Antithesis implies contrast of sense

Appropriateness. An appropriate style will adapt itself to (1) the emotions of the hearers, (2) the character of the speaker, (3) the nature of the subject.

Style, to be good, must be clear; it must also be appropriate, avoiding both meanness and excess of dignity

Style. It is not enough to know what to say; we must also say it in the right way

Particular law is that which each community lays down and applies to its own members: this is partly written and partly unwritten. Universal law is the law of Nature.

The above are the motives that make men do wrong to others; we are next to consider the states of mind in which they do it, and the persons to whom they do it.

Thus every action must be due to one or other of seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, anger, or appetite.

Let us first decide what sort of things people are trying to get or avoid when they set about doing wrong to others.

Law" is either special or general. By special law I mean that written law which regulates the life of a particular community; by general law, all those unwritten principles which are supposed to be acknowledged everywhere.

That which most people seek after, and which is obviously an object of contention, is also a good; for, as has been shown, that is good which is sought after by everybody, and "most people" is taken to be equivalent to "everybody."

Now the political or deliberative orator's aim is utility: deliberation seeks to determine not ends but the means to ends, i.e. what it is most useful to do. Further, utility is a good thing.

Those in power are more ambitious and more manly in character than the wealthy, because they aspire to do the great deeds that their power permits them to do. Responsibility makes them more serious: they have to keep paying attention to the duties their position involves. They are dignified rather than arrogant, for the respect in which they are held inspires them with dignity and therefore with moderation -- dignity being a mild and becoming form of arrogance.

Wealthy men are insolent and arrogant; their possession of wealth affects their understanding; they feel as if they had every good thing that exists; wealth becomes a sort of standard of value for everything else,

no education in riches

They have neither that excess of confidence which amounts to rashness, nor too much timidity, but the right amount of each. They neither trust everybody nor distrust everybody, but judge people correctly. Their lives will be guided not by the sole consideration either of what is noble or of what is useful, [1390b] but by both; neither by parsimony nor by prodigality, but by what is fit and proper.

power

we do not fear things that are a very long way off: for instance, we all know we shall die, but we are not troubled thereby, because death is not close at hand

Moreover, anger can be cured by time; but hatred cannot. The one aims at giving pain to its object, the other at doing him harm

Things that cause friendship are: doing kindnesses; doing them unasked; and not proclaiming the fact when they are done, which shows that they were done for our own sake and not for some other reason.

Consequently we do not get angry with any one who cannot be aware of our anger, and in particular we cease to be angry with people once they are dead, for we feel that the worst has been done to them, and that they will neither feel pain nor anything else that we in our anger aim at making them feel.

As to the frame of mind that makes people calm, it is plainly the opposite to that which makes them angry, as when they are amusing themselves or laughing or feasting; when they are feeling prosperous or successful or satisfied; when, in fine, they are enjoying freedom from pain, or inoffensive pleasure, or justifiable hope.

Also towards those who admit their fault and are sorry: since we accept their grief at what they have done as satisfaction, and cease to be angry

it is plain that we feel calm towards those who do nothing of the kind, or who do or seem to do it involuntarily.

The persons with whom we get angry are those who laugh, mock, or jeer at us, for such conduct is insolent

it is plain that the more we are under these conditions the more easily we are stirred.

(1) The frame of mind is that of one in which any pain is being felt.

good sense, good moral character

the emotion of anger: here we must discover (1) what the state of mind of angry people is, (2) who the people are with whom they usually get angry, and (3) on what grounds they get angry with them. It is not enough to know one or even two of these points; unless we know all three, we shall be unable to arouse anger in any one.

There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator's own character -- the three, namely, that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it: good sense, good moral character, and goodwill

he must also make his own character look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of mind

of all syllogisms, whether refutative or demonstrative, those are most applauded of which we foresee the conclusions from the beginning, so long as they are not obvious at first sight

There are two kinds of enthymemes: (a) the demonstrative, formed by the conjunction of compatible propositions; (b) the refutative, formed by the conjuction of incompatible propositions.

The four general lines of argument are: (1) The Possible and Impossible; (2) Fact Past; (3) Fact Future; (4) Degree.

(1) make his own character look right and (2) put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of mind. As to his own character; he should make his audience feel that he possesses prudence, virtue, and goodwill.

Wealth as a whole consists in using things rather than in owning them; it is really the activity -- that is, the use -- of property that constitutes wealth.

That happiness is one or more of these things, pretty well everybody agrees.

For all advice to do things or not to do them is concerned with happiness and with the things that make for or against it; whatever creates or increases happiness or some part of happiness, we ought to do; whatever destroys or hampers happiness, or gives rise to its opposite, we ought not to do.

ways and means, war and peace, national defence, imports and exports, and legislation.

reasoning.

but to a more instructive art and a more real branch of knowledg

show that the good or the harm, the honour or disgrace, the justice or injustice, is great or small, either absolutely or relatively; and therefore it is plain that we must also have at our command propositions about greatness or smallness and the greater or the lesser -- propositions both universal and particular.

it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speech's end and object.

The "example" has already been described as one kind of induction;

Every one who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or examples:

The man who is to be in command of them must, it is clear, be able (1) to reason logically, (2) to understand human character and goodness in their various forms, and (3) to understand the emotions-that is, to name them and describe them, to know their causes and the way in which they are excited.

his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses

Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself

But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us

it is not the function of medicine simply to make a man quite healthy, but to put him as far as may be on the road to health; it is possible to give excellent treatment even to those who can never enjoy sound health

And if it be objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common against all good things except virtue, and above all against the things that are most useful, as strength, health, wealth, generalship.

For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct. Here, then, we must use, as our modes of persuasion and argument,

Home | Book I | Book II | Book III | Index | Bibliography Book I - Chapter 1 [1354a] Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alike are concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others. Ordinary people do this either at random or through practice and from acquired habit. Both ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art. Now, the framers of the current treatises on rhetoric have constructed but a small portion of that art. The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory. These writers, however, say nothing about enthymemes, which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion, but deal mainly with non-essentials. The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case. Consequently if the rules for trials which are now laid down some states -- especially in well-governed states -- were applied everywhere, such people would have nothing to say. All men, no doubt, think that the laws should prescribe such rules, but some, as in the court of Areopagus, give practical effect to their thoughts and forbid talk about non-essentials. This is sound law and custom. It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity -- one might as well warp a carpenter's rule before using it. Again, a litigant has clearly nothing to do but to show that the alleged fact is so or is not so, that it has or has not happened. As to whether a thing is important or unimportant, just or unjust, the judge must surely refuse to take his instructions from the litigants: he must decide for himself all such points as the law-giver has not already defined for him. Now, it is of great moment that well-drawn laws should themselves define all the points they possibly can and leave as few as may be to the decision of the judges; and this for several reasons. First, to find one man, or a few men, who are sensible persons and [1354b] capable of legislating and administering justice is easier than to find a large number. Next, laws are made after long consideration, whereas decisions in the courts are given at short notice, which makes it hard for those who try the case to satisfy the claims of justice and expediency. The weightiest reason of all is that the decision of the lawgiver is not particular but prospective and general, whereas members of the assembly and the jury find it their duty to decide on definite cases brought before them. They will often have allowed themselves to be so much influenced by feelings of friendship or hatred or self-interest that they lose any clear vision of the truth and have their judgement obscured by considerations of personal pleasure or pain. In general, then, the judge should, we say, be allowed to decide as few things as possible. But questions as to whether something has happened or has not happened, will be or will not be, is or is not, must of necessity be left to the judge, since the lawgiver cannot foresee them. If this is so, it is evident that any one who lays down rules about other matters, such as what must be the contents of the "introduction" or the "narration" or any of the other divisions of a speech, is theorizing about non-essentials as if they belonged to the art. The only question with which these writers here deal is how to put the judge into a given frame of mind. About the orator's proper modes of persuasion they have nothing to tell us; nothing, that is, about how to gain skill in enthymemes. Hence it comes that, although the same systematic principles apply to political as to forensic oratory, and although the former is a nobler business, and fitter for a citizen, than that which concerns the relations of private individuals, these authors say nothing about political oratory, but try, one and all, to write treatises on the way to plead in court. The reason for this is that in political oratory there is less inducement to talk about nonessentials. Political oratory is less given to unscrupulous practices than forensic, because it treats of wider issues. In a political debate the man who is forming a judgement is making a decision about his own vital interests. There is no need, therefore, to prove anything except that the facts are what the supporter of a measure maintains they are. In forensic oratory this is not enough; to conciliate the listener is what pays here. It is other people's affairs that are to be decided, so that the judges, intent on their own satisfaction and listening with partiality, surrender themselves to the disputants instead of judging between them. [1355a] Hence in many places, as we have said already, irrelevant speaking is forbidden in the law-courts: in the public assembly those who have to form a judgement are themselves well able to guard against that. It is clear, then, that rhetorical study, in its strict sense, is concerned with the modes of persuasion. Persuasion is clearly a sort of demonstration, since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated. The orator's demonstration is an enthymeme, and this is, in general, the most effective of the modes of persuasion. The enthymeme is a sort of syllogism, and the consideration of syllogisms of all kinds, without distinction, is the business of dialectic, either of dialectic as a whole or of one of its branches. It follows plainly, therefore, that he who is best able to see how and from what elements a syllogism is produced will also be best skilled in the enthymeme, when he has further learnt what its subject-matter is and in what respects it differs from the syllogism of strict logic. The true and the approximately true are apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted that men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess at probabilities. It has now been shown that the ordinary writers on rhetoric treat of non-essentials; it has also been shown why they have inclined more towards the forensic branch of oratory. Rhetoric is useful (1) because things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the decisions of judges are not what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves, and they must be blamed accordingly.

The true and the approximately true are apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted that men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth.

Hence it comes that, although the same systematic principles apply to political as to forensic oratory, and although the former is a nobler business

It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity -- one might as well warp a carpenter's rule before using it.

Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of bot

The "non-technical" (extrinsic) means of persuasion -- those which do not strictly belong to the art of rhetoric. They are five in number, and pertain especially to forensic oratory: (1) laws, (2) witnesses, (3) contracts (4) tortures, (5) oaths

Law is either (a) special, viz. that written law which regulates the life of a particular community, or (b) general, viz. all those unwritten principles which are supposed to be acknowledged everywhere.

seven causes of human action, viz. three involuntary, (1) chance, (2) nature, (3) compulsion; and four voluntary, viz. (4) habit, (5) reasoning, (6) anger, (7) appetite

entails a consideration of degree

Political (1) exhortation and dehortation, (2) future, (3) expediency and inexpediency; B. Forensic (1) accusation and defence, (2) past, (3) justice and injustice; C. Epideictic (1) praise and censure, (2) present, (3) honour and dishonour

it must adapt itself to an audience

(1) the speaker's power of evincing a personal character which will make his speech credible (ethos ); (2) his power of stirring the emotions of his hearers (pathos ); (3) his power of proving a truth, or an apparent truth, by means of persuasive arguments (logos )

Definition of rhetoric as "the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion.

It is a subject that can be treated systematically

Its possible abuse is no argument against its proper use on the side of truth and justice.

I marvel at men who felicitate those who are eloquent by nature on being blessed with a noble gift, and yet rail at those who wish to become eloquent, on the ground that they desire an immoral and debasing education. Pray, what that is noble by nature becomes shameful and base when one attains it by effort?

But I do hold that people can become better and worthier if they conceive an ambition to speak well,137 if they become possessed of the desire to be able to persuade their hearers, and, finally, if they set their hearts on seizing their advantage—I do not mean “advantage” in the sense given to that word by the empty-minded, but advantage in the true meaning of that term;138 and that this is so I think I shall presently make clear.

rivate or to public affairs; nay, they are not even remembered for any length of time after they are learned because they do not attend us through life nor do they lend aid in what we do, but are wholly divorced from our necessities.

We ought, therefore, to think of the art of discourse just as we think of the other arts, and not to form opposite judgements about similar things, nor show ourselves intolerant toward that power which, of all the faculties which belong to the nature of man, is the source of most of our blessings. For in the other powers which we possess, as I have already said on a former occasion,125 we are in no respect superior to other living creatures; nay, we are inferior to many in swiftness and in strength and in other resources; but, because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and invented arts; and, generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man which the power of speech has not helped us to establish. For this it is which has laid down laws concerning things just and unjust, and things honorable and base; and if it were not for these ordinances we should not be able to live with one another. It is by this also that we confute the bad and extol the good. Through this we educate the ignorant and appraise the wise

But as a symptom, not only of their confusion of mind, but of their contempt for the gods, they recognize that Persuasion is one of the gods, and they observe that the city makes sacrifices to her every year,121 but when men aspire to share the power which the goddess possesses

irritated, jealous, perturbed in spirit, and are much in the same state of mind as lovers ar

First of all was Solon.

No, it is evident that these students cross the sea and pay out money and go to all manner of trouble because they think that they themselves will be the better for it and that the teachers here are much more intelligent than those in their own countries. This ought to fill all Athenians with pride and make them appreciate at their worth those who have given to the city this reputation.

These charges are of two kinds. Some of them say that the profession of the sophist is nothing but sham and chicane, maintaining that no kind of education has ever been discovered which can improve a man's ability to speak or his capacity for handling affairs, and that those who excel in these respects owe their superiority to natural gifts; while others acknowledge that men who take this training are more able, but complain that they are corrupted and demoralized by it

first of all, have a natural aptitude for that which they have elected to do; secondly, they must submit to training and master the knowledge of their particular subject, whatever it may be in each case; and, finally, they must become versed and practised in the use and application of their art; for only on these conditions can they become fully competent and pre-eminent in any line of endeavor

equire them to combine in practice the particular things which they have learned, in order that they may grasp them more firmly and bring their theories into closer touch with the occasions for applying the

physical training for the body, of which gymnastics is a part, and, for the mind, philosophy, which I am going to explain. These are twin arts—parallel and complementar

It is acknowledged that the nature of man is compounded of two parts, the physical and the mental

I seem to be unfortunate, and that these people appear to be boorish and churlish toward their fellow-citizens

I consider that this kind of life is more agreeable than that of men who are busy with a multitude of things, and that it is, besides, more in keeping with the career to which I have dedicated myself from the first

”

for the power to speak in any set order has escaped me.

He was a good man and true, a credit to Athens and to Hellas, but he could not lower himself to the level of people who are intolerant of their natural superiors.

For if you please the people in Athens, no matter what you do they will not judge your conduct by the facts but will construe it in a light favorable to you; and if you make mistakes, they will overlook them, while if you succeed, they will exalt your success to the high heaven

for he was by nature as inept in courting the favor of men as he was gifted in handling affairs.

the force of his own character in order to win the good will of the rest of the world, believing that this is a greater and nobler kind of generalship than to conquer many cities many times in battle.

It is the ability to collect an army which is adequate to the war in hand, and to organize and to employ it to good advantage.

First of all is the ability to know against whom and with whose help to make war;

What, then, are the requisites of a good general and what ability do they involve?

The facts, then, about Timotheus I can put most concisely and in the most comprehensive terms by saying that he has taken more cities by storm than any other man has ever done, and I include all generals who have led armies into the field whether from Athens or from the rest of Hellas

I am not guilty of corrupting my associate

All these men were crowned by Athens with chaplets of gold,57 not because they were covetous of other people's possessions, but because they were honorable men and had spent large sums of their private fortunes upon the city.

yet not one of them will be found to have uttered a word of complaint about his sojourn with me

ans and counsels them to be of one mind among themselves?

but that those discourses are better and more profitable which denounce our present mistakes than those which praise our past deeds, and those which counsel us what we ought to do than those which recount ancient history

I am wont to deal with princes as well as with private men

I detach one part from another, and breaking up the discourse, as it were, into what we call general heads, I strive to express in a few words each bit of counsel which I have to offer.4

consider well whether I appear to you to corrupt the young by my words, or, on the contrary, to inspire them to a life of valor and of dangers endured for their country

Developing this theme, I show that Athens has been author of all the advantages which the Hellenes now enjoy. Then, having concluded the account of these benefactions, and desiring to show more convincingly that leadership in the expedition is the right of Athens, I further try to prove that far greater honor is due to her for the perils she has faced in war than for her other benefactions.

I shall present in evidence the actual words

For I ask you not only to show me no mercy, if the oratory which I cultivate is harmful, but to inflict on me the extreme penalty if it is not superior to any other.

that while those who are thought to be adept in court procedure are tolerated only for the day when they are engaged in the trial, the devotees of philosophy are honored and held in high esteem in every society and at all times; that, furthermore, while the former come to be despised and decried as soon as they are seen two or three times in court, the latter are admired more and more as they become better and more widely known; and, finally, that while clever pleaders are sadly unequal to the higher eloquence, the exponents of the latter could, if they so desired, easily master also the oratory of the courts.

First of all, then, you should know that there are no fewer branches of composition in prose than in verse.

Be assured, therefore, that you shall hear from me the whole truth, and in this spirit give me your attention.

whom he calls the teacher of other men, everyone would regard his power as irresistible.

Then again you will find associated with them either men who are themselves in evil case or who want to ruin others, while in my company are those who of all the Hellenes lead the most untroubled lives.

o judge me to be the kind of man which the accusation and the defense in this trial will show me to be; for if you decide the case on this basis, you will have the credit of judging honorably and in accordance with the law, while I, for my part, shall obtain my complete deserts.

Here in the indictment my accuser endeavors to vilify me, charging that I corrupt young men30 by teaching them to speak and gain their own advantage in the courts contrary to justice, while in his speech he makes me out to be a man whose equal has never been known either among those who hang about the law-courts or among the devotees of philosophy; for he declares that I have had as my pupils not only private persons but orators, generals, kings, and despots;31 and that I have received from them and am now receiving enormous sums of money

in a word, it smothers truth, and pouring false ideas into our ears, it leaves no man among our citizens secure from an unjust death

it is not yet easy for the jury to decide from what the first speaker has said whether he has based his arguments on the truth; nay, they will be fortunate if they are able to draw a just conclusion from the arguments of both sides

in order that if I shall appear to speak well, I may show that I am subject to the charges which he has made about my cleverness; while if it turns out that I speak less ably than he has led you to expect, you may think that mine is the weaker cause.

I consider that in all the world there are none so depraved and so deserving of the severest punishment as those who have the audacity to charge others with the offenses of which they themselves are guilty

But it occurred to me that if I were to adopt the fiction of a trial and of a suit brought against m

a true image of my thought and of my whole life; for I hoped that this would serve both as the best means of making known the truth about me and, at the same time, as a monument, after my death, more noble than statues of bronze

saying that it has to do with writing speeches for the courts,5 very much as one might have the effrontery to call Pheidias, who wrought our statue of Athena,6 a doll-maker, or say that Zeuxis and Parrhasius7 practiced the same art as the sign-painters

novel and differen

Life is too complicated for that, and no man can foresee exactly the consequences of his acts--the future is a thing unseen. All that education can do is to develop a sound judgement (as opposed to knowledge ) which will meet the contingencies of life with resourcefulness and, in most cases, with success

I do think that the study of political discourse can help more than any other thing to stimulate and form such qualities of character.

neglected all the good things which this study affords, and became nothing more than professors of meddlesomeness and greed

But to choose from these elements those which should be employed for each subject, to join them together, to arrange them properly, and also, not to miss what the occasion demands but appropriately to adorn the whole speech with striking thoughts and to clothe it in flowing and melodious phrase(18) -- these things, I hold, require much study and are the task of a vigorous and imaginative mind:

For ability, whether in speech or in any other activity, is found in those who are well endowed by nature and have been schooled by practical experience.(17) Formal training makes such men more skilfull

oratory is good only if it has the qualities of fitness for the occasion,(15) propriety of style, and originality of treatmen

For what has been said by one speaker is not equally useful for the speaker who comes after him; on the contrary, he is accounted most skilled in this art who speaks in a manner worthy of his subject and yet is able to discover in it topics which are nowise the same as those used by others.

But I marvel when I observe these men setting themselves up as instructors of youth who cannot see that they are applying the analogy of an art with hard and fast rules to a creative process.

More than that, they do not attribute any of this power either to the practical experience or to the native ability of the student, but undertake to transmit the science of discourse as simply as they would teach the letters of the alphabet,

that they are on the watch for contradictions in words(10) but are blind to inconsistencies in deeds

they pretend to wisdom and assume the right to instruct the rest of the world

But these professors have gone so far in their lack of scruple that they attempt to persuade our young men that if they will only study under them they will know what to do in life and through this knowledge will become happy and prosperous. More than that, although they set themselves up as masters and dispensers of goods so precious, they are not ashamed of asking for them a price of three or four minae

since they pretend to search for truth, but straightway at the beginning of their professions attempt to deceive us with lies

f all who are engaged in the profession of education were willing to state the facts instead of making greater promises than they can possibly fulfill, they would not be in such bad repute with the lay-public.

Death, if I am right, is in the first place the separation from one another of two things, soul and bod

judged have their clothes on

power and art have to be provided in order that we may do no injustic

Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument:—Is the pleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles and I are agreed about that.

Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument:—Is the pleasant the same as the good?

And 'lawful' and 'law' are the names which are given to the regular order and action of the sou

'Healthy,' as I conceive, is the name which is given to the regular order of the bod

Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is best, and do they seek to improve the citizens by their speeches, or are they too, like the rest of mankind, bent upon giving them pleasure, forgetting the public good in the thought of their own interest, playing with the people as with children, and trying to amuse them, but never considering whether they are better or worse for this?

I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two sorts; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the other, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of the souls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best, whether welcome or unwelcome, to the audience

works by experience and routine,

Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice and thrice over, as they sa

Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and evil, for they are different

Do you see the inference:—that pleasure and pain are simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same part, whether of the soul or the body

You talk about meats and drinks and physicians and other nonsense; I am not speaking of the

using words which have no meaning and that you are explaining nothing?—will you tell me whether you mean by the better and superior the wiser, or if not, whom

Then not only custom but nature also affirms that to do is more disgraceful than to suffer injustice, and that justice is equality; so that you seem to have been wrong in your former assertion, when accusing me you said that nature and custom are opposed, and that I, knowing this, was dishonestly playing between them, appealing to custom when the argument is about nature, and to nature when the argument is about custom

Are the superior and better and stronger the same or differen

three qualities—knowledge, good-will, outspokenness, which are all possessed by you.

the study of philosophy too far

And this is true, as you may ascertain, if you will leave philosophy and go on to higher things: for philosophy,

he would trample under foot all our formulas and spells and charms, and all our laws which are against nature: the slave would rise in rebellion and be lord over us, and the light of natural justice would shine forth

whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker; and in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior.

Convention and natur

For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth, are appealing now to the popular and vulgar notions of right, which are not natural, but only conventional

that the whole world should be at odds with me, and oppose me, rather than that I myself should be at odds with myself, and contradict myself.

if there were not some community of feelings among mankind, however varying in different persons—I mean to say, if every man's feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by the rest of his species—I do not see how we could ever communicate our impressions to one another.

and you will certainly say, that you never heard a man use fewer words.

what was the nature, of the art, and by what name we were to describe Gorgias

that he has attended more to the art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic.

And our friend Gorgias is one of the best, and the art in which he is a proficient is the noblest.

But now what shall we call him—what is the art in which he is skilled

put any question to him, and that he would answer.

exhibit

Yes, that was our intention in coming.

as a connected whole. (4) The third step is: whenever you hear something, connect it with what you know already

The greatest and fairest discovery has been found to be memory; it is useful for everything, for wisdom as well as for the conduct of life

And if he knows how to play the flute, he will always be able to play the flute, whenever it is necessary to do this. (9) And a man who knows how to give a judgment ought to have a right understanding of the just, because this is what cases are about

And, first of all, how will it not be possible for a man who knows about the nature of all things to act rightly in every case and (teach the city) to do so too?

We learn our words in this fashion and we don't know who our teachers are

it is that wisdom and virtue can neither be taught nor learne

Does he exist with respect to some particular thing, or just in general?" Then if someone denies that the man exists, he is mistaken, because he is treating (the particular and) universal senses as being the same. Because everything exists in some sense

For whenever anyone asks this question they answer that the two groups say the same things, but that the wise speak at the right moment and the demented at the wrong one

As a result of the argument they say that if a thing comes to pass, the statement they make is true, but if it does not, then the statement is false.

I would be the only person making a true statement since I am the only person who is one

both expressed in the same words

As for the poets, they write their poems to give men pleasure and not for the sake of truth.

God does not stand aloof from just deceit, and There are times when god respects an opportunity for lies.

And to murder one's nearest and dearest is right: in the case of Orestes and of Alcmaeon, even the god answered that they were right to have done as they did.

just

Take the example of parents: suppose one's father or mother ought to drink or eat a remedy and is unwilling to do so, isn't it just to give the remedy in a gruel or drink and to deny that it is in it

And they say that if a group of people should collect from all the nations of the world their disgraceful customs and then should call everyone together and tell each man to select what he thinks is seemly, everything would be taken away as belonging to the seemly things. I would be surprised if things which were disgraceful when they were collected should turn out to be seemly and not what they were when they came

wrong

handsome

nothing is always seemly or always disgraceful

And I think that if someone should order all men to make a single heap of everything that each of them regards as disgraceful and then again to take from the collection what each of them regards as seemly, not a thing (would) be left, but they would all divide up everything, because not all men are of the same opinion.

the Greeks regard these things as disgraceful and against the la

appears to be seeml

wicked

to the Spartans

And it is seemly to do good to one's friends but disgraceful to do so to one's enemies

Some say the seemly is one thing and the disgraceful another, and that as the name differs, so does the thing named, and others say that the seemly and disgraceful are the same

distinguis