrange them in groups ... separated by clearly determined lines of demarcation .... At the bottom of our conception of class there is the idea of a circumscription with fixed and definite outlines. "7 Indeed, the word define derives from the Latin word for boundary, which is finis. To define something is to mark its boundaries, 8 to surround it with a mental fence that sepa­rates it from everything else. As evidenced by our failure to notice objects that are not clearly differentiated from their surroundings, it is their boundaries that allow us to perceive "things" at all.

Nonetheless, without some lumping, it would be impossible ever to experience any collectivity, or mental entity for that matter. The ability to ignore the uniqueness of items and regard them as typical members of categories is a prerequisite for classifying any group of phenomena. Such ability to "typify"106 our experience is therefore one of the cornerstones of social reality

A mental field is basically a cluster of items that are more similar to one another than to any other item. Generating such fields, therefore, usually involves some lumping.

In order to endow the things we perceive with meaning, we normally ignore their uniqueness and regard them as typical mem­bers of a particular class of objects (a relative, a present), acts (an apology, a crime), or events (a game, a conference).2 After all, "If each of the many things in the world were taken as distinct, unique, a thing in itself unrelated to any other thing, perception of the world would disintegrate into complete meaninglessness. "3 Indeed, things become meaningful only when placed in some category.

Resistance Realily is 'that which resists,' according to Latour's (1987) Pragmatist­inspired definition. The resistances thal designers and users encounter will change lhc ubiquitous networks of classifications and standards. Although convergence may appear at times to create an inescapable cycle of feedback and verification, the very multiplicity of people, things and processes involved mean lhat they are never locked in for all time.

Infrastructure and Method: Convergence These ubiquitous, textured dai;sifications and standards help frame our representation of the past and the sequencing of event� in the present. They (:an best be understood as doing the ever local, ever partial work of making it appear that science describes nature (and nature alone) and that politics is about social power (and social power alone).

Practical Politics �1 ·he fourch major theme is uncovering the practical politics of classifying awl standardizing. 'fhi<; is the de.sign end of the spectrum of investigat­ing categories and standards as technologies. There are two processes associated with these politics: arriving at categories and standards, and, along the way, deciding what will be visible or invisible within the system.

The Indeterminacy of the Past: Multiple Times, Multiple Voices The third methodological theme concerns ihe f1asl as indetc,rr,1inate. 10 We are constantly revising our knowledge of the past in light of new developments in the present.

Materiality and Texture The second methodological departure point is that. classifications and standards are material, as well as symbolic.

This categorical saturation furthermore forms a complex web. Al­though it is possible to pull out a single dassilication scheme or stan­dard for reference purposes, in reality none of them stand alone. So a subproperty of ubiquity is interdependence, ,md frequently, integration. A systems approach might see the proliferation of both standards and classilications as purely a matter of integration-almost like a gigantic web of interoperability. Yet the sheer density of these phenom­ena go beyond questions of interoperability. They are layered, tangled, textured; they interact lo form an ecology as well as a flat set of compatibilities.

Ubiquity The first major theme is the ubiquity of classifying and standardizing. Classification schemes and standards literally saturate our environ­ment.

A definition of infrastructure

This chapter offers four themes, methodological points of departure for the analysis of these complex relationships. Each theme operates as a gestalt switch-it comes in the form of an i11fras/:ruclural inversion (Bowker 1994). This inversion is a struggle against the tendency of infrastructure to disappear (except when breaking down). Tt means learning to look closely at technologies and arrangements that, by design and hy habit, tend to fade into the woodwork (sometimes literally!). Infrastructural inversion means recognizing the depths of interde­pendence of technical networks and standards, on the one hand, and the real work of politics and knowledge production8 on the other.

Standards Classifications and standards are closely related, but not identical. \-Vhile this book focuses on classificalion, standards are crucial compo­nents of the larger argument. The systems we discuss often do become standardized; in addition, a standard is in part a way of classifying the world. What then are standards? The term as we use it in the book has several dimensions:

Infrastructures are never transparent for everyone, ancl lheir '\\•ork­abilit y as they scale up becomes increasingly complex. Through due methodological attention to the architecture and use of these syslems, we can achieve a deeper understanding of how it is that individuals and communities meet infrastructure. ·we know that this means, at Lhe leasl, an understanding of infraslructure that includes these points:

The sheer density of the collisions of classification schemes in our lives calls for a new kind of science, a new set of metaphors, linking tradi­tional social science and computer and information science. We need a tqpography of things such as the distribution of ambiguity; the fluid dynamics of how classification systems meet up-a plate tectonics rather than a static geology. This nevi science will draw on the best empirical studies of work-arounds, information use, and mundane tools such as desktop folders and file cabinets (perhaps peering back­wards out frorn the Web and into the practices). It will also use the best of object-oriented programming and other areas of computer science to describe this territory. It will build on years of valuable research on classification in library and information s<:ience.

Information infrastrucLUre is a tricky thing to analyze_l; Good, usable systems disappear almost by deiinition. The easier they arc lo use, the harder they are to see.

A� we know from studies of work of all sorts, people do not do the ideal joh, but the doable job. \Vhen faced with too many alternatives and too much information, they satisfice (Mard1 and Simon 1958).

Forms like Lhe death certificate, ·when ag6TTcgated, form a case of what Kirk and Kutd1ins (1992) call "the substitution of precision for validity" (see also Star 1989b). That is, when a seemingly neutral data collection mechanism is substituted for ethkal conflict about the con­tents of the forms, the moral debate is partially erased. One may get ever more prn:ise knowledge, without having resolved deeper ques­tions, and indeed, by burying those questions.

Classifications may or may not become standardized. If they do not, they are ad hoc, limited to an individual or a local community, and/or of Limited duration. At the same time, every successful standard imposes a classification system, al the very least between good and bad ways of organizing acLions or things. And the work-arounds involved in the practical use of standards frequently entail the use of ad hoc nonstandard categories.

Nomenclature and dassifi<:at..ion are frequently confused, howevc1; since attempts are often made to model nomencla­ture on a 1>ingle, stable system of classification principles, as for exam­ple with bot.any (Bowke1; in press) or anatomy.

Clas.�ification A classification is a spatial, temporal, or sjH1ti11-lemporal segmm,tation rif lhe world. ,\ "classification system" is a set of boxes (rnelaphorical or literal) inlo which things can be pul to then do some kind of work-bureau­cratic or knowledge production. In an abstract, .ideal sense, a classifica­tion system exhibits the frillowing properties:

vVe have a moral and ethical agenda in our querying of these systems. Each standard and each category valorizcs some point of view and silences another. This is not inherently a bad thing-indeed it is inescapable.

Table 1.1 A definition of infrastructure

This categorical saturation furthermore forms a complex web. Al­though it is possible to pull out a single classification scheme or stan­dard for reference purposes, in reality none of them stand alone. So a_ subproperty of ubiquity is interdependence, and frequently, integra­t10n. A systems approach might see the proliferation of both standards and classifications as purely a matter of integration-almost like a gigantic web of interoperability. Yet the sheer density of these phenom­ena go beyond questions of interoperability. They are layered, tangled, textured; they interact to form an ecology as well as a flat set of compatibilities.

Ubiquity __ The first major theme is the ubiquity of classifying and standardmng. Classification schemes and standards literally saturate our environ­ment.

This chapter offers four themes, methodological points of departure for the analysis of these complex relationships. Each theme operates as a gestalt switch-it comes in the form of an infrastructural inversion (Bowker 1994). This inversion is a struggle against the tendency of infrastructure to disappear (except when breaking down). It means learning to look closely at technologies and arrangements that, by design and by habit, tend to fade into the woodwork (sometimes literally!). Infrastructural inversion means recognizing the depths of interde­pendence of technical networks and standards, on the one hand, and the real work of politics and knowledge production8 on the other.

Infrastructures are never transparent for everyone, and their work­ability as they scale up becomes increasingly complex. Through due methodological attention to the architecture and use of these systems, we can achieve a deeper understanding of how it is that individuals and communities meet infrastructure. We know that this means, at the least, an understanding of infrastructure that includes these points:

Information infrastructure is a tricky thing to analyze.6 Good, usable systems disappear almost by definition. The easier they are to use, the harder they are to see. As well, most of the time, the bigger they are, the harder they are to see.

The sheer density of the collisions of classification scheme� in_ our liv�s calls for a new kind of science, a new set of metaphors, hnkmg tradi­tional social science and computer and information scien�e. We ne�d a topography of things such as the distribution of ambiguity; the flu_,d dynamics of how classification systems �eet u�-a plate tectomcs rather than a static geology. This new science will draw on the best empirical studies of work-arounds, info�mation use, and �undan_e tools such as desktop folders and file cabmets (perhaps peering back­wards out from the Web and into the practices). It will also use th<: best of object-oriented programming and other areas of compute, science to describe this territory. It will build on years of valuablt research on classification in library and information science.

s we know from studies of work of all sorts, people do not do the ideal job, but the doable job. When faced with too many alternatives and too much information, they satisfice (March and Simon 1958).

Forms like the death certificate, when aggregated, form a case of what Kirk and Kutch ins ( 1992) call "the substitution of precision for validity" (see also Star 1989b). That is, when a seemingly neutral data collection mechanism is substituted for ethical conflict about the con­tents of the forms, the moral debate is partially erased. One may get ever more precise knowledge, without having resolved deeper ques­tions, and indeed, by burying those questions.

Classifications may or may not become standardized. If they do not, they are ad hoc, limited to an individual or a local community, and/or of limited duration. At the same time, every successful standard imposes a classification system, at the very least between good and bad ways of organizing actions or things. And the work-arounds involved in the practical use of standards frequently entail the use of ad hoc nonstandard categories.

Standards Classifications and standards are closely related, but not identical. While this book focuses on classification, standards are crucial compo­nents of the larger argument. The systems we discuss often do become standardized; in addition, a standard is in part a way of classifying the world.

Nomenclature and classification are frequently confused, however, since attempts are often made to model nomencla­ture on a single, stable system of classification principles,

Classification A classification is a spatial, temporal, or spatio-temporal segmentation of the world. A "classification system" is a set of boxes (metaphorical or literal) into which things can be put to then do some kind of work-bureau­cratic 9r knowledge production.

We have a moral and ethical agenda in our querying of these systems. Each standard and each category valorizes some point of view and silences another.

rom this view of what culture is follows a view equally assured, of what describing it is-the writing out of systematic rules, an ethnographic algorithm, which, if followed, would make it possible so to operate, to pass (physical appearance aside) for a native. In such a way, extreme subjectivism is married to extreme formalism, with the expected result: an explosion of debate as to whether particular analyses (which come in the form of taxonomies, paradigms, tables, trees, and other ingenuities) reflect what the natives "really" think or are merely clever simula­tions, logically equivalent but substantively different, of what they think. ...

Analysis, then, is sorting out the structures of signification-what Ryle called established codes, a somewhat misleading expression, for it makes the enterprise sound too much like that of the cipher clerk when it is much more like that of the literary critic-and determining their social ground and import.

Moreover,one of the CSCW findings was that such categorization (and especially howcategories are collapsed into meta-categories) is inherently political. The pre-ferred categories and categorization will differ from individual to individual.

Ontology depth

classification (which is furthermore one of its 'social functions)

in the interests of a new object and a new language neither of which has a place in the field of the sciences that were to be brought peacefully together, this unease in classification being precisely the point from which it is possible to diagnose a certain mutation.

CLARK is a software tool for classifying any type of DNA/RNA sequences

The classification system we are presenting is based on six of the most salient distinguishing factors. These are summarized in Figure 3.

hird, at this juncture, control is being equated with visibility and visibility with personal security. But how these individuals are made visible matters for both privacy and security, let alone the politics of conflating refugees, migration and terrorism. Indeed, working with specific data framing mechanisms affects how the causes and effects of disasters are identified and what elements and people are considered (Frickel 2008

In order to endow the things we perceive with meaning, we normally ignore their uniqueness and regard them as typical mem-bers of a particular class of objects (a relative, a present), acts (an apology, a crime), or events (a game, a conference).

Even though everyone knows Israel has the bomb, if you have a clearance and want to keep it, stick to discussing Israel's stockpile of strategic kumquats.