4,949 Matching Annotations
  1. Nov 2018
    1. "Using mixed methods, we examined the contribution of four scenario-based online discussion strategies -structured, scaffolded, debate and role play – to the learners’ cognitive presence, the outcome of the discussion. "

    1. Kern 2006 Chapelle recommends the interactionist approach to SLA (see Pica, 1994) Egbert and Petrie (2005): expand the theory from the interactionist to sociocultural perspective.

      "Sociocultural theory, like interactionist SLA, emphasizes the importance of learner interaction, but it is interested less in negotiation evoked adjustments in input than in the social and cultural situatedness of learner activity, learners’ agency in co-constructing meanings (as well as their own roles), and the importance of mediation by tools and signs."

      Systemic-functional linguistics framework for CMC; Anthropology; Semiotic theory; Plass cognitive theory while inputting the language with multi-media;

    1. 2009 Chapelle C.A. Four general approaches: cognitive linguistic; psycholinguistic; human learning; social context Problems in the four categories.

    1. "Researchers have found that cognitive interactionist and sociocultural SLA theories offer a means of interpreting prior research on CALL and suggest a point of departure for designing future studies of CALL activities that are based on human–computer interaction and computer-mediated communication."

      Chapelle. C. A 2007. theories expand from interactionist to cognitive interactionist and sociocultural theory cognitive interactionist: Human-computer interaction. sociocultural: CMC (Computer-Mediated Communication)

    1. The Interaction Approach and CMC (Bryan Smith): The Interaction Approach(IA) in second language acquisition studies suggests that there is a link between interaction and learning. This approach focuses on three major components of interaction — exposure (input), production (output), and feedback. Many CALL researchers have adopted this theoretical perspective in exploring the relationship between CMC and instructed second language acquisition, exploiting many of the argued affordances offered by this medium in relation to the key tenets of the IA. This paper will provide a conceptual overview of the IA and explore specifically how CALL researchers have sought to study SLA from this theoretical perspective. We will discuss several methodological hurdles facing researchers engaged in this type of research and will offer some suggested strategies for conducting sound SLA/CALL research from an IA.

      the interaction approach overlaps with psycholinguistic approach under the cognitive theory

    1. ಅಯ್ಯಾ ನಿನ್ನ ಸಂಗದಲ್ಲಿ ಸಂಗಿಯಾದೆಅಯ್ಯಾ, ನಿನ್ನ ಸಂಗದಿಂದ ಕಾಕುತನವ ಬಿಟ್ಟುಬೇಕಾದ ಹಾಂಗೆಯಾದೆ.ಅಯ್ಯಾ, ನಿನ್ನ ಒಲವು ಅನೇಕ ಪ್ರಕಾರದಲ್ಲಿಪಸರಿ ಪರ್ಬಿತ್ತು ಎನ್ನ ಸರ್ವಾಂಗದಲ್ಲಿ.ನಿನ್ನವರೊಲುಮೆಯ ಆನಂದವನು ಎನಗೆ ಕರುಣಿಸುಕಪಿಲಸಿದ್ಧಮಲ್ಲಿಕಾರ್ಜುನಯ್ಯಾ ನಿಮ್ಮ ಧರ್ಮ.
    2. ಅಷ್ಟದಳಕಮಲವ ಮೆಟ್ಟಿ ಚರಿಸುವಹಂಸನ ಭೇದವ ಹೇಳಿಹೆನು:ಪೂರ್ವದಳಕೇರಲು ಗುಣಿಯಾಗಿಹನು.ಅಗ್ನಿದಳಕೇರಲು ಕ್ಷುಧೆಯಾಗಿಹನು.ದಕ್ಷಿಣದಳಕೇರಲು ಕ್ರೋದ್ಥಿಯಾಗಿಹನು.ನೈಋತ್ಯದಳಕೇರಲು ಅಸತ್ಯನಾಗಿಹನು.ವರುಣದಳಕೇರಲು ನಿದ್ರೆಗೆಯ್ವುತಿಹನು.ವಾಯುದಳಕೇರಲು ಸಂಚಲನಾಗಿಹನು.ಉತ್ತರದಳಕೇರಲು ಧರ್ಮಿಯಾಗಿಹನು.ಈಶಾನ್ಯದಳಕೇರಲು ಕಾಮಾತುರನಾಗಿಹನು.ಈ ಅಷ್ಟದಳಮಂಟಪದ ಮೇಲೆ ಹರಿದಾಡುವ ಹಂಸನಕುಳನ ತೊಲಗಿಸುವ ಕ್ರಮವೆಂತುಟಯ್ಯಾಯೆಂದೊಡೆ:ಅಷ್ಟದಳಮಂಟಪದ ಅಷ್ಟಕೋಣೆಗಳೊಳಗೆಅಷ್ಟ ಲಿಂಗಕಳೆಯ ಪ್ರತಿಷ್ಠಿಸಿಹಂಸನ ನಟ್ಟ ನಡುಮಧ್ಯದಲ್ಲಿ ತಂದು ನಿಲಿಸಲುಮುಕ್ತಿಮೋಕ್ಷವನೆಯ್ದಿ ಪರವಶನಾಗಿಪ್ಪನಯ್ಯಾ,ಮಹಾಲಿಂಗಗುರು ಶಿವಸಿದ್ಧೇಶ್ವರ ಪ್ರಭುವೇ.
    3. ಅಯ್ಯಾ, ಕಾಲತೊಳೆದುಕೊಂಡು ಬಂದರೆ ಕಣ್ಣಮುಂದೆ ನಿಂದೆ.ಕೈಯ ತೊಳೆದುಕೊಂಡು ಬಂದರೆ ಮನದ ಮುಂದೆ ನಿಂದೆ.ತಲೆಯ ತೊಳೆದುಕೊಂಡು ಬಂದರೆ ಭಾವದ ಮುಂದೆ ನಿಂದೆ.ಸಂದು ಸಂಶಯ ಕುಂದು ಕಲೆಯ ಕಳೆದುಳಿದು ಬಂದರೆಸರ್ವಾಂಗಸನ್ನಿಹಿತನಾಗಿ ನಿಂದೆ.ಬಂದ ಬರವು ಚಂದವಾಗಿ ನಿಂದರೆ ಅಂದಂದಿಗೆ ಅವಧರಿಸುಮುಂದುವರಿವೆನು ಮುದದಿಂದೆ ಗುರುನಿರಂಜನ ಚನ್ನಬಸವಲಿಂಗಾ.
    4. ಅಸಂಖ್ಯಾತ ಆದಿಬ್ರಹ್ಮರುತ್ಪತ್ಯವಾಗದಂದು,ಅಸಂಖ್ಯಾತ ಆದಿನಾರಾಯಣರುತ್ಪತ್ಯವಾಗದಂದು,ಅಸಂಖ್ಯಾತ ಸುರೇಂದ್ರಾದಿಗಳು ಉತ್ಪತ್ಯವಾಗದಂದು,ಅಸಂಖ್ಯಾತ ಮನುಮುನಿ ದೈತ್ಯರು ಉತ್ಪತ್ಯ ಲಯವಾಗದಂದು,ಓಂಕಾರವೆಂಬ ಆದಿಪ್ರಣವವಾಗಿದ್ದನು ನೋಡಾನಮ್ಮ ಅಪ್ರಮಾಣಕೂಡಲಸಂಗಮದೇವ.
    5. ಅಂಗದ ಮೇಲೊಂದು ಲಿಂಗವು, ಲಿಂಗದ ಮೇಲೊಂದು ಅಂಗವು.ಆವುದು ಘನವೆಂಬೆ ? ಆವುದು ಕಿರಿದೆಂಬೆ ?ತಾಳೋಷ್ಠಸಂಪುಟಕ್ಕೆ ಬಾರದ ಘನ, ಉಭಯಲಿಂಗವಿರಹಿತವಾದ ಶರಣ.ಕೂಡಲಚೆನ್ನಸಂಗಾ ಲಿಂಗೈಕ್ಯವು.
    6. ಅಯ್ಯಾ ಆರೂ ಇಲ್ಲದ ಅರಣ್ಯದಲ್ಲಿ, ನಾನಡಿಯಿಟ್ಟು ನಡವುತ್ತಿರ್ದೆನಯ್ಯಾ.ಮುಂದೆ ಬರೆಬರೆ ಮಹಾಸರೋವರವ ಕಂಡೆ.ಸರೋವರದೊಳಗೊಂದು ಹಿರಿಯ ಮೃಗವ ಕಂಡೆ.ಆ ಮೃಗಕ್ಕೆ ಕೊಂಬುಂಟು ತಲೆಯಿಲ್ಲ,ಬಾಯುಂಟು ಕಣ್ಣಿಲ್ಲ, ಕೈಯುಂಟು ಹಸ್ತವಿಲ್ಲ,ಕಾಲುಂಟು ಹೆಜ್ಜೆಯಿಲ್ಲ, ಒಡಲುಂಟು ಪ್ರಾಣವಿಲ್ಲ.ಇದ ಕಂಡು ನಾ ಹೆದರಿ, ಹವ್ವನೆ ಹಾರಿ, ಬೆದರಿ ಬಿದ್ದೆನಯ್ಯಾ.ಆಗೆನ್ನ ಹೆತ್ತತಾಯಿ ಬಂದು ಎತ್ತಿ ಕುಳ್ಳಿರಿಸಿ,ಚಿತ್ತಮೂಲಾಗ್ನಿಯ ಒತ್ತಿ ಉರುಹಿದರೆ, ಇವೆಲ್ಲವು ಸುಟ್ಟು ಬಟ್ಟಬಯಲಾದವು.ಆ ಬಟ್ಟಬಯಲೊಳಗೆ ಅಡಿಯಿಟ್ಟು ನಡೆವಾಗ,ಮುಂದೆ ಇಟ್ಟಡಿಯ ಬಾಗಿಲೊಳಗೆ ಮತ್ತೊಂದು ಮೃಗವ ಕಂಡೆ.ಆ ಮೃಗಕ್ಕೆ ತಲೆಯುಂಟು ಕೊಂಬಿಲ್ಲ, ಕಣ್ಣುಂಟು ಬಾಯಿಲ್ಲ,ಹಸ್ತವುಂಟು ಕೈಯಿಲ್ಲ, ಹೆಜ್ಜೆಯುಂಟು ಕಾಲಿಲ್ಲ, ಪ್ರಾಣವುಂಟು ಒಡಲಿಲ್ಲ.ಇದ ಕಂಡು ನಾ ಅಪ್ಪಿಕೊಳಹೋದಡೆ, ಮುಟ್ಟದ ಮುನ್ನವೆ ಎನ್ನನೆ ನುಂಗಿತ್ತು.ನುಂಗಿದ ಮೃಗ ಮಹಾಲಿಂಗದಲ್ಲಿಯೆ ಅಡಗಿತ್ತು,ಬಸವಪ್ರಿಯ ಕೂಡಲಚೆನ್ನಬಸವಣ್ಣಾ.
    7. ಅಂಗೈಯೊಳಗಣ ಲಿಂಗಮ್ರ್ಕೂಯ ಕಂಗಳಲ್ಲಿಂಗಗೊಟ್ಟಡೆ,ತಿಂಗಳ ಸೂಡನಾದೆ ನೋಡಾ ಅಯ್ಯಾ.ಮಂಗಳಮೂರ್ತಿ ಗಂಗಾಜೂಟಾಂಗಮಯಕಪಿಲಸಿದ್ಧ ಮಲ್ಲಿಕಾರ್ಜುನಂಗ ಬೇರೆಂದರಿಯಲ್ಲ ನೋಡಾ,ನಿಜದ ನಿರ್ವಯಲಲ್ಲಯ್ಯನೆ.
    8. ಅಂಥ ಬ್ರಹ್ಮಾಂಡವ ಎಪ್ಪತ್ತೈದುಲಕ್ಷದ ಮೇಲೆಸಾವಿರದೇಳುನೂರಾ ನಲವತ್ತೆಂಟುಬ್ರಹ್ಮಾಂಡವನೊಳಕೊಂಡುದೊಂದು ಭದ್ರವೆಂಬ ಭುವನ.ಆ ಭುವನದೊಳು ಭದ್ರಕರ್ಣನೆಂಬ ಮಹಾರುದ್ರಮೂರ್ತಿ ಇಹನು.ಆ ರುದ್ರಮೂರ್ತಿಯ ಓಲಗದಲ್ಲಿಎಂಟುನೂರಾ ಎಪ್ಪತ್ತುಕೋಟಿ ಚಂದ್ರಾದಿತ್ಯರು ವೇದಪುರುಷರುಮುನೀಂದ್ರರು ದೇವರ್ಕಳಿಹರು ನೋಡಾ.ಎಂಟುನೂರಾ ಎಪ್ಪತ್ತುಕೋಟಿ ರುದ್ರ-ಬ್ರಹ್ಮ-ನಾರಾಯಣಇಂದ್ರಾದಿ ದೇವರ್ಕಳಿಹರು ನೋಡಾಅಪ್ರಮಾಣಕೂಡಲಸಂಗಮದೇವಾ.
    9. ಅಗ್ಘವಣಿ ಸುಯಿದಾನವಾದ ಶರಣಂಗೆ,ತನು ಸುಯಿದಾನವಾಗಬೇಕು.ತನು ಸುಯಿದಾನವಾದ ಶರಣಂಗೆಮನ ಸುಯಿದಾನವಾಗಬೇಕು.ಮನ ಸುಯಿದಾನವಾದ ಶರಣಂಗೆಪ್ರಾಣದ ಮೇಲೆ ಲಿಂಗ ಸಯವಾಗಬೇಕು.ಪ್ರಾಣದ ಮೇಲೆ ಲಿಂಗ ಸಯವಾಗದಿರ್ದಡೆಇದೆಲ್ಲ ವೃಥಾ ಎಂದಿತ್ತು ಕೂಡಲಚೆನ್ನಸಂಗಯ್ಯನ ವಚನ
    10. ಅಯ್ಯಾ ಆರೂ ಇಲ್ಲದ ಅರಣ್ಯದಲ್ಲಿ, ನಾನಡಿಯಿಟ್ಟು ನಡವುತ್ತಿರ್ದೆನಯ್ಯಾ.ಮುಂದೆ ಬರೆಬರೆ ಮಹಾಸರೋವರವ ಕಂಡೆ.ಸರೋವರದೊಳಗೊಂದು ಹಿರಿಯ ಮೃಗವ ಕಂಡೆ.ಆ ಮೃಗಕ್ಕೆ ಕೊಂಬುಂಟು ತಲೆಯಿಲ್ಲ,ಬಾಯುಂಟು ಕಣ್ಣಿಲ್ಲ, ಕೈಯುಂಟು ಹಸ್ತವಿಲ್ಲ,ಕಾಲುಂಟು ಹೆಜ್ಜೆಯಿಲ್ಲ, ಒಡಲುಂಟು ಪ್ರಾಣವಿಲ್ಲ.ಇದ ಕಂಡು ನಾ ಹೆದರಿ, ಹವ್ವನೆ ಹಾರಿ, ಬೆದರಿ ಬಿದ್ದೆನಯ್ಯಾ.ಆಗೆನ್ನ ಹೆತ್ತತಾಯಿ ಬಂದು ಎತ್ತಿ ಕುಳ್ಳಿರಿಸಿ,ಚಿತ್ತಮೂಲಾಗ್ನಿಯ ಒತ್ತಿ ಉರುಹಿದರೆ, ಇವೆಲ್ಲವು ಸುಟ್ಟು ಬಟ್ಟಬಯಲಾದವು.ಆ ಬಟ್ಟಬಯಲೊಳಗೆ ಅಡಿಯಿಟ್ಟು ನಡೆವಾಗ,ಮುಂದೆ ಇಟ್ಟಡಿಯ ಬಾಗಿಲೊಳಗೆ ಮತ್ತೊಂದು ಮೃಗವ ಕಂಡೆ.ಆ ಮೃಗಕ್ಕೆ ತಲೆಯುಂಟು ಕೊಂಬಿಲ್ಲ, ಕಣ್ಣುಂಟು ಬಾಯಿಲ್ಲ,ಹಸ್ತವುಂಟು ಕೈಯಿಲ್ಲ, ಹೆಜ್ಜೆಯುಂಟು ಕಾಲಿಲ್ಲ, ಪ್ರಾಣವುಂಟು ಒಡಲಿಲ್ಲ.ಇದ ಕಂಡು ನಾ ಅಪ್ಪಿಕೊಳಹೋದಡೆ, ಮುಟ್ಟದ ಮುನ್ನವೆ ಎನ್ನನೆ ನುಂಗಿತ್ತು.ನುಂಗಿದ ಮೃಗ ಮಹಾಲಿಂಗದಲ್ಲಿಯೆ ಅಡಗಿತ್ತು,ಬಸವಪ್ರಿಯ ಕೂಡಲಚೆನ್ನಬಸವಣ್ಣಾ.
    1. ಆಕಾರ ನಿರಾಕಾರವೆಂಬೆರಡೂ ಸ್ವರೂಪಂಗಳು ;ಒಂದು ಆಹ್ವಾನ, ಒಂದು ವಿಸರ್ಜನ,ಒಂದು ವ್ಯಾಕುಳ, ಒಂದು ನಿರಾಕುಳ.ಉಭಯಕುಳರಹಿತ ಗುಹೇಶ್ವರಾ_ನಿಮ್ಮ ಶರಣ ನಿಶ್ವಿಂತನು.
    1. ರಾಕಾರವೆಂಬೆರಡೂ ಸ್ವರೂಪಂಗಳು ;ಒಂದು ಆಹ್ವಾನ, ಒಂದು ವಿಸರ್ಜನ,ಒಂದು ವ್ಯಾಕುಳ, ಒಂದು ನಿರಾಕುಳ.ಉಭಯಕುಳರಹಿತ ಗುಹೇಶ್ವರಾ_ನಿಮ್ಮ ಶರಣ ನಿಶ್ವಿಂತನು.
    1. the fact that bodies like the Wellcome Trust exist is an indication of the power games can have

      Games are the only entertainment medium right now that aren't showing any sign of an expiration date. Most people don't pay for music and movies anymore, and most social media sites go in and out of popularity. Games, however, have never lost popularity, there's always going to be another kid turning 10 that'll want a play-station for Christmas. Therefore, it is games that are the best method for education or to highlight political issues.

    1. That makes this challenge a lot harder to resolve than if we had tried a century ago

      But even if we had tried a century ago, would it have mattered? The article just stated that "we'd have gotten segregated cities anyways because of behavior that's beyond the reach of regulation."

    2. racial preferences still shape where people choose to live today.

      Fear of what is different?

    3. behavior that's beyond the reach of regulation

      Good way of explaining why we still see segregation in our communities

    4. restrictive covenants

      What is a restrictive covenant?

    5. Fair Housing Act

      What does this act say? When was it passed?

    6. "we would still have very segregated cities, because a certain number whites were unwilling to live with blacks."

      Segregation is still present today. A great example of this is the segregation and disparities we see in inner city public schools.

    7. Shertzer and Walsh are pointing to another set of factors — not the policies of institutions, but the behavior of individuals.

      Racist behaviors. But I do not see how this is novel information? This time period is teeming with examples of racist behavior not motivated by institutional policies.

    8. That makes this earlier form of white flight even more striking; their new homes didn't necessarily have lower taxes or better school districts, factors that complicated the motivations of later generations of whites.

      OK... so this era of White flight is striking because they were leaving for purely racist motivations. Not because there were also better reasons to move out of the city (lower taxes, better schools).

    9. "Whites left the neighborhood as a result of blacks arriving," Shertzer says, "not for other reasons."

      So... racism? Is that what they are considering a "casual" reason for leaving?

    10. As blacks arrived in northern neighborhoods, more whites left.

      I can understand why White people were able to move from neighborhoods. However, how were cities legally able to keep African Americans from moving in to certain neighborhoods?

    11. relevant to American cities that are still racially divided today

      Which cities? I think the cities that are racially divided today would be similar to the ones that were segregated in the past (Chicago, New York, Detroit).

    12. "White flight" is usually described as a post-World War II phenomenon

      I wonder why "White flight" is typically associated with this time period? I think I remember learning about a GI Bill that encouraged this once the soldiers returned home from war.

    1. Create opportunities to apply knowledge immediately after a video.

      I really liked this idea and I have already applied it to my upcoming online lesson plan for an online course.

    1. Study: Most Teaching and Learning Uses Technology Nowadays

      This article reviews the impact of technology in the classroom. Today over 73% of teachers stated students are using tablets or laptops in the classroom. According to David Nagel, technology not only dominates education but also make students more productive and stimulates them intellectually.

      There is a link on the site to the complete study.

      RATING: 4/5 (rating based upon a score system 1 to 5, 1= lowest 5=highest in terms of content, veracity, easiness of use etc.)

  2. Oct 2018
    1. Workingmothers,becausetheyhavefamiliestosupport,havemoretoloseandmaybelesswillingtojeopardizetheircurrentjobsorprofessionalstatusbyspeakingout.Mothersarestillregularlyjudgednegativelybyouremployersandsocietyforchargingaheadprofessionallyafterwehavechildren.Itdoesn’ttakemuchtointernalizethatsexismtoconvinceourselvesthatourkidsarebetteroffwithamotherwhodoesn’thaveademandingjob,whichcanleadustobeingmoreresignedthanfieryaboutbeingpassedoverforapromotionornotcalledbackforajobinterview.Ormaybeworkingmothersarejustplaintired.Butit’salsonoteworthytomethatwe’veneverhadahigh-pr

      covering?

    2. “Shewaswaytoofocusedonherpregnancy.Itwasdistractingher.Ididn’tthinkshewasgoingtobecommittedenoughtothejob,soIhadtolethergo.”Ilookedather,stunned.Thiswoman—amotherherself—whoworkedonarangeoninitiativestosupportwomenwasopenlyandcasuallyadmittingtoillegaldiscrimination,againstanothermother.

      If you look in the EEOC link, you'll see that this is pregnancy discrimination and is illegal. And yet it happens.

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    Annotators

    1. entropic

      This is what Edgar Orrin Klapp meant when he wrote in his 1986 Overload and Boredom: Essays on the Quality of Life in the Information Society that “meaning and interest are found mostly in the mid-range between extremes of redundancy and variety-these extremes being called, respectively, banality and noise” (). Redundancy is repetition of the same, which creates a condition of insufficient difference, while noise is the chaos of non-referentiality, or entropy. In a way, these extremes collapse into each other, in that both can be viewed “as a loss of potential … for a certain line of action at least” ().

      There is perhaps something of "the real" here, as well. Volker Woltersdorff (2012, 134) writes that: The law of increasing entropy is a concept of energy in the natural sciences that assumes the tendency of all systems to eventually reach their lowest level of energy. Organic systems therefore tend toward inertia … Freud identifies the death drive with entropy … within his theory, the economy of the death drive is to release tension."

      Adam Phillips clarifies the death drive: “People are not, Freud seems to be saying, the saboteurs of their own lives, acting against their own best interests; they are simply dying in their own fashion (to describe someone as self-destructive is to assume a knowledge of what is good for them, an omniscient knowledge of the ‘real’ logic of their lives)” (2000, 81, cf. 77).

    2. The real

      In Return of the Real the critic Hal Foster considers "the real" to be art and theory grounded in the materiality of actual bodies and social sites. (As opposed to the "art-as-text" model of the 70s and the "art-as-simulacrum" model of the 80s).

      In Rewiring the Real, Mark Taylor describes the thought of "god" and "the real" as synonymous. One vision of theism he is concerned with is that of Schleirmacher, Schiller, Schlegel, Hölderlin, and Novalis, through to Coleridge, Wordsworth, Emerson, Thoreau, and Stevens, where god becomes identified as the creative impulse immanent in the world. He is also concerned with the ontological thought of Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Freud, Poe, Melville, Blanchot, Jabès, and Derrida for whom the real is "wholly other, or, in Kierkegaard's words that continue to echo, 'infinitely and qualitatively different'" (4). In the latter tradition, Lacan, following most closely on Freud, is especially associated with the concept of the real. For him, the real is the state of nature from which we have been severed by our entrance into language. It erupts, however, whenever we are forced to confront the materiality of our existence, as with needs and drives, such as for hunger, sex, and sleep.

    1. While entertainment production information may not be high on many people’s lists of important information, the Internet Movie Database is a vital instrument in keeping track of television, movie, and video game history.

      Someday, when facial recognition rules the day, we'll all be able to log into IMDB and see ourselves in other peoples' home videos/movies.

    1. audiences want the new work to offer new insights into the characters and new experiences of the fictional world.

      A case in point is the spin-off series "Fear the Walking Dead" which looks at the "Walking Dead" universe form a different perspective and has recently had a character crossover (Morgan)- see here for more details: http://walkingdead.wikia.com/wiki/Morgan_Jones_(Fear_The_Walking_Dead)

      The "Walking Dead" franchise began with graphic novels. "Harry Potter" much surely mark one of the most successful transmedia franchises, books, films, computer games, lego characters, costumes, and extended fanclubs (UCC Harry Potter Society uses a sorting hat, and the quasi-gothic architecture of UCC as a backdrop).

    2. A good character can sustain multiple narratives and thus lead to a successful movie franchise. A good “world” can sustain multiple characters (and their stories) and thus successfully launch a transmedia franchise.

      Tolkien's "Lord of the Rings" and "The Hobbit" and their film adaptations are possibly the ultimate exemplar of the power of world-building. To a lesser extent (and aimed at a younger age group) would be C.S. Lewis's "Chronicles of Narnia" with various stage,T.V. film, animated and radio adaptations

    1. The Eden Club - Exclusive Golf Club Membership | International Private Members Club

      The Eden Club is an international private members' club providing three very special dimensions: the most luxurious private members club in St Andrews, Scotland – the home of golf; an outstanding schedule of annual events and a unique Secretariat service.

    1. A Legislative union of the British North American Provinces is not liable to all the objections which, as I believe, apply. to a Federal or Federative union; but it is liable to the objection that great discontent in the Lower Provinces would follow the centralization in one Government, and in one Legislature, at Quebec or Montreal, of the powers and authority now vested in the Governments and Legislatures of the several provinces; and, moreover, I believe that no single Government or single Legislature could, in present circumstances, satisfactorily govern and legislate for a territory extending over an area so immense, and so sparsely populated as many portions of that territory are.

      Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    2. Again, the establishment of a Federal or Federative union would, as l believe, be immediately followed by an agitation in favour of the election or the Local Governors, instead of their being nominated by the Crown. And it would be the more difficult to resist this application on account of the purely local or municipal character of the powers with which the Governors would he intrusted ; but the compliance with the request would he in my opinion-highly dangerous, not only because it would at once be fatal to British influence in the Local Governments and Local Legislatures, but also because it would, I believe, be followed quickly by a similar application from the United ‘Provinces, with regard to the Gov,ernor-Generalship, still more difficult to resist from the force With which it would be pressed, but the compliance with which would at once practically sever the connexion between the Crown and British North America.

      Preamble, §§.58, 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    3. union which they contemplate is not to be necessarily of the same character as that which binds together the several States of the neighbouring Republic. But upon whatever basis a Federative union might be formed, it must, I think, be liable -to one of two objections, either of which ought, as it appears to me, to be fatal to such a scheme. For if the Local Governments and Local Legislatures are still to- continue to exercise the same authority in local legislation and local matters which now appertains to them (and there is comparatively little business of any other description which they are now called upon to discuss), then the result of such a union will be still further to degrade the Local Governments and Legislatures without diminishing their authority while the ‘Central Government and Central Legislature, nominally endorsed with high powers, and proud of their position, but with little or no business of a purely Colonial character to occupy their attention, would, I fear, claim an authority on subjects not purely Colonial, but also of Imperial importance (such as questions of foreign trade, &c.), and shortly be brought into collision with Her Majesty’s Government and with the Imperial Parliament. If, on the other hand, the Local Governments and Local Legislatures were shorn of a large portion or their present powers (to which proposal 1 do not believe that the Lower Provinces would agree), the inhabitants of the Lower Provinces would, in my opinion, very soon, if not immediately, become discontented with an arrangement which would deprive them of -the power they now possess over the management of their own affairs, and render New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward’s Island, Provinces of Canada, instead of being, as they now are, Provinces of the British Empire.

      Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    4. I presume that the word ‘”Federative” has been used ‘in the Memorandum of the Executive Council of Canada to imply that the

      Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    5. should embrace the question of a Legislative, as well as that of a Federal or Federative union, and the expediency of uniting some, as well as that of uniting all the provinces

      Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    6. It is possible that a Federative union of the British North American Provinces would afford to the Canadian Government the – readiest mode of escape from the difficulties and embarrassments which now surround the settlement of the “seat of Government ” question, and I presume that I am right in supposing that, although the ostensible object of the proposed inquiry is the union by Federative bonds with Canada of the other British North American Provinces, the Canadian Government have no less in view the, severance of the bond which now joins the two Canadas in a Legislative Union, and the substitution for that bond of a more elastic tie of a Federal or a Federative character.

      §.16 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    7. ment to this may be added that, by the proposed distribution of the revenue, each province would have a direct pecuniary interest in the preservation of the authority of the Federal Government. In these respects’ it is conceived that the proposed Confederation would possess greater inherent strength than that of the United States, and would combine the advantages of the unity for general purposes of a Legislative union, with so much of the Federative principle as -would give all the benefits of local government and legislation upon questions of provincial interest.

      Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    8. The Local Legislatures would not be in a position to claim the exercise of the same sovereign power-, which have frequently been the cause of difference between the American States and their General Govern-

      Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    9. It will be observed that the basis of confederation now proposed differs from that of-the-United States in several important particulars. It does not profess to be derived from the people, but would be the Constitution provided by the Imperial Parliament; thus affording the means of remedying any defect, which is now practically impossible under the American Constitution.

      §§.91, 91(1), and 92(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

      Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982.

    10. The Confederation might include the constitution of a Federal Court of Appeal.

      §.101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    11. It will form. a subject for mature deliberation whether the powers of the Federal Government should be confined to the points named, or should be extended to all matters not specially entrusted to the Local Legislatures.

      §.91(29) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    12. That the powers of the Federal Legislature and Government should comprehend the Customs, Excise, and all trade questions; postal service, militia, banking, currency, weights and measures, and bankruptcy; public works of a national character; harbours and lighthouses; fisheries, and their protection; criminal justice; public lands, public debt, and government of unincorporated and Indian territories.

      §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    13. When Mr. Galt, therefore, came into office; it was natural that the question of an union of the Colonies should at once be discussed-. I found him and several of the gentlemen about to assume office deeply impressed with the idea that, in some such union alone could be found the ultimate solution of the great question which had been made a ground of agitation by Mr. Brown, and his friends, at the general election, viz., the existing equality of representation -of Upper and Lower Canada, and the alleged injustice inflicted on the former by such equality. This question is one, I need not say, which threatened to touch the root of the present union of the two sections of Canada -as by law established, and might imperil its existence by reviving all the old antagonism of race and religion.

      §.51 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    14. The union of Lower with Upper Canada was based upon perfect equality being preserved between these Provinces-a condition the more necessary from the differences in their respective language, law, and. religion; and although there is now a large English population in Lower Canada, still these differences exist to an extent, which prevents any perfect and complete assimilation of the views of the two sections.

      §.51 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    15. The population, trade, and resources of all these Colonies have so rapidly increased of late years, and the removal f trade-restrictions has made them, in so great a degree, self-sustaining, that it appears to the Government of Canada exceedingly important to bind still more closely the ties of their common allegiance to the British Crown, and to obtain for general purposes, such an identity in legislation as may seem to consolidate their growing power, thus raising, under, the protection of the Empire, an important Confederation on the North American Continent. At present, each Colony is totally distinct in its government, its customs and trade, and its general legislation. To each other no greater facilities are extended than to any foreign State; and the only common tie is that which binds all to the British Crown. This state of things is considered to be neither promotive of the physical prosperity of all, nor of that moral union which ought to be preserved in the presence of the powerful Confederation of the United States.

      §.121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    16. That the Federal, Government should be composed of a Governor General, or Viceroy, to be appointed by the Queen; of an Upper House, or Senate, elected upon a territorial basis of representation and of a House of Assembly, elected on the basis of population., The Executive to be composed of Ministers, responsible to the Legislature:

      Preamble, §§.22, 91, and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    1. more.

      The speaker regrets her past relationships and realizes they were so meaningless that she does not even remember them. She wishes she could have stayed with the one person she truly did love

    1. As the power is unleashed, computers on the Semantic Web achieve at first the ability to describe, then to infer, and then to reason. The schema is a huge step, and one that will enable a vast amount of interoperability and extra functionality. However, it still only categorizes data. It says nothing about meaning or understanding.

      The author presents an interesting progression for the Web to eventually learn to reason. The picture he paints of more accessible content on the internet hinges on the internet learning to reason, which is a human characteristic. It seems we need to apply human characteristics to all of our mechanics for them to progress in their usefulness.

    1. having children is a privilege that has been historically denied to many nonwhite and nonafflu-ent people.

      The idea of "no future"/ "declining to reproduce the Child" doesn't do anything to help indigenous people because having children is an act that has been regulated for indigenous people. Settler colonialism/white supremacy does not want indigenous people to create future generations so having a child could be seen as a radical act for indigenous people.

  3. Sep 2018
    1. But in the past year alone, teens have demonstrated that they have the power to change the national conversation and mood.

      It was smart of Snap to add this to their app because teens do use Snapchat a lot and as shown in the quote above teens do have power to change the world how they see fit. So getting more teens to register to vote is very smart of Snap.

    2. Snapchat says it reaches 28.5 to 30 million 18-24 year old users in the U.S. According to a recent survey of Instagram users, approximately 32 percent of its 1 billion-strong user base is 18-24.

      Snapchat reaches around 30 million 18-24 year old users; important ages that are more recently able to vote and take political action. Instagram and snapchat are most popular amongst younger users.

    1. BOOK 12 THE ARGUMENT The Angel Michael continues from the Flood to relate what shall succeed; then, in the mention of Abraham, comes by degrees to explain, who that Seed of the Woman shall be, which was promised Adam and Eve in the Fall; his Incarnation, Death, Resurrection, and Ascention; the state of the Church till his second Coming. Adam greatly satisfied and recomforted by these Relations and Promises descends the Hill with Michael; wakens Eve, who all this while had slept, but with gentle dreams compos'd to quietness of mind and submission. Michael in either hand leads them out of Paradise, the fiery Sword waving behind them, and the Cherubim taking thir Stations to guard the Place. AS one who in his journey bates at Noone, Though bent on speed, so heer the Archangel paus'd Betwixt the world destroy'd and world restor'd, If Adam aught perhaps might interpose; Then with transition sweet new Speech resumes. [ 5 ] Thus thou hast seen one World begin and end; And Man as from a second stock proceed. Much thou hast yet to see, but I perceave Thy mortal sight to faile; objects divine Must needs impaire and wearie human sense: [ 10 ] Henceforth what is to com I will relate, Thou therefore give due audience, and attend. This second sours of Men, while yet but few; And while the dread of judgement past remains Fresh in thir mindes, fearing the Deitie, [ 15 ] With some regard to what is just and right Shall lead thir lives and multiplie apace, Labouring the soile, and reaping plenteous crop, Corn wine and oyle; and from the herd or flock, Oft sacrificing Bullock, Lamb, or Kid, [ 20 ] With large Wine-offerings pour'd, and sacred Feast, Shal spend thir dayes in joy unblam'd, and dwell Long time in peace by Families and Tribes Under paternal rule; till one shall rise Of proud ambitious heart, who not content [ 25 ] With fair equalitie, fraternal state, Will arrogate Dominion undeserv'd Over his brethren, and quite dispossess Concord and law of Nature from the Earth, Hunting (and Men not Beasts shall be his game) [ 30 ] With Warr and hostile snare such as refuse Subjection to his Empire tyrannous: A mightie Hunter thence he shall be styl'd Before the Lord, as in despite of Heav'n, Or from Heav'n claming second Sovrantie; [ 35 ] And from Rebellion shall derive his name, Though of Rebellion others he accuse. Hee with a crew, whom like Ambition joyns With him or under him to tyrannize, Marching from Eden towards the West, shall finde [ 40 ] The Plain, wherein a black bituminous gurge Boiles out from under ground, the mouth of Hell; Of Brick, and of that stuff they cast to build A Citie and Towre, whose top may reach to Heav'n; And get themselves a name, least far disperst [ 45 ] In foraign Lands thir memorie be lost, Regardless whether good or evil fame. But God who oft descends to visit men Unseen, and through thir habitations walks To mark thir doings, them beholding soon, [ 50 ] Comes down to see thir Citie, ere the Tower Obstruct Heav'n Towrs, and in derision sets Upon thir Tongues a various Spirit to rase Quite out thir Native Language, and instead To sow a jangling noise of words unknown: [ 55 ] Forthwith a hideous gabble rises loud Among the Builders; each to other calls Not understood, till hoarse, and all in rage, As mockt they storm; great laughter was in Heav'n And looking down, to see the hubbub strange [ 60 ] And hear the din; thus was the building left Ridiculous, and the work Confusion nam'd. Whereto thus Adam fatherly displeas'd. O execrable Son so to aspire Above his Brethren, to himself assuming [ 65 ] Authoritie usurpt, from God not giv'n: He gave us onely over Beast, Fish, Fowl Dominion absolute; that right we hold By his donation; but Man over men He made not Lord; such title to himself [ 70 ] Reserving, human left from human free. But this Usurper his encroachment proud Stayes not on Man; to God his Tower intends Siege and defiance: Wretched man! what food Will he convey up thither to sustain [ 75 ] Himself and his rash Armie, where thin Aire Above the Clouds will pine his entrails gross, And famish him of Breath, if not of Bread? To whom thus Michael. Justly thou abhorr'st That Son, who on the quiet state of men [ 80 ] Such trouble brought, affecting to subdue Rational Libertie; yet know withall, Since thy original lapse, true Libertie Is lost, which alwayes with right Reason dwells Twinn'd, and from her hath no dividual being: [ 85 ] Reason in man obscur'd, or not obeyd, Immediately inordinate desires And upstart Passions catch the Government From Reason, and to servitude reduce Man till then free. Therefore since hee permits [ 90 ] Within himself unworthie Powers to reign Over free Reason, God in Judgement just Subjects him from without to violent Lords; Who oft as undeservedly enthrall

      Book XII: continues Michael's vision. Adam and Eve are comforted by hearing of the future redemption of their race. The poem ends as they wander forth out of Paradise and the door closes behind them.

    1. The whole of the clauses which refer to the latter are as complete as the most ardent supporters of union could desire, tempered by the lew exceptions by means of which the provinces have wished to shelter their local institutions from attack.

      §§.92(14) and 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    2. The 34th paragraph of the 29th clause of the scheme reads thus: ” The establishment of a General Court of Appeal for the Federated Provinces.” What is the object—what will be the character of the tribunal?

      §§.92(14) and 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    3. We ought to look at the question apart from party considerations, and on its own merits: that is to say, we ought to place in the Constitution a counterpoise to prevent any party legislation, and to moderate the precipitancy of any government which might be disposed to move too fast and go too far,—I mean a legislative body able to protect the people against itself and against the encroachments of power. (Hear, hear.) In England, the Crown has never attempted to degrade the House of Peers by submerging it, because it knows well that the nobility are a bulwark against the aggressions of the democratic element. The House of Lords, by their power, their territorial possessions, and their enormous wealth, are a great defence against democratic invasion, greater than anything we can oppose to it in America. In Canada, as in the rest of North America, we have not the castes—classes of society—which are found in Europe, and the Federal Legislative Council, although immutable in respect of number, inasmuch as all the members belonging to it will come from the ranks of the people, without leaving them, as do the members of the House of Commons, will not be selected from a privileged class which have no existence. Here all men are alike, and are all equal; if a difference is to be found, it arises exclusively from the industry, the intelligence, and the superior education of those who have labored the most strenuously, or whom Providence has gifted with the highest faculties. (Hear, hear.) Long ago the privileges of caste disappeared in this country. Most of our ancient nobility left the country at the conquest, and the greater number of those who remained have sunk out of sight by inaction. Accordingly, whom do we see in the highest offices of state? The sons of the poor who have felt the necessity of study, and who have risen by the aid of their intellect and hard work. (Hear, hear.) Everything is democratic with us, because everyone can attain to everything by the efforts of a noble ambition. The legislative councillors appointed by the Crown will not be, therefore, socially speaking, persons superior to the members of the House of Commons; they will owe their elevation only to their own merit.

      §.22 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    4. He said that even if the Lower House were altogether liberal, the Upper House would remain composed of conservatives; this was his fear. He has been a long while trying to gain predominance for his democratic notions, but it is evident he will not succeed.

      §.22 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    5. relative to the constitution of the Legislative Council, and said that he had not looked at the question, while speaking the other evening, in the same light as the honorable member for the county of Quebec. He spoke of the conservatives as a party, and his fear was, not that the Upper House would not be conservative enough, but that it would be too much so.

      §.22 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    6. MR. GEOFFRION—YOU have equality between the two provinces. HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—Yes, we have equality, but not as a race, nor in respect of religion. When the leader for Lower Canada shall have sixty-five members belonging to his section to support him, and command a majority of the French-Canadians and of the British from Lower Canada, will he not be able to upset the Government if his colleagues interfere with his recommendations to office? That is our security. At present, if I found unreasonable opposition to my views, my remedy would be to break up the Government by retiring, and the same thing will happen in the Federal Government.

      §.22 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    7. HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—Am I not in a minority at present in appointing judges? And yet when I propose the appointment of a judge for Lower Canada, is he not appointed?

      §.22 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    8. the objection of the honorable member for the county of Quebec is well founded, because the Federal Government may appoint all English or all French-Canadians as legislative councillors for Lower Canada. If the honorable member had read the resolutions, he would have found that the appointments of legislative councillors are to be made so as to accord with the electoral divisions now existing in the province. Well, I ask whether it is probable that the Executive of the Federal Government, which will have a chief or leader as it is nowVI ask whether it is very probable that he will recommend the appointment of a French-Canadian to represent divisions like Bedford or Wellington for instance?

      §.22 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    9. Lower Canada is in a peculiar position. We have two races of people whose interests are distinct from each other in respect to origin, language and religion. In preparing the business of the Confederation at Quebec, we had to conciliate these two interests, and to give the country a Constitution which might reconcile the conservative with the democratic element; for the weak point in democratic institutions is the leaving of all power in the hands of the popular element. The history of the past proves that this is an evil. In order that institutions may be stable and work harmoniously, there must be a power of resistance to oppose the democratic element. In the United States the power of resistance does not reside in the Senate, nor even in the President.

      §.22 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    10. a class of men who would not represent the province for which they are appointed, and who could give no pledge that they would maintain its institutions.

      §§.24, 25, 26, and 28 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    11. he will see that the first nominations are to be made by the existing governments. Thus the Government of Canada, that of New Brunswick and that of Nova Scotia will appoint legislative councillors, but afterwards the Federal Government will make the appointments. The honorable member for Quebec can, with reason, draw the conclusion that there is no guarantee that the views of the provinces will be respected. I for my part have investigated the matter, more in connection with the power that will be vested in the legislative councillors. I asserted that by appointing them for life and limiting their number, an absolute authority would be created, which would be quite beyond the control of the people and even of the Executive; that the power of this body will be so great, that they will always be in a position to prevent every reform if they thought proper, and that a collision between the two branches would be inevitable and irremediable. The danger arising from the creating of such a power is exactly that of being obliged to destroy it if they resist too obstinately the popular demands. In England there is no necessity for breaking down the obstructions sometimes presented by the House of Lords, because the Crown having it in its power to appoint new peers, can overcome the difficulty. Here there will be no means of doing it, when the number of councillors is fixed. Accordingly, I have looked at the question through the medium of the powers assigned to the councillors, whereas the honorable member for the county of Quebec fears lest the Government should make choice of men who would not represent public opinion in the provinces; that they might appoint members all of French origin or all of English origin to represent Lower Canada, or take them all from among

      §§.24, 25, 26, and 28 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    12. In our Constitution it is the duty of the Legislative Council to exercise the conservative influence, and to modify the legislation too energetic and too full of outside effervescence, which is sent for their consideration from the House of Commons. But when public opinion gains vigor from the obstacles which it encounters, and the reforms demanded are rational and come before them in due course, there is no danger that the legislation which embodies them will be obstructed in its progress; for the people will rise in their majesty and in their sense of justice, as did the people of England in 1832, and the obstacles they might meet with on their way would be swept away as by a torrent. (Hear, hear.) HON. MR. DORION—That is exactly where the danger lies. HON. MR. CAUCHON—That is the danger which assailed the House of Lords in 1832, but no one would venture to confront to the last extremity a danger such as this. But the honorable member for Quebec tells us, if I understand him rightly, that we have not sufficient guarantees for Lower Canada in the appointment of the legislative councillors. The selection of legislative councillors has no bearing whatever on the question we are now considering, viz., whether the appointment by the Crown is or is not preferable to the elective principle. But in answer to him I will say, that the scheme before us seems to be quite clear. According to this plan the candidates for the Legislative Council will be recommended by the local governments and appointed by the General Government, and it is by this very division of powers that the selections are sure to be good, and made in conformity with the desire and sentiments of the provinces. HON. MR. DORION—Only the first nominations are to be made in this manner, not those which may be made afterwards. HON. MR. CAUCHON—The first nominations will be made by the present Governments, and the federal councillors will be taken from the present legislative councillors to the number prescribed, 24, provided so many can be found who will accept the post, and who possess the requisite property qualification. The Conference has engaged, by the terms of the scheme, to respect the rights of the Opposition, and any government who should fail to carry out so solemn an engagement would well deserve to lose the public confidence. (Hear, hear.) I repeat that the mode of appointing the councillors in no wise affects the conservative principle of nomination on which the constitution of the Legislative Council ought to be based.

      §§.24, 25, 26, and 28 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    13. It is true that the House of Lords, Conservative though it be, finds itself removed from all popular influence; but its numbers may be increased upon the recommendation of the responsible advisers of the Crown, if such a measure were to become necessary to obtain the concurrence of both Houses, or to prevent a collision between them. The position which its members occupy in it establishes a sort of compromise between the Crown and the popular element. But this new House, after Confederation, will be a perfectly independent body; its members will be nominated for life, and their number cannot be increased. How long will this system work without bringing about a collision between the two branches of the Legislature? Let us suppose the Lower House composed in a great part of Liberals, for how long a time would it submit to an Upper House named by Government? Be kind enough to observe, Mr. SPEAKER, that under the old system, the Legislative Council possessed the same elements of existence as the House of Lords, and that the Crown could increase its numbers at need; it augmented it in 1849, as it threatened to augment the House of Lords in 1832. Observe, again, that it is precisely this control exercised by the Crown over the Upper House that the hon. gentleman found so fatal to legislation previous to 1856. But there is a more rational manner of appreciating the part sustained by the House of Lords in the British Constitution. No one denies to the Sovereign the abstract right of increasing at will the House of Lords; but such right has never been exercised but for the purpose of rewarding men distinguished for great national services and when, in 1832, WILLIAM IV. granted Earl GREY the tremendous power to swamp the representative body of the great landed nobility, it was because the country was moving with rapid strides towards revolution, and because there remained to the Sovereign but two alternatives, either to lessen the moral weight of the House of Lords, or to see his own throne knocked to pieces from under his feet.

      §§.22, 24, 26, 51, and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    14. It must then have been a real revolution, this nomination of one hundred new peers, a revolution as real as that which menaced the Throne; and do we not feel persuaded that if one day our Federal Legislative Council were to place itself obstinately and systematically in opposition to popular will, matured and strengthened by ordeals, it would not be swept away by a revolutionary torrent such as threatened to sweep away the House of Lords in 1832? This Council, limited as to numbers , because the provinces insist on maintaining in it an equilibrium without which they would never have consented to a union, this Council, sprung from the people—having the same wants, hopes and even passions, would resist less the popular will in America, where it is so prompt and active, than could the House of Lords in England, where the masses are inert because they have not political rights; reason tells us thus because they would be a less powerful body socially or politically.

      §§.22, 24, 26, 51, and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    15. We have accorded the principle of representation based upon population in the House of Commons of the Federal Government, and that is without doubt a great sacrifice; but we ought only to make so important a concession on the condition that we shall have equality of representation in the Legislative Council, and the right reserved to ourselves to appoint our twenty-four legislative councillors, in order that they may be responsible to the public opinion of the province and independent of the Federal Government.—Without this essential guarantee I affirm that the rights of Lower Canada are in danger. For my part I am ready, on behalf of Lower Canada, to give up her right to elect directly her twenty-four legislative councillors, although the retention of the elective principle might perhaps be the surest means of preserving our institutions; but I am anxious that the new Constitution now proposed should give us adequate guarantees that the legislative councillors to be appointed for life should, at all events, be selected by the Local Government of Lower Canada, which would be responsible to the people. These not ill-grounded sources of anxiety I should like to see removed.

      §§.22, 24, 51, and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    16. in relation to the qualifications and appointment of the legislative councillors. Like him, I am quite of opinion that the conservative element ought, of necessity, to be the basis of the Legislative Council, to counterbalance the popular element. This principle governed the constitution of the House of Lords in England, that of the Legislative Council in Belgium, and that of every well organized representative government.

      §.23 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    17. In the scheme of the Quebec Conference there was no delegation of the supreme authority, either from above or below, inasmuch as the provinces, not being independent states, received, their political organizations from the Parliament of the Empire.

      §.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    18. The hon. member for Hochelaga has declared that he was willing to accord to the Protestants the guarantees of protection which they sought for the education of their children; but in this he has been forestalled by the Quebec Conference and by the unanimous sentiment of the Catholic population of Lower Canada. If the present law be insufficient, let it be changed. Justice demands that the Protestant minority of Lower Canada shall be protected in the same manner as the Catholic minority of Upper Canada, and that the rights acquired by the one and the other shall not be assailed either by the Federal Parliament or the local legislatures.

      §.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    19. Protestantism dominates in the government and in the legislature, and yet has not Catholicity been better treated, and has it not been better developed, with more liberty and more prosperity than under the regime of the Constitution of 1791. (Hear, hear.) Living and laboring together we have learned to know, to respect, to esteem each other, and to make mutual concessions for the common weal.

      §.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    20. On the contrary, did it not emancipate the latter, civilly and religiously, and did it not give that minority privileges which it had not hitherto possessed? If our people are inflexibly attached to our faith, it is also full of toleration, of good-will towards those who are not of the same belief.

      §.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    21. Before the union, the parliamentary majority in Lower Canada was Catholic, and although it was long involved in a struggle with power, was it ever guilty of an injustice towards the Protestant minority?

      §.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    22. And yet when the honorable member for Joliette asked with much reason of the honorable member for Lotbinière why he did not speak of Confederation based upon monarchical principles, the latter gentleman answered that he could not speak of what did not exist, and of what was absurd.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    23. They did not act wrongly then, those forty chosen men of British North America who came to Quebec to erect a new nation on the monarchical basis, and as much as possible on the principles of the Parliament of Great Britain.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    24. M. DE TOCQUEVILLE has lived too long; his admirable work on democracy in America produces upon our minds, at the present day, only the effect of an heroic poem; it is the Isle of Calypso, so admirably sung by FENELON, but which fades away when you have closed Telemachus.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    25. We have also seen, not far from our own homes, that same democracy wrapped in the mantle of republicanism, moving at a rapid pace towards demagogy, and from demagogy to an intolerable despotism.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    26. vinces, and secure efficiency, harmony and permanency in the working of the union, would be a General Government, charged with matters of common interest to the whole country; and Local Governments for each of the Canadas, and for the Provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, charged with the control of local matters in their respective sections. Provision being made for the admission into the union, on equitable terms, of Newfoundland, the Northwest Territory, British Columbia, and Vancouver.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    27. principles which threatened society at large. What the Opposition detest the most in the project of the Quebec Conference, is its monarchical character, as also those words found at the commencement of that remarkable work :— The best interests and present and future prosperity of British North America will be promoted by a Federal union under the Crown of Great Britain, provided such union can be effected on principles just to the several provinces. In the Federation of the British North American Provinces, the system of government best adapted, under existing circumstances, to protect the diversified interests of the several pro-

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    28. It appears therefore that the only alternative which now offers itself to the inhabitants of Lower Canada is a choice between dissolution pure and simple, or Confederation on one side, and representation by population on the other. And however opposed Lower Canada may be to representation by population, is there not imminent danger that it may be finally imposed upon it, if it resist all measures of reform, the object of which is to leave to the local authorities of each section the control of its own interests and institutions. We should not forget that the same authority which imposed on us the Act of Union, or which altered it without our consent, by repealing the clause which required the concurrence of two thirds of the members of both Houses in order to change the representation respecting the two sections, may again intervene to impose upon us this new change.

      Preamble, Part V, §§.51, 52, 91, 91(1), 92, and 92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    29. The example of the neighboring states, in which the application of the Federal system has shown us how fitting it was to the government of an immense territory, inhabited by people of different origins, creeds, laws and customs, has no doubt suggested the idea; but it was only in 1856 that this proposition was enunciated before the Legislature by the Lower Canadian Opposition, as offering, in its opinion, the only effective remedy for the abuses produced by the present system.

      §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    30. The honorable member for Brockville, the Postmaster General, the Speaker, and other members representing Lower Canadian counties, in the present Parliament, have already voted for representation by population. Before long, it will become impossible to resist the demand of Upper Canada in this respect. If representation by population be not granted now, it will infallibly obtain it later, but then without any guarantee for the protection of the French Canadians.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    31. Representation “based upon population was one of the least causes of this project. [And further on] : But, as soon as the Government found itself, after its defeat, obliged either to resign or to appeal to the people, gentlemen on the other side of the House, without there being the slightest agitation on this question, prepared to embrace their most violent adversaries, and said to themselves: ” We are going to forget our past differences, provided we can preserve our portfolios. “

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    32. Necessarily, I do not mean to say that I shall always be opposed to Confederation. The population may extend itself, and cover the virgin forests which exist between Canada and the Maritime Provinces, and commercial relations may increase in such a manner as to render Confederation necessary.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    33. Mr. DORION argued that when Lower Canada had the preponderance of population, complaints were of the inequality of the representation of that section. The union of Belgium and Holland, which was somewhat similar to that at present existing between Upper and Lower Canada was dissolved when it was found it did not work advantageously to both countries. He instanced a number of questions on which it was impossible for Upper and Lower Canada to agree; public feeling being quite dissimilar— subjects popular in one section being the reverse in the other. He warned Lower Canada members, that when the time came that the whole of the representatives from the western portion of the province would be banded together on the question, they would obtain representation by population, and secure the assistance of the Eastern Township members in so doing. He regarded a Federal union of Upper and Lower Canada as a nucleus of the great Confederation of the North American Provinces to which all looked forward. He concluded by saying he would vote for the resolution, as the only mode by which the two sections of the province could get out of the difficulties in which they now are. He thought the union ought to be dissolved, and a Federal union of the provinces would in due time follow.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    34. The honorable member for Brockville, the Honorable Postmaster General, the Speaker, and other members representing Lower Canadian counties in the present Parliament, have voted for representation by population. Before long, it will be impossible to resist the demands of Upper Canada in this respect. If representation by population is not granted now, it will infallibly obtain it at a later period, but then without any guarantees for the protection of the French- Canadians. The repeal of the union, a Federal union, representation based on population, or some other great change must in all necessity take place, and for my part I am disposed to consider the question of representation by population, in order to see if it may not be conceded with guarantees for the protection of the religion, the language, and the laws of Lower Canadians. I am equally ready to take into consideration the project of a Confederation of the provinces, leaving to each section the administration of its local affairs, as for example the power of regulating its own civil, municipal and educational laws; and to the General Government the administration of the public works, the public lands, the post-office department, and commerce.

      §§.51, 52, 91, and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    35. With the control of our public lands in our own hands, we can attract the tide of emigration, retain our own people in the country, and advance in prosperity as rapidly as the other provinces.

      §§.92(5), 95, and 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    36. It will be said that the national life of Lower Canada is so deeply rooted, that it is impossible to destroy it; but, if we desire to secure its safety, we must accept the present scheme of Confederation, under which all the religious interests of Lower Canada, her educational institutions, her public lands, in fact everything that constitutes a people’s nationality, will find protection and safety.

      §.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    37. The Conservative party has always opposed representation by population under the present union, because under this union we are face to face with the population of a country of which the products are different from ours, and of which the interests are not always identical with ours. This question was strongly agitated. The whole people of Lower Canada resisted that demand, and the whole Conservative party firmly refused to consent to it, while the other party—the Opposition party—held out hopes to those who demanded that measure, and allied themselves with them.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    38. The Federal system is the normal condition of American populations; for there are very few American nations which have not a political system of that nature. The Federal system is a state of transition which allows the different races inhabiting the same part of the globe to unite, with the view of attaining national unity and homogeneousness. Spain, Belgium, France, and several other European countries were formerly peopled by different races, who constituted so many different communities; but they became united, they entered into confederations, and in the course of ages all the communities were consolidated into those which we now see—into everything that is held to be beautiful, noble and great throughout the whole world. When the Federal system has been put in practice in an enlightened manner, it has always sufficed for the requirements of those who adopted it.

      §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    39. Without uniformity, without unity, it is impossible to make any serious attempt at defence in case of attack, and the divided country falls an easy prey to the enemy.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    40. These powers of the Federal Government are not, as we understand the matter, to be exercised, except as regards the following subjects, viz., Commerce, comprising purely commercial laws, such as laws respecting banks and other institutions of a general financial character, coinage, and weights and measures; Customs, including the establishment of a uniform tariff, and the collection of the revenue resulting therefrom; great Public Works and Navigation, such as canals, railways, telegraph lines, great seaport works and the lighting of the coast; Post Office arrangements, both in their entirety and in their internal and external details; the Militia in the entirety of its organization; Criminal justice, comprising all offences which do not come under the jurisdiction of the police courts and justices of the peace. Everything else connected with civil law, education, public charities, the settlement of public lands, agriculture, city and rural police, road works, in fact, with all matters relating to the family life, so to speak, of each province, will remain under the exclusive control of the respective Local Government of each one of them, as by inherent right; the powers of the Federal Government being looked upon as merely a concession of rights, which are specially designated.

      §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    41. What hopes may we not be allowed to indulge respecting the material future of the immense country which includes the two Canadas, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, the Hudson’s Bay Territory and Vancouver’s Island, when we reflect on the wealth of a soil which is almost everywhere remarkably fertile, (except the extreme North,) on the resources which the forests have treasured up for the settler in the lapse of ages, on the immense fisheries in the Gulf, sufficient of themselves to feed the whole world with fish of the finest quality; when we consider that the whole of this vast continent offers to us, in its various geological formations mineral wealth of the most precious kinds, and that nature has arranged for us channels of intercommunication of incredible grandeur. The fertile soil of these provinces intersected throughout their entire length by the rivers St. Lawrence and St. John, bathed by the waters of the Gulf and those of the Great Lakes, the superb forests through which flow the immense Ottawa, the St. Maurice and the Saguenay, the mines of copper bordering on lakes Superior and Huron, the iron mines of Canada, the coal measures of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, the seaports of Quebec, Halifax and St. John, the ores of all kinds dispersed throughout the provinces—all those form an aggregate of means which, if we suppose them to be turned to account by a competent population, governed by a political system based on true principles of order and liberty, justifies the most extravagant calculations of profit, the most extraordinary predictions of growth, as compared with the present state of things.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    42. [Page 576]
    43. [Page 575]
    44. we shall always have our court of final appeal in Her Majesty’s Privy Council
    1. At most, the resolutions are not a treaty, but the mere draft of an agreement come to between those gentlemen. HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—Oh, yes, it is a treaty, and we are now fighting to uphold it. MR. DUNKIN—Well, it is a draft of a treaty if you like, but it is not a treaty. Plenipotentiaries, who frame treaties, have full authority to act on behalf of their respective countries. HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—It is the same as any other treaty entered into under the British system. The Government is responsible for it to Parliament, and if this does not meet your approval, you can dispossess us by a vote of want of confidence.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    2. Her Majesty says in her Speech from the Throne at the opening of the Imperial Parliament, that she approves of the Conference that framed the treaty. Is not the royal sanction sufficient authority?

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    3. We are asking for that authority now

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    4. Well, a treaty, I suppose, implies authority on the part of those who framed it to enter into it.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    5. MR. DUNKIN—I think we shall, if we maintain and strengthen our relations with the parent state; but I do not think we shall, if we adopt a scheme like this, which must certainly weaken the tie between us and the Empire. Our language to England had better be the plain truth—that we are no beggars, and will shirk no duty; that we do not want to go, and of ourselves will not go; that our feelings and our interests alike hold us to her; that, even apart from feeling, we are not strong enough, and know our own weakness, and the strength of the power near us; and that the only means by which we can possibly be kept from absorption by that power, is the maintaining now—and for all time that we can look forward to—of our connection with the Mother-Land.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    6. Now, I am not desirous that our acceptance of the scheme should go home to be cited (as it would be) to the people of England, as a proof that we so view it—a proof that we wish to be separated from the Empire. I am quite satisfied separation will never do. We are simply sure to be overwhelmed the instant our neighbors and we differ, unless we have the whole power of the Mother Country to assist us.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    7. The people of England have no desire to snap asunder abruptly the slender links which still unite them with their trans-atlantic fellow-subjects, or to shorten by a single hour the duration of their common citizenship. * * * * We are led irresistibly to the inference that this stage has been well nigh reached in the history of our trans-Atlantic provinces. Hence it comes to pass that we accept, not with fear and trembling, but with unmixed joy and satisfaction, a voluntary proclamation, which, though couched in the accents of loyalty, and proffering an enduring allegiance to our Queen, falls yet more welcome on our eats as the harbinger of the future and complete independence of British North America.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    8. If, as has been alleged, a legislative union is unattainable, because inconsistent with due securities for the rights guaranteed to the French Canadians, by treaty or by the Quebec Act, and Federation is therefore the only alternative, the vital question for the framers of this Constitution is how the inherent weakness of all federations can in this instance be cured, and the Central Government armed with a sovereignty which may be worthy of the name. It is the essence of all good governments to have somewhere a true sovereign power. A sovereignty which ever eludes your grasp, which has no local habitation, provincial or imperial, is in fact no government at all. Sooner or later the shadow of authority which is reflected from an unsubstantial political idea must cease to have power among men. It has been assumed by those who take a sanguine view of this political experiment, that its authors have steered clear of the rock on which the WASHINGTON Confederacy has split. But if the weakness of the Central Government is the rock alluded to, we fear that unless in clear water and smooth seas, the pilot who is to steer this new craft will need a more perfect chart than the resolutions of the Quebec Conference afford, to secure him against the risks of navigation.

      §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    9. What we have to fear, and if possible to guard against, is the constant peril of a three-fold conflict of authority implied in the very existence of a federation of dependencies retaining, as now proposed, any considerable share of intercolonial independence.

      §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    10. We are to buy the Hudson’s Bay territory, and take care of it, and make a grand road all across the continent, which Great Britain shrinks from contemplating herself.

      §§.121 and 146 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    11. The completion of the Intercolonial Railway, and the probable annexation of the fertile portions of the Great North-Western territory to the new Confederation, form a portion only of the probable consequences of its formation, the benefits of which will not be limited to the colonies alone, but in which Europe and the world at large will eventually participate. When the Valley of the Saskatchewan shall have been colonized, the communications between the Red River Settlement and Lake Superior completed, and the harbour of Halifax united by one continuous line of railway, with the shores of Lake Huron, the three missing links between the Atlantic and Pacific ocean will have been supplied.

      §§.121 and 146 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    12. The result of these proposals, if carried into effect, would be the creation of a new state in North America, still retaining the name of a British dependency, comprising an area about equal to that of Europe, a population of about four millions, with an aggregate revenue in sterling of about two millions and a half, and carrying on a trade (including exports, imports and intercolonial commerce) of about twenty-eight millions sterling per annum. If we consider the relative positions of Canada and the Maritime Provinces—the former possessing good harbors, but no back country, the former an unlimited supply of cereals, but few minerals; the latter an unlimited supply of iron and coal, but little agricultural produce. The commercial advantages of union between states so circumstanced, are too obvious to need comment. The completion of the Intercolonial Railway, and the probable annexation of the fertile portions of the Northwest territory to the new Confederation, form a portion only of the probable consequences of its formation, but in which Europe and the world at large will eventually participate. When the—

      Preamble, §§.121 and 146 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    13. A very important question, on which these papers afford no information, is that relating to the future condition of those territories and dependencies of the Crown in North America, which are not included within the present boundaries of the five provinces. “We allude more particularly to the territories now held by the Hudson’s Bay Company, under the Crown, by charter or lease. The Crown is doubtless bound to take care that the interest of its grantees—[it never seems to have occurred to our friend that we, too, are grantees]—are not prejudiced by these changes; but, on the other hand, an English trading company is ill qualified to carry on the government and provide for the defence of a vast and inaccessible expanse of continental territory.

      §.146 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    14. It is scarcely surprising that any project which may offer a prospect of escape from a political situation so undignified and unsatisfactory should be hailed with a cordial welcome by all parties concerned. But one meaning can be put upon all this. In the opinion of the writer, England does not believe that these provinces are worth anything to her, while the connection with the Mother Country is worth all to us ; and she would hail with satisfaction any way of escape from the obligations and dangers that we are said to cast upon her.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    15. Retainers who will neither give nor accept notice to quit our service, must, it is assumed, be kept for our service. There are, nevertheless, special and exceptional difficulties which beset us in this portion of our vast field of empire.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    16. It might puzzle the wisest of our statesmen, if he were challenged to put his finger on any single item of material advantage resulting to ourselves from our dominions in British North America, which cost us at this moment about a million sterling a year.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    17. It is not unnatural that the desire to maintain a connection with the power and wealth of the Mother Country should be stronger on the side of the colonies than it is on that of the British public, for they owe almost everything to us, and we receive but little from them. Moreover, the existing system of colonial government enables them to combine all the advantages of local independence with the strength and dignity of a great empire. But the Imperial Government in the meantime has to decide, not as of old, whether Great Britain is to tax the colonies, but to what extent the colonies are to be permitted to tax Great Britain—a question which is daily becoming more urgent and less easy of solution.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    18. There are problems of colonial policy the solution of which cannot, without peril, be indefinitely delayed; and though Imperial England is doing her best to keep up appearances in the management of her five and forty dependencies, the political links which once bound them to each other and to their common centre are evidently worn out. Misgivings haunt the public mind as to the stability of an edifice which seems to be founded on a reciprocity of deception, and only to be shored up for the time by obsolete and meaningless traditions.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    19. I am well enough satisfied that Lord DERBY himself has not the most remote idea of falling in with the views of the so-called colonial reformers in England, who desire to see the colonies pay for every thing or be cast off; but he knows the hold that their views have gained at home, and he speaks accordingly.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    20. Under these circumstances I see with additional satisfaction—[Meaning of, course, though courtesy may have disallowed the phrase, “less dissatisfaction,” for he certainly did not see those other matters with any satisfaction at all]—I see with additional satisfaction the announcement of a contemplated important step. I mean the proposed Federation of the British American Provinces. (Hear, hear.) I hope I may regard that Federation as a measure tending to constitute a power strong enough, with the aid of this country, which I trust may never be withdrawn from those provinces, to acquire an importance which, separately, they could not obtain. (Hear, hear.) If I saw in this Federation a desire to separate from this country, I should think it a matter of much more doubtful policy and advantage; but I perceive with satisfaction, that no such wish is entertained. Perhaps it is premature to discuss, at present, resolutions not yet submitted to the different provincial legislatures, but I hope I see in the terms of that Federation an earnest desire on the part of the provinces to maintain for themselves the blessing of the connection with this country, and a determined and deliberate preference for monarchical over republican institutions.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    21. “We are supposed, by one of these noble lords, to bo taking a step analogous to that taken by the authors of the Declaration of Independence ; and by the other, to be moved by the same impulse of empire that has been leading to the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    22. the northern provinces of British America. I heartily concur in all—[the all being as we have just seen, not much]—that has been said by my noble friend the mover of this address in his laudation of that project. It is, my lords, a most interesting contemplation that that project has arisen, and has been approved by Her Majesty’s Government. It is certainly contrary to what might be considered the old maxims of government in connection with the colonies, that we should here express —and that the Crown itself should express— satisfaction at a measure which tends to bind together, in almost independent power, our colonies in North America. We do still believe that though thus banded together, they will recognize the value of British connection, and that while they will be safer in this amalgamation, we shall be as safe in their fealty. The measure will no doubt, my lords, require much prudent consideration and great attention to provincial susceptibilities.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    23. Why should these resolutions suggest to any one’s mind the declaration of independence? Did the gentlemen who signed these resolutions in order to authenticate them—pledge their lives and fortunes, and I don’t know what besides, to anything, or risk anything, by appending their signatures to the document? Was it a great exercise of political heroism? Why, the men who signed the declaration of independence qualified themselves in the eyes of the Imperial Government for the pleasant operations of heading and hanging. They knew what they were about. They were issuing a rebel declaration of war. But this is a piece of machinery, on the face of it at least, to perpetuate our connection with the Mother Country! Why then does it suggest the idea that so great a scheme of self-government, or one shadowing forth so many similar and possible changes, ” hardly ever before occurred?” It is because there is, underlying the speaker’s thought, just that idea of the anti-colonial school in England, that we are going to slip away from our connection with the Mother Country; and in this respect, therefore, it seems to him that it is like the declaration of independence. The remaining sentence indicates a curious misapprehension as to the present posture of this question. ” If the delegates of these several colonies finally agree to the resolutions framed by their committee, and if these resolutions be approved by the several legislatures of the several colonies, Parliament will be asked to consider and complete this federation of our Northern American possessions.” The noble lord, the mover of the Address, seems to take the resolutions for a mere report of a committee which (on their way here) had yet to be submitted to the consideration of the delegates ! Next, I turn to the language of Lord HOUGHTON, the seconder of the Address ; and from his lips too, we have an almost distinct utterance of the idea of our coming independence. He says :—

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    24. If it is a declaration that this thing is a treaty, which may not be amended by us without flying in the face of Her Majesty’s Government, I do not understand the meaning of words. (Hear, hear.) In connection with the Speech from the Throne, we had, the other night, some notice taken, on the floor of this House, of language used in discussing the address in the Imperial Parliament. Lords CLAREMONT, HOUGHTON, GRANVILLE and DERBY had something to say in respect of this scheme in the House of Lords ; as also, Mr. HANBURY TRACY in the House of Commons. I do not attach great weight to what was there said, because there really was little said any way, and that little could not indicate any great amount of knowledge upon the subject treated. However, I will quote first what the mover of the address, the Earl of CLAREMONT, said. After referring to the war in New Zealand, he went on :— My Lords, although these operations in India, New Zealand, and Japan, are matters of more or less interest or concern to the nation, and, as such, are fully deserving of notice, yet they are small in comparison to the importance of the probable change in the constitution of our North American Colonies. Since the declaration of independence by the colonies, since known as the United States of America, so great a scheme of self-government, or one shadowing forth so many similar and possible changes, has not occurred.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    25. These delegates adopted resolutions having for their object a closer union of those provinces under a central government. If those resolutions shall be approved by the provincial legislatures, a bill will be laid before you for carrying this important measure into effect”

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    26. The language addressed from the Throne to the Imperial Parliament is this: ” Her Majesty has had great satisfaction in giving Her sanction—”to what?—” to the meeting of a conference of delegates from the several North American Provinces, who, on invitation from Her Majesty’s Governor General, assembled at Quebec.”

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    27. It is true we are not actually giving up the American colonies,—nay, the despatch we are quoting does not contain the slightest hint that such a possibility ever crossed the mind of the writer; but yet it is perfectly evident—and there is no use in concealing the fact—that the Confederation movement considerably diminishes the difficulty which would be felt by the colonies in separating from the Mother Country. Even now the North American Confederation represents a state formidable from the numbers of its hardy and energetic population, and capable, if so united, of vigorously defending the territories it possesses. A few years will add greatly to that population, and place Canada, Hochelaga, Acadia, or by whatever other name the Confederacy may think fit to call itself, quite out of the reach of invasion or conquest. Such a state would not only be strong against the Mother Country under the impossible supposition of our seeking to coerce it by force, but it might be separated from us without incurring the disgrace of leaving a small and helpless community at the mercy of powerful and warlike neighbors.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    28. “The second point which Her Majesty’s Government desire should be reconsidered”—and this phrase is positively, so far as words can give it, a command on the part of Her Majesty’s Government that it shall be reconsidered :— The second point which Her Majesty’s Government desire should be reconsidered is the constitution of the Legislative Council. They appreciate the considerations which have influenced the Conference in determining the mode in which this body, so important to the constitution of the Legislature, should be composed. But it appears to them to require further consideration whether, if the members be appointed “for life, and their number be fixed, there will be any sufficient means of restoring harmony between the Legislative Council and the popular Assembly, if it shall ever unfortunately happen that a decided difference of opinion shall arise between them. These two points, relating to the prerogative of the Crown and the Constitution of the Upper Chamber have appeared to require distinct and separate notice. Is not that a pretty emphatic dissent ?

      §§.24 and 26 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    29. Her Majesty’s Government cannot but express the earnest hope, that the arrangements which may be adopted in this respect may not be of such a nature as to increase—at least in any considerable degree—the whole expenditure, or to make any material addition to the taxation, and thereby retard the internal industry, or tend to impose new burdens on the commerce of the country.

      §.92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    30. First, an objection is raised as to the want of accurate determination of the limits between the authority of the Central and that of the local legislatures.

      §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    31. we are trying to strengthen our union with the Mother Country—that we care far less about a mere union with neighboring provinces, which will frighten no one in the least, but that we arc determined to maintain at all hazards and draw closer, that connection with the Mother Country which alone, so long as it lasts, can and will protect us from all serious aggression. (Hear, hear.) But we are told that, on account of a variety of considerations connected with the state of opinion at home, and out of deference to that opinion, we must positively carry out this scheme.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    32. If, now, a different idea is to prevail—if the notion is to go abroad that we are, by creating ourselves into a new nationality, to be somewhat less connected with the Empire than these provinces heretofore have been, then I do apprehend that a very different future is before us, and that in all sorts of ways, by vexations of all kinds, by the fomenting of every trouble within our own borders, whether originating from abroad, or only reacted on from abroad, we shall be exposed to dangers of the most serious kind.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    33. In and before 1840, after the troubles which had been distracting Canada were put down, it was declared, and perfectly well understood, that the Imperial Government was simply determined to hold on to the connection with this country.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    34. It is quite right that the General Government should have such powers; but the very fact of our having to make a reservation of this kind, is an unpleasant recognition of the fact, in itself the reverse of encouraging, of the all darkening neighborhood of the United States.

      §.33 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    35. We are here proposing to create in this part of the Queen’s dominions a mere sub-federation, so to speak, tending, so far as it tends to anything, towards the exclusion of this kind of provision.

      Preamble, §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    36. if our connection with the Empire is to last, we must have—this department of our public affairs attended to by a regularly appointed Minister of the Crown here, who, whenever occasion requires, may explain them and who shall be responsible to this House. Of course, nobody denies that the Governor General is the channel of communication between us and the Imperial Government. He is the Queen’s representative and servant, and his communications with the Home Government must be of the most confidential character, except in so far as he may see fit to make them known. But fully admitting this, still besides those communications of this character which he may, have and indeed at all times must have unrestrictedly with the Imperial Government, there should be—and, if our Imperial relations are to be maintained, there must be—a further class of communications between the two governments, as to which the Governor should be advised by a minister whose particular duty it should be to manage affairs between the Mother Country and ourselves, and to be in effect a local adviser, as to such matters, of the Imperial advisers of the Crown in England.

      Preamble, §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    37. dency. (Hear, hear.) All the great provinces are flying off too much, attending too exclusively to mere local considerations, too little to those of the general or Imperial kind. And at home, as we seem to be flying off, they, too, are thinking of us and of the interests they and we have in common less and less. What is wanting, if one is to look to the interest of the Empire, which is really that of all its parts—what is wanting, as I have said, is an effective federalization of the Empire as a whole, not a subordinate federation here or there, made up out of parts of it. I have neither time nor strength to-night to go fairly into the question of how this thing should be done; but a few words more as to that, I must be pardoned for.

      Preamble, §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    38. Your Federal Government will occupy about as anomalous a position between the Imperial and provincial governments as I showed, last night, will be occupied by your lieutenant governors between the Federal authority and the provinces. Both will be out of place, and to find themselves in work they must give trouble. I do not see how they can do good, but I do see how they can do any quantity of harm. (Hear, hear.) The real difficulty in our position is one that is not met by the machinery here proposed. What is that difficulty? In the larger provinces of the empire we have the system of responsible government thoroughly accorded by the Imperial Government, and thoroughly worked out; and the difficulty of the system that is now pressing, or ought to be, upon the attention of our statesmen is just this—that the tie connecting us with the Empire, and which ought to be a federal tie of the strongest kind, is too slight, is not, properly speaking, so much as a federal tie at all. These provinces, with local responsible government, are too nearly in the position of independent communities; there is not enough of connection between them and the parent state to make the relations between the two work well, or give promise of lasting long. There is in the machinery too much of what may be called the centrifugal ten-

      Preamble, §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    39. when we propose to create a Federal Government between the Imperial and Provincial, we are equally proposing to create a something which, having nothing of its own to do, must find work by encroaching on the functions of the Imperial and provincial governments in turn, with no place among nations, no relations with other countries, no foreign policy; it will stand in just the same position towards the Imperial Government as Ganada now stands in, or as Upper or Lower Canada before the union used to occupy. That intermediate work of government which is now done by the Province of Canada, the Province of New Brunswick, the Province of Nova Scotia, the Province of Prince Edward Island and the Province of Newfoundland, is to be done, part by the Federal Government and part by the provinces. The work is simply divided that is now done by the provincial legislatures and governments, and in my opinion there is no use in this subdivision of work at all. You are putting this fifth wheel to the coach, merely to find out that a misfitting odd wheel will not serve any useful purpose, nor so much as work smoothly with the other four.

      §§.91, 92, and 132 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    40. The Imperial Government will be the head of the Empire as much as ever, and will alone have to attend to all foreign relations and national matters ; while we shall be nothing more than we are now. Half-a-dozen colonies federated are but a federated colony after all. Instead of being so many separate provinces with workable institutions, we are to be one province most cumbrously organised—nothing more.

      §.132 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    41. Unlike the people of the United States, we are to have no foreign relations to look after, or national affairs of any kind; and therefore our new nationality, if we could create it, could be nothing but a name. I must say that according to my view of the change we ought to aim at, any idea of Federation that we may entertain had need take an Imperial direction. Whenever changing our institutions, we had need develop and strengthen—not merely maintain, but maintain, develop and strengthen—the tie, not yet Federal as it ought to be, between us and the parent state.

      §.132 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    42. I am free to admit that a reduction of the tariff on certain articles, or even some measure of reduction all round, might be no material loss, or might even be a gain, to the revenue— in ordinary or prosperous times, that is to say. But when the object of reducing the tariff is to meet other exigencies than those of revenue, one can hardly hope to get such a tariff as shall give us the largest revenue attainable. And besides, no one can deny that we are about entering upon a time, commercially speaking, that may be termed hard.

      §.121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    43. We are marching fast and steadily towards free trade. We must meet the views of the people of the Lower Provinces, who are hostile to high tariffs, and the demand of the Imperial authorities that we should not tax their manufactures so heavily as—in their phrase—almost to deprive them of our market. It was distinctly and officially stated the other day, in Newfoundland, that assurance had been given to the Government of Newfoundland that the views of the Canadian Government are unmistakably in this direction. And I do not think there is any mistake about that, either. To show how people at home, too, expect our tariff to come down, I may refer to the speech of Mr. HAMBURY TRACY, in seconding the Address in answer to the Speech from the Throne, in the House of Commons the other day. He could not stop, after saying generally that he was pleased with this Confederation movement, without adding that he trusted it would result in a very considerable decrease in the absurdly high and hostile tariff at present prevailing in Canada.

      §.121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    44. The same sort of thing may be looked for in reference to the New Brunswick timber export duty and the Nova Scotia mineral export duty. Here is one form of the cry that may be raised; ” You give these exceptional privileges to New Brunswick and Nova Scotia; give them, or some equivalent, to us also.”

      §.109 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    1. [Page 29]
    2. [Page 41]
    3. In order to protect local interests, and to prevent sectional jealousies, it was found requisite that the three great divisions into which British North America is separated, should be represented in the Upper House on the principle of equality. There are three great sections, having different interests, in this proposed Confederation.
    4. To the Upper House is to be confided the protection of sectional interests ; therefore is it that the three great divisions are there equally represented, for the purpose of defending such interests against the combinations of majorities in the Assembly.
    1. We may, however, place just confidence in the development of our resources, and repose in the belief that we shall find in our territorial domain, our valuable mines and our fertile lands, additional sources of revenue far beyond the requirements of the public service.

      §.118 of the Constitution Act, 1867

      Referenced in Re: Exported Natural Gas Tax, [1982] 1 SCR 1004, 1982 CanLII 189 (SCC)

    2. [Page 69]
    3. If we require to find an example of the benefits of free commercial intercourse, we need not look beyond the effects that have followed from the working of the Reciprocity Treaty with the United States. In one short year from the time when that treaty came into operation, our trade in the natural productions of the two countries swelled from less than $2,000,000 to upwards of $20,000,000 per annum, and now, when we are threatened with an interruption of that trade—when we have reason to fear that the action of the United States will prove hostile to the continuance of free commercial relations with this country, when we know that the consideration of this question is not grounded on just views of the material advantages resulting to each country but that the irritation connected with political events exercises a predominant influence over the minds of American statesmen, it is the duty of the House to provide, if possible, other outlets for our productions. If we have reason to fear that one door is about to be closed to our trade, it is the duty of the House to endeavour to open another; to provide against a coming evil of the kind feared by timely expansion in [Page 65] another direction; to seek by free trade with our own fellow colonists for a continued and uninterrupted commerce which will not be liable to be disturbed at the capricious will of any foreign country.

      §.121 of the Constitution Act, 1867

      Referenced in R v Comeau, 2016 NBPC 3 (CanLII).

    4. Now, when we were united together, if union were attained, we would form a political nationality with which neither the national origin, nor the religion of any individual, would interfere. It was lamented by some that we had this diversity of races, and hopes were expressed that this distinctive feature would cease. The idea of unity of races was Utopian—it was impossible. Distinctions of this kind would always exist. Dissimilarity, in fact, appeared to be the order of the physical world and of the moral world, as well as in the political world. But with regard to the objection based on this fact, to the effect that a great nation could not be formed because Lower Canada was in great part French and Catholic, and Upper Canada was British and Protestant, and the Lower Provinces were mixed, it was futile and worthless in the extreme. Look, for instance, at the United Kingdom, inhabited as it was by three great races. (Hear, hear.) Had the diversity of race impeded the glory, the progress, the wealth of England? Had they not rather each contributed their share to the greatness of the Empire? Of the glories of the senate, the field, and the ocean, of the successes of trade and commerce, how much was contributed by the combined talents, energy and courage of the three races together? (Cheers.) In our own Federation we should have Catholic and Protestant, English, French, Irish and Scotch, and each by his efforts and his success would increase the prosperity and glory of the new Confederacy. (Hear, hear.) We viewed the diversity of races in British North America in this way: we were of different races, not for the purpose of warring against each other, but in order to compete and emulate for the general welfare.
    1. [Page 88]

      §. 26 of the Constitution Act, 1867

      Referenced in Singh v. Canada (Gen. Div.), 1990 CanLII 6922 (ON SC)

    2. But the very essence of our compact is that the union shall be federal and not legislative. Our Lower Canada friends have agreed to give us representation by population in the Lower House, on the express condition that they shall have equality in the Upper House. On no other condition could we have advanced a step ; and, for my part, I am quite willing they should have it. In maintaining the existing sectional boundaries and handing over the control of local matters to local bodies, we recognize, to a certain extent, a diversity of interests ; and it was quite natural that the protection for those interests, by equality in the Upper Chamber, should be demanded by the less numerous provinces.
    1. accustom the people to direct taxation

      §§.91(3) and 92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    2. Men who for years past have devoted their pen to the unhallowed work of undermining the Catholic religion and vilifying its ministers, who have long aimed at destroying in the minds of French-Canadians all love for their peculiar institutions—the safeguards of our nationality

      §.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    3. any injustice to Upper Canada could arise. And then my honorable friend will see how it is to be distributed afterwards in the way of population, so that although there might be a little loss in the first instance, there would be an immense gain in the end.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    4. We find a section of the people in Lower Canada opposing the work on the ground that it will tend to destroy their language and nationality ; and we find also the British element in Lower Canada complain that in the arrangement for the Local Legislature their rights and privileges will be swept away. (Hear, hear.) On the other hand, Upper Canadians are opposing the scheme as injurious to their true interests, and asserting that the financial difficulties likely to arise under it will be detrimental to the welfare of the west ; so that where there is such great diversity of opinion, it was impossible to mature a scheme which should be in all respects perfect and satisfactory. No doubt Upper Canada has some cause to complain. For instance, the eighty cents per head for carrying on the local governments appears unfair in principle to Upper Canada, and as such they have reason to feel dissatisfied. This apportionment is on the present basis of population, and whatever may be the increase in numbers of the western section of the province, if even we increase during the next ten years in the same ratio that we have been increasing for the past ten years ; if we double our population we shall still only get the eighty cents per head for the present population. There is no doubt this is an objectionable feature. HON. MR. BROWN—Will my honorable friend allow me to assure him that he is slightly in error, and to show him how he is so ? Supposing we increase in population, the other provinces will increase also, and the only unfairness that could possibly exist in the case supposed would be in so far as the population of Upper Canada was relatively greater than that of the other provinces. HON. MR. HOLTON—It is a matter of ratio. HON. MR. BROWN—Yes, it is simply a question of ratio. My honorable friend will see how the principle works. At the rate we are proceeding now, some 2 1/2, 3, or 4 per cent., it would take a great many years before

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    5. But I have failed to see, and I yet fail to see, that the Liberal party of Upper Canada have ever given up the advocacy of representation by population. We found all parties in Lower Canada—both the English-speaking population and French-speaking population —refusing to concede to us what we conceived to be this just and proper principle; and when the opportunity was offered to us of relieving the country from its difficulties, we felt that no party considerations or party ties should be allowed to interfere with what we conceived to be our sacred duty to our constituents and our country.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    6. As a commercial work, I have looked into it in all its bearings, and have failed to see the advantages it will confer. The farmers of the grain-producing districts of Upper Canada have the same market to sell their surplus products as the farmers of the States, that is, the English market. Now, I think it is impossible to show that the produce of Upper Canada can be conveyed by this Intercolonial Railway to the seaboard, and thence to Liverpool, as profitably as the Americans can carry it to the seaboard at New York and thence to the English market. If by the one route the grain cannot be carried as cheaply as by the other, it is impossible for the Canadian farmer or merchant to be placed in as good a position as the American. But if, having constructed the Intercolonial Railway, our Government says, ” We will compete with the Americans ; we will put the rates of transportation so low as to offer our farmers as cheap a route by it as by the States,” then the cost of this will have to be borne by the people in another way, for the road failing to pay even expenses, the excess of expenditure will become a charge upon the country for years.

      §.121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    7. Now, sir, I believe that in a commercial, agricultural, and defensive point of view, the union would be desirable. Placed as we are now, with the abrogation of the Reciprocity treaty threatened, does it not become our duty, I ask, to make some effort to change and improve our condition ? As I stated, sir, the subject has been so ably placed before this House by honorable gentlemen who have preceded me, and who are so much more capable of dealing with it than I am, that I will not attempt to repeat the arguments in favor of this scheme, commercially, financially, and politically, which have already been adduced. But there are one or two points as to the resources of the whole of British North America, to which I would for a moment invite the attention of the House. The union is desirable with a view to the development of our mineral resources. In British Columbia and Vancouver’s Island the gold fields equal, if they do not exceed in value, those of any other part of the world. Iron we have in that vast extent of country lying between the Rocky Mountains and Lake Superior, a country equal if not superior, for the purposes of settlement and cultivation to any we have in Canada, and whose area is estimated at from eighty to one hundred million acres. Then, again, we have magnificent iron and copper mines in Canada, while the Lower Provinces possess vast mineral resources, extensive coal fields, and valuable fisheries.

      §.121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    8. 33rd sub-section gives to the General Gov.- ornament the power of ” rendering uniform all or any of the laws relative to property and civil rights in Upper Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Prince Edward Island, and rendering uniform the procedure of all or any of the courts in these provinces ; but any statute for this purpose shall have no force or authority in any province until sanctioned by the legislature thereof.” So that in reality no such law will be binding until it has the sanction of the Local Legislature of the province particularly affected thereby. Such being the guarded terms of the resolution, why is it not made applicable to Lower Canada as well as to the other provinces ? Nothing could be done respecting its peculiar laws without the consent of its Local Legislature, and it is quite possible to my mind, that there are some laws which it would be advantageous to all parts of the Confederation to assimilate. But they emphatically declare in these redo- lotions that there shall be no interference with the laws of Lower Canada. So that while it is proposed to assimilate the laws of the other provinces, there is a large section of intervening country which is to have, for all time to come, laws separate and distinct from the rest.

      §§.93 and 94 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    9. Well, provision has been made for the consolidation of these laws; but observe how religiously the laws of Lower Canada are guarded from interference. The

      §§.93 and 94 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    10. ” The Local Government and Legislature of each province shall be constructed in such manner as the existing legislature of each such province shall provide.” I do not understand from this whether it is competent or not for us in this Legislature, before there is a Federal union, to make provision for the Local Government and Legislature, or whether we are to await the action upon the subject of Federation of the Imperial Government. Our action, one should suppose, ought to be taken after the Imperial Government has pronounced. Perhaps this is the intention. Mr. SPEAKER, they refuse to tell us anything about it. It may be that, as soon as these resolutions are carried, we will be sent about our business ; that the Imperial Legislature will be invited to pass an act, and that they will convene us again, provision being made for that course, and so in point of fact, having once affirmed the principle of Federation, we will have to accept such local legislatures as they choose to give us.

      Part V of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    11. they have declined to allow us to understand what sort of a local legislature we are to have They will not tell us how our Executive is to be formed. They will not tell us whether we are to have legislative councils in Upper and Lower Canada, and whether or not they will be elected councils. They will not tell us what number of members will constitute the Executive Council of the Confederation, nor what influence each individual province will have in that government. They will not bring down the scheme for the local legislatures. They tell us that it is better to withhold those details—that we are dealing with Federation alone, and have no business discussing local governments What is the object of all this vagueness ?

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    12. however, have said that they were in favor of direct taxation for the support of the local governments, because it would lead those who have to pay the taxes to look more closely into what was going on, and the manner in which their money was expended. (Hear, hear.) There seems also to have been a feeling in the Lower Provinces in favor of a legislative union, and the Hon. Mr. GREY seems to be combatting that idea. He says that with a legislative union, municipal institutions, and direct taxation in every province, would be the only means of getting along. He expressed himself as opposed to that and in favor of a Federal union, which he thought would afford them all the advantage that could be attained, commercially, by union, and would allow each province to retain control over its own local affairs. The local legislatures, he said, were to be deprived of no power over their own affairs that they formerly possessed. But in Canada it was represented that the local legislatures were to be only the shadow of the General Legislature—that they were to have merely a shadow of power, as all their proceedings were to be controlled by the Federal Government. That is the position taken by the advocates of the measure on this floor. So it seems that those gentlemen who have represented to us that they acted in great harmony, and came to a common decision when they were in conference, take a widely different view of the questions supposed to have been agreed upon, and give very different accounts of what were the views of parties to the conference on the various subjects. (Hear, hear.) In the Lower Provinces they were strongly opposed to direct taxation, while here it was present end as one of the advantages to accrue from the Federation. (Cries of No, no.) Well, Mr. SPEAKER, I say yes. That view of the case has been taken. If the amount allowed for the expenses of local legislation—the 80 cents per head—was found insufficient, the local parliaments must resort to direct taxation to make up the deficiency, while in tile Lower Provinces, it seems, nothing of that kind was to follow.

      §§.91(3), 92(2), and 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    13. The Federal character of the United States Government has been referred to prove that it has increased the prosperity of the people living under it; but in point of fact the great and relentless war that is now raging there—that fratricidal war in which brother is arrayed against brother, filled with hatred toward each other, and which has plunged the country into all the horrors of the deadliest strife—is the strongest comment upon the working of the Federal principle—the strongest argument against its application to these provinces. (Hear, hear.) The French element in Lower Canada will be separated from us in its Local Legislature and become less united with us than it is now ; and therefore there is likely to be disagreement between us. Still more likely is there to be disagreement when the people of Upper Canada find that this scheme will not relieve them of the burdens cast upon them, but, on the contrary, will subject them to a legislature that will have the power of imposing direct taxation in addition to the burdens imposed by the General Government. When they find that this power is exercised, and they are called upon to contribute as much as before to the General Government, while taxed to maintain a separate Local Legislature—when they find that the material question is to weigh with them, they will look to the other side of the line for union. I feel that we are going to do that which will weaken our connection with the Mother Country, because if you give power to legislate upon the same subjects to both the local and the federal legislatures, and allow both to impose taxation upon the people, disagreements will spring up which must necessarily have that effect. (Hear, hear.) Then again, by this scheme that is laid before us, certain things are to be legislated upon by both the general and the local legislatures, and yet the local legislation is to be subordinate to the legislation of the Federal Parliament. For instance, emigration and agriculture are to be subject to the control of both bodies. Now suppose that the Federal Legislature chooses to decide in favor of having emigration flow to a particular locality, so as to benefit one province alone—I do not menu this expression to be understood in its entire sense, because I think that emigration in any one portion will benefit the whole, but it will benefit the particular locality much more at the time—and if provision is made by the General Legislature for emigration of that kind, and grants are made from the public funds to carry it out, it will cause much complaint, as the people who are paying the greatest proportion of the revenue will be subject to the drafts upon them as before.

      Preamble, §§.91, 92, and 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    14. He says :—” It is not a question of interest, or mere commercial advantage ; no, it is an effort to establish a new empire in British North America.”

      §.121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    15. HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—Allow me to make a remark. A little while ago the honorable gentleman quoted from a speech of Hon. Mr. TILLEY, in which that gentleman supposed the case, that on some evil day Upper Canada, actuated by selfish motives, would endeavor to obtain the passing of some measure that would be conducive to her exclusive aggrandizement. ” In that event,” said Hon. Mr. TILLEY, addressing himself to his people below, with the view of meeting that hypothetical case, “you will have the sixty-five members from Lower Canada and the forty-seven from below, to unite in resisting any attempt of the kind.” On that account the honorable member for North Ontario has stated that he is opposed to this scheme of Federation. He prefers a legislative union ; but of course with a legislative union there would be the same ratio of representation, and his opposition, on this particular ground, ought to apply to the one system as much as to the other.

      §.51 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    16. Hon. Mr. TILLEY made this representation in a speech which he delivered on the 17th November last :— So close is the contest between parties in the Canadian Legislature, that even the five Prince Edward Island members by their vote could turn victory on whatever side they chose, and have the game entirely in their own hands. Suppose that Upper Canada should attempt to carry out schemes for her own aggrandizement in the west, could she, with her eighty-two representatives, successfully oppose the sixty-five of Lower Canada and the forty-seven of the Lower Provinces, whose interests would be identical ? Certainly not ; and she would not attempt it. MR. H. MACKENZIE—What has that to do with representation by population ? MR. M. C. CAMERON—” What has that to do with representation by population ?” asks the hon. gentleman. Representation by population was agitated, so far as Upper Canada is concerned, because we are paying so large a proportion of the revenue of the country ; and should the Lower Provinces have a corresponding voice, we should still pay the same proportion of revenue—instead, in fact, of standing on an equality, we would have thirty voices more to contend against. (Hear, hear.) Now, let us see whether, in another point of view, it is going to benefit us. It is represented by this same gentleman in the Lower Provinces that, when this change takes place, they will be relieved from the burdens they now bear

      §.51 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    17. it would be exceedingly inconvenient to manage the local affairs of so widely extended a country. I did not say that we could not exercise a general control over the country.

      §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    1. I believe that when these colonies are combined, acting in concert, and quickened and invigorated by a feeling of mutual dependence and interest, the tendency will be to increase their wealth and manufactures, and general strength. And, sir, I am satisfied one of the great advantages cf this union will be found in this that wk. will be raised above our sectionalisms, and come to feel and to act as the citizens of a great country, with destinies committed to us such as may well evoke the energies of a great people.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    2. Ourselves from that protection we have so long enjoyed; but we desire, while remain- in under that protection, to do all that lies in our power for our self-defence, and for the development of all the great interests which Providence has committed to our trust; and we seek at the hands of the British Parliament such legislation as will enable us to accomplish these great ends for the whole of British America.

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    3. But, as I have stated, I think the Conference has been exceedingly happy in the plan they have submitted for our adoption A community of British free- men as we are, deliberately surveying our past as well as our present position, and look- in forward to our future, we in effect resolve that we will adhere to the protection of the British Crown; that we will tell the GOLDWIN SMITH school–these who are crying out for cutting off the colonies—that we will cling to the old Mother Land –(hear, hear)–we desire to maintain our connection; we have no desire to withdraw

      Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    4. The first steps towards a Federation of the American Colonies would thus bus to form them all into one state, to give that state a completely organized government, and then to delegate to each of the colonies out of which that great state is formed, such powers of local government as may be thought necessary, reserving to the Central Government all such powers as are not expressly delegated. The Government of New Zealand forms a precedent well worthy the attention of those who are undertaking this arduous negotiation. And I cannot doubt that the framers of this Constitution have studied the precedent as well of the proposed Constitution of Australia, as that of the Constitution of New Zealand, which has been in use for ten years past.

      §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    5. The great weakness of the American system has lain in the fact that the several states, on entering the union, claimed independent jurisdiction ; that they demitted to the Central Government certain powers, and that they claimed equal and sovereign powers with regard to everything not so delegated and demitted. The weaknesses aid difficulties of that system have been avoided in the project now before us, and we have the central power with defined and sovereign powers, and the local parliaments with their defined and delegated powers, but subordinated to the central power. The article says: — It is quite clear that the Federal Constitution of the United States of America forms a precedent which cannot possibly be followed in its principles or details by the united colonies, so long as they remain part of the dominions of the Imperial Crown. The principle of the American Federation is, that each is a sovereign state, which consents to delegate to a central authority a portion of its sovereign power, leaving the remainder, which is not so delegated, absolute and intact in its own hands. This is not the position of the colonies, each of which, instead of being an isolated sovereign state, is an integral part of the British Empire. They cannot delegate their sovereign authority to a central government, because them do not possess the sovereign authority to delegate. The only alternative as it seems to us would be to adopt a course exactly the contrary of that which the United States adopted, and instead of taking for their motto E Pluribus Unum, to invert it by saying In Uno Plural.

      Preamble, §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.